VASUBANDHU'S

VIJÑAPTI - MĀTRATĀ - SIDDHI

(With Sthiramati's Commentary)

[TEXT WITH ENGLISH TRANSLATION]

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Dedicated to the sacred memory of my late lamented teacher, Dr. P. C Bagchi and to Prof. Wang-shen-tien

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FOREWORD

Indian Buddhism is ordinarily categorized into the Lower Vehicle (Hīna-yāna) and the Greater Vehicle (mahā-yāna). Lower Vehicle stands for early Buddhism based on Pāli Tripiṭaka, the original scripture of Buddhism. With emphasis on spiritual life, it admits reality of matter. The Greater Vehicle, claims its origin from Sanskrit Tripiṭaka. But the emphasis is shifted from refinement of life to intellectual crystallization resulting in denying of matter.

The two sub-schools of the Lower Vehicle—Vaibhāṣika and the Sautrāntika agree that matter exists but disagree as to its cognition. The Vaibhāṣika perceives matter but the Sautrāntika only infers it. The two sub-schools of the Greater Vehicle– the Yogācāra and the Mādhyamika agree that matter does not exist but disagree as to its conception. For the Yogācāra, matter is only a projection (*ākāra*) of consciousness (*Vijñāna*). For the Mādhyamika, matter eludes all definition (*nirupākhya*). Hence the four sub-schools have differed from one another on the issue viz, the nature of matter.

Of the four sub-schools, the Yogācāra, gained prominence, thanks to the two pioneers, Asaṁga and Vasubandhu, the two brothers. While Asamga's approach was saintly, Vasubandhu's intellectual.

The Vijñapti-mātratā-siddhi of Vasubandhu is the first systemization of the Doctrine of Consciousness (*vijñāna-vāda*). It consists of two parts. The first part is made

up of twenty verses (*kārikā*) and so called "Viṁśatikā" while the second part is of thirty verses (*kārikā*) and so called "Triṁśikā". Vasubandhu wrote a short commentatry (*vṛtti*) on the first part. But it is not known whether he wrote on the second part as well. But the second part has as many as ten commentaries (*ṭīkā*) of which that by Sthiramati is available in Sanskrit.

Dr. K. N. Chatterjee has carefully edited the *Kārikās*, the Vṛtti and the Ṭīkā of Sthiramati. To introduce it to the English-knowing scholars, he has translated all the three in English which is as lucid as faithful to the original. The work is balanced by a historical Introduction at the beginning and critical notes at the end. The Introduction presents a total perspective of Buddhism while the Notes unravel the intricacies of Buddhist concepts. The work is a glowing tribute to his two great teachers in this field-one Indian and the other, Chinese, to whom it is dedicated.

I have no doubt Dr. Chatterjee's venture will be hailed as a contribution to Buddhism in general and the Doctrine of Consciousness (*Vijñāna-Vāda*) in particular. I wish it all success.

1 8. 80 **S. Bhattacharya**

PREFACE

Long twenty-five years have passed since I had the unique privilege to sit at the feet of Dr. P. C. Bagchi, to get myself initiated to the field of research on Indological studies and Buddhism. It is because of his desire that I had the opportunity to visit China in the late fifties to learn Chinese and study Buddhism. There also I had the fortune to have a teacher like Prof. Wang-Shen-T'ien. He was kind enough to read to me the whole text of the vijñapti-mātratā-siddhi as translated by Hsüan Chuang into Chinese. My head bends down with respect and veneration for these two great masters of Buddhism.

Vijñapti-mātratā-siddhi comprises of two sets of *kārikās* namely the *Viṁśatikā-kārikā* and the *Trimśikā-kārikā* composed by *Vasubandhu*. On the *Viṁśatikā-kārikā*, *Vasubandhu* himself wrote a Commentary (*vṛtti*) and on the *Triṁśikā-kārikā*, ten Commentries are said to have been written. All these ten Commentries were translated by Hsüan Cnuang into Chinese and are still preserved in the form of a book entitled "Che'ng wei shih lün". Scores of Commentaries were written on this text in Chinese. The *Viṁśatikā-kārikā* also was put into Chinese translation by four different scholars – *Guṇaratna*, *Prabhākara*, *Hsüan Chuang* and *I-Tsing*. The *viṁśatikā-kārikā* as translated by Hsüan Chuang has been translated into English by Hamilton and the rest of the three other translations are yet to be introduced to the English knowing people. The *Trimśikā-kārikā* and the Commentaries thereon as translated by

Hsüan Chuang have been translated into French by Prof. Poussin. The English-knowing people are still not favoured with an English translation of such an important text.

Apart from the translation work of Hsüan Chuang, there is a Sanskrit text, discovered by Prof. Levi, comprising of the two *kārikās*, the vṛtti of *Vasubandhu* on the *viṁśatikā-kārikā* and the Commentary on the *Triṁśikā-kārikā* written by *sthiramati*.

The present work is a translation of this text into English, accompanied with a long introduction and critical notes. The introduction seeks to present Buddhism in its historical perspective and with all its philosophical impact on the later Indian thinkers. The *Yogācāra* or the *vijñānavāda* school, of which the present text is held to be a representative one has been critically analysed. The critical notes at the fag end of the work is intended to throw light on the obscure aspects of Buddhism or of the school concerned. Care has been taken to make the notes authentic and meaningful as far as possible. The Chinese sources too, at times, have been taken into consideration.

Before I conclude, I take the privilege of once more offering salutation & the best of my regards for my teachers I have referred to earlier. I also remember in this context, some of my teachers who have all the time inspired me to take an academic life and they are Late Surendra Nath Bhattacharya, Sri Haripada Chakravarty, Prof. Rama Ranjan Mukherjee, Prof. Kriṣṇa Gopal Goswami, Prof. Satkari Mukherjee and Dr. Amarasvar Thakur.

I must in the long run, express my deep sense of gratitude and respect to Dr. Siddheswar Bhattacharya, ex-Mayurbanj

Professor, B. H. U. with whom I have the privilege of reading a few texts on Indian philosophy. Dr. Siddheswar Bhattacharya has all along been a guide-star in my life and he with all love and affection has sought to endow me with the treasure of Sanskrit learning. His blessings, I always crave.

I also express my sense of obligation to Sri Nanda-Kishore Dikṣit. Who has shown an academic intersest in getting the present work published and has made me indebted to him.

B. H. U. Krishnanath Chatterjee
1975.

INTRODUCTION

The origin of Buddhism is not very clear. The idea that Buddihsm originated by way of a reaction against the slaughter of animals in sacrifies is only a myth. The biographies of Buddha as given in the Lalitavistara, the Buddha-Mahāvastu-avadāna or in the Buddha-carit do not mention any such thing as the reason of origin and growth of Buddhism. Non-violence too was nothing new as a doctrine since of the upaniṣads had already provided for it. Jainism also, is claimed to have had talked of it earlier than Buddhism.

The idea that Buddhism has its roots in the concept of non-duality of the upaniṣads is equally wrong since the concept of non-duality was to be formed as yet. The older upaniṣads were composed as so many parts of the Brāmaṇas that were employed in sacrifices. Vedānta as a system was yet to take a shape. Buddhism was also not non-dualistic in the beginning, it became so only with the appearance of Mahāyāna.

Buddhism, therefore must have had its origin in the Sāṃkhya system. The two preceptors of Buddha-Āḍara Kālam and Udraka were the two masters of the Sāṃkhya school of thought. Both were of the opinion that '*mukti*' or salvation meant that the soul should be releived of all its association with the world of things, i.e. it should be '*kevalī*'. Buddha resisted such an opinion. The soul, if it ever exist, in his opinion, must exist only as related to the world, it does not have the prospect of being left alone.

Kauṭilya has referred to only three sytems of philosophy—Sāṃkhya, Yoga and the Lokāyata. Yoga is an off-shoot of the Sāṃkhya and both were dualistic. The available literature on them are all late in composition. The Kārikā of Īśvarakṛṣṇa is the oldest available text on Sāṃkhya. Īśvarakṛṣṇa belonged to 500 A.D. But Sāṃkhya as a school must have been much older than that. The commentary on Yoga has quoted a few texts of Pañicaśikha. Āsuri was known to the Jainas. In the Mahābhārata, Āsuri and Pañicaśikha are spoken of. Pañicaśikha is said to have been in Mithila—the Capital of Janaka. Kapilaś text is not found. The twenty-two sūtras that go by his name do not seem to have been that old. They are possibly composed on the basis of Īśvarakṛṣṇa's Kārikā. But the Sāṃkhya as a system must be very old as spoken of by Kauṭilya. Aśvaghoṣa also has referred to Kapila.

The most distinctive feature of Buddhism is that of the Saṅgha order of . life. The vedic society had its emphasis on the house-hold order of life and was patriarchal. Patriarchy involves hierarchy and in every sphere of life, such a hierarchy was apparent. The varṇa–system is possibly the most absorbing one. Values were also created in favour of such a social order. The father or the patriarch became the man of highest worldly authority and on that very pattern, a supreme authority was conceived of. Mother and matennity came to be looked down upon. The body that is directly born of the mother was discounted and the myth of the soul was put forward. Creation–myths were narrated and ultimately there was established an immutable essence wherefrom the world of creation was held to have emanated.

Buddhism was a challege to such a society and the underlying social order. The Vanga-Bagadha-Cera people were possibly the adherents of matriarchy and were against all sorts of social hierarchy. The Saṅgha order of life was definitely a negation of hierarchy and a challenge to the Aryan household order based on hierarchy. The system of heaving heads cleanly shaved was also a revolt against the idea of identifying oneself with the patriarchal '*pravaras*' that the Aryans had been insisting upon. Violation of '*Sagotra*' rules in marriage also went against the Aryan concept of family. It is obvious that Buddhism that had started as a system of ethics could not have overlooked the social needs of the day. As a matter of fact, any system of philosophy, worth its name, must have its roots in the society and as a matter of course, serve the cause of the society. Buddhism sought to preserve the nature of the society of its own origin as against the invading Aryans. Not only that. Buddhism sought to address itself to the outside world also. As agaginst the immutable Brahman or soul, therefore, it postulated the concept of eternal flux; as against permanence, impermanence per se. The psychological background of the society had to be moulded so that the society could accomodate change in its nomenclature.

As a matter of fact, the family, has been a controversial issue in the scheme of the society and even today the world has been divided into diverse political camps in which the idea of family or family pattern is an important issue of conflict. Family involves hierarchy and individuality that breeds 'self' and egoism which stands in direct confrontation with the notion of equality. Hierarchy

ultimately brings in the concept of control and gyvernment that militates against the idea of 'free humanity'.

Buddhism, therefore, could hardly accomodate hierarchy and for that it had to disavow family and family life. Family has its roots in patriarchy and patriarchy in the concept of the immutable soul. Buddhism, therefore, on the metaphysical plane, thought it wise to proclaim the doctrine of impermanence or momentariness.

HĪNYĀNA and MAHĀYĀNA

Broadly speaking Buddhiṣm is divided into two schools Hīnyāna & Mahāyāna. In early Buddhism, there was no such school as Hīnayāna. It is the Mahāyānists who branded the earlier school as Hīnayāna. There was obviously an attitude of supremacy underlying such a classification. In the begining, there were two Yānas-Pratyeka-buddhayāna or Pratyekayāna and śrāvakayāna. Pratyeka-buddhas are they who had no opportunity to personally listen to the religious discourses given by the Buddhas and who, therefore, by their own efforts attained salvation. They, however, were unable to liberate others. Śrāvakas, on the other hand, are those who got the opportunity of listening to the religious discourses given by the Buddhas and attained salvation. Initially, they are known as Śrāvakas, and then they become Bhikṣus when they live in 'vihāras'. After having stayed in a 'vihāra', a 'śrāvaka' becomes a 'srotāpanna'. After that, he attains to the stages on 'Sakṛdāgāmī' and 'anāgāmī' gradually and reaches to the stage of 'Arhat' in the long run. They also attain salvation personally and can liberate others. According to the Mahāyāna view, these two Yānas are Hīnayāna in-as-much-

as their outlook is selfish. They were concerned only with personal liberation. To the Mahāyānists, personal liberation was not of much concern. It is so said that when Avalokiteśvara was about to attain salvation, he was approached by all and they enquired of him as to what whould happen to them in case he would not be there to liberate them. At this, Avalokiteśvara took the resolve that he would not seek for salvation till everybody else was liberated. This concept of universal 'Karuṇā' gave Mahāyāna its glory.

The Mahāyāna also developed its Tripiṭaka. They had hundreds of sūtras to their credit and the Prajñā-pāramitā was the most representative of these sūtras. So also 'Bodhi-sattva-Vinaya' developed. The sole aim of 'Vinaya', according to them, was to eradicate all 'kleśas or afflictions. All are but 'Vikalpa' or the result of subjective construction. With the growth of indererminate knowledge, 'Vikalpa' dies out; as for abhidharma, the Mahāyānists spoke of 'anuttara-samyak-sambodhi !

In 'Śrāvakayāna', trisaraṇa-gamana, and the acceptance of 'Pañcaśīla' were common to the Bhilkṣus aed the house-holder disciples alike. In addition to these five śīlas, three more were prescribed for the advanced house-holder disciples. These were 'to give up garlands & other luxurious things,' 'to desist from using harsh language' and 'not to indulge in music, dance and the like'. Two more śīlas were prescribed for the Bhikṣus only and they were 'to give up the habit of using elevated seats or beadsteads' and 'not to touch gold or other coins.' In addition to these, the Śrāvakayāna insisted on one more ritual known as 'Poṣadha-vrata' or the ritual of fasting. They undertook fasting

. on two 'aṣṭamī tithis', two 'caturdaśīs', purṇimā and amāvasyā. On these days, all the disciples-Bhikṣus and householders alike, were to assemble in Vihāras and listen to religious discourses.

The Mahāyāna also speaks of 'triśaraṇa and of Śīlas. But 'Poṣadhavrata' is not much heard of. Immediately after the acceptance of 'triṣaraṇa, they were allowed to seek for 'Bodhijñāna'. This stage was called 'Bodhicittotpāda' or 'Cittotpāda' merely. After th is, they had to cross two more stages—'Pāpadeśanā' or discourses on sins and 'puṇyānumodanā' or longing for merit, after which they would attain the stage, 'Ṣaṭpāramitā'.

'Vīrya'. is one of the Mahāyānipāramitāas. The Mahāyānists' or Bodhisattvaś aim was to attain the stage of excellence in maintaining the Śīlas and help others to maintain them. To the Hīnayānists religion was somewhat the cultivation of some negative virtues, not to do this', 'not to do that' and the like. 'Vīrya', therefore, was reasonably unknown, to them. The Mahāyānists, on the other hand, were rather more assertive and thus full of vitality and energy.

The Śrāvaka-yāna spoke of few 'dhyānas only—the first one is marked with conjecture, the second with love, the the third with pleasure and the fourth with none. After having undergone these four 'dhyānas, one attains the stages of srotāpanna, 'sakṛdāgāmī' and 'anāgāmī and Arhat gradually. The Mahāyāna also speaks of 'dhyānas' and 'samādhis in connection of which, these four 'dhyānas also are spoken of. The Mahāyāna does not speak of 'Srotāpanna, Sakṛdāgāmī, Anāgāmī or Arhat'. On the contrary, it speaks of 'daśa bodhisattvabhūmi'. The Bodhisattva has

to cross the bhūmis before he can qualify himself for the attainment of Nirvāṇa and Karuṇā is the most prominent characteristic of his citta in an ascending order in conformity with the 'bhūmis.

The Prajñāpāramitā speaks of two kinds of truth—'saṁrvṛta' and 'paramārtha'—conventional and Absolute. All that we see around is false although from the worldly point of view, they are taken as truth. Their truth is relative. The other kind of truth is a truth, independent of all other considerations. The Mahāyānists call it śūnya.

The triśaraṇa in Hīnayāna meant Buddha, Dharma, and Saṁgha while in Mahāyāna it meant Dharma, Buddha and Saṁgha. Budha was relegated to the second position. Goutama was only an incarnation of Buddha and he was designated the seventh position. The Mahāyāna held that Goutama Buddha had merely made a compilation of the 'Right Law'. His position was almost like that of 'Vyāsadeva' in Hinduism. Dhyānī-buddha, according to the Mahāyāna, was the ideal Buddha and five such Dhyānī-buddhas (Amitābha and Vairocana and the like) are admitted of. Goutama was assigned the position of a mere 'dvārapāla' of these 'Dhaānībuddas'.

In the Mahāyāna, 'dharma' is of worthier consideration than the Buddha and by 'dharma' is meant the 'stūpa or 'Caitya'. Beside the 'caitya' again stands the temple of five Dhyānībuddhas.

Cradually in place of Dharma, Buddha and Saṁgha, Prajñā, Upāya and Bodhisattva developed as the 'triśaraṇa' with the Mahāyānisits. The Mahāyānists were 'jñāna-

vādins' and as such it was felt reasonable that Dharma should make room for Prajñā as their ideal. Salvation, to them, was knowledge in essence. Buddha was, therefore, considered the means of attaining Prajñā and since Dharma and Buddha were identified with Prajñā and Upāya, Saṁgha turned to be Bodhisattva.

After about one hundred years of Buddha's Nirvāṇa, there arose serious difference of opinion amongst his followers and this difference of opinion centred round chiefly ten things called 'daśavatthu' (daśavastu).

1. The Bhikṣus were prohibited from hoarding any food-stuff. Collection of alms were their only source of living. It is presumable that they received cooked food from house-holders. Such food was perhaps cooked without salt. Whatever might have been the reason, food, cooked with salt was not served or accepted—a practice still not unknown in India. The Bhikṣus, therefore, slowly got into the habit of having salt for their own use and they procured it in the hollowed horns of dead animals. To this, the elders objected, as it involved the practice of hoarding things.

2. The Vinaya insisted upon the idea that Bhikṣus must have their daily meal before 12 O'clock noon and after that nobody must take any solid food. But the bhikṣus had to collect cooked food. It was probable that sometimes to avoid forced fasting, they did not mind to have the meal even if their own shadow have gone say by an inch beyond its noon-time size. The elders objected.

3. The bhikṣus were asked to beg alms in one village only in a day and they must not go to any other village for alms the same day. If however, they have any invitation in any other village, they must leave the village scheduled for begging for that day without asking for any alms and without food to attend the invitation. But the bhikṣus, sometimes, were declined to do so. To this, elders objected.

4. Bhikṣus residing in a particular hall or a locality were to undergo fast (upoṣatha) and listen to religious discourses together on aṣṭamī, amavāsyā and purṇimā days. Many bhikṣus, sometimes, disliked this idea; they were in favour of an option in regard to this community fasting; the elders objected.

5. Gcnerally the bhikṣus of a particular vihāra used to take a collective decision in regard to their works. But sometimes, some of them might happen to be absent and in that case convention developed that subject to their concurrence, the works would be performed. Some objected to this to the effect that why should it be so presumed that the absentee members would concur to their opinion. To this, the elders held that it could not be helped, the works of the vihāra cannot suffer because of their absence.

6. Sometimes some bhikṣus used to resort to certain practices incidentally initiated by their own personal 'gurus'. Such practices, sometimis, being directly in contradiction with what Buddha had said, the

elders sought to impress upon the bhikṣus not to undertake such practices.

7. Bhikṣus were not to take their daily mcal beyond 12 o'clock noon and if needed thep could drink only liquids; so the bhikṣus, sometimes, used to drink buttermilk. But some of the bhikṣus would not allow the curd to be churned and pour water into it and would feign to consider it buttermilk to which the elders objected.

8. Bhikṣus used to drink punjent juice although not fermented as yet. The elders held that it was virtually a kind of wine.

9. The bhikṣus were ordained not to take an elevated seat or bed and as such seats, with their fringes cut off were also prohibited for their use. The neo-buddhists contended that it did not involve violation of the Buddha's advice, while the elders thought that it did.

10. Bhikṣus were not allowed to accept or even touch gold or silver, But the bhikṣus of Vaiśālī did not abide by this provision. They used to provide for a disc full of water in the hall of community fastings (Upoṣatha-śālā) and asked the upāsakas to offer 'Kārṣāpaṇa' or 'Kāhāpaṇa' in that disc The elders objected to such a practice.

The bhikṣus of Vaiśālī sought to introduce these ten practices after about one hundred years had passed after the death of Goutama. At that time, one some bhikṣu Yasa by name came to Vaiśālī and he found that the 'upāsakas' were offering 'Karṣāpaṇa'. He forbade them to do so, at

which the bhikṣus of Vaiśālī became annoyed and tried to oppress him. He left for Kauśāmbī and from there, he sent for the bhikṣus living in Pāvā and Avantī. Ultimately, he went to the Ahogaṅga mountain where Sambhūta Sonavāsī used to live. Unto him, he narrated the whole story. Gradually sixty bhikṣus from Pāvā and eighty other bhikṣus from Avantī arrived. It was finally agreed upon that they should seek the advice of Revata who was the oldest of all and the most learned. He used to stay at Taxila. They all met him at a place called Sahajāti near Taxıla and on hearing from them; he said that all those ten practices were against the religion of Buddha and they must be put an end to it. The bhikśus of Vaiśālī tried in every possible way to win Revata to their side. But all to no effect. They ultimately sought refuge with the king of Pāṭaliputra, but that too did not prove to be of any success. Revata ultimately came down to Vaiśāli and gave the proposal that an Uvvāhikā (council) be formed for the purpose. The Uvvāhikā was formed of eight most venerable and learned bhikṣus. They all gave their opinion against these practices. Those who accepted their opinion were known as Sthaviravādins and those who did not were known as Mahāsāṁghikas.

According to cylonese tradition Goutama Buddha attained 'parinirvāṇa in the year 543 B. C. The Chinese record reveals that Buddha attained Nirvāṇa in the year 486 B. C. In the city, Canton, an wooden plank was discovered with certain marks on it. The Nirvāṇa anniversary day was observed with great pomp & grandeur by the bhikṣus there & each such day was marked on it. In all, there were 975 such sectarian marks on it and such a mark was given on 489 A. D. So the date of Nirvāṇa

should be 973–489 = 486 B. C. The European scholars are of the opinion that the date should be 483 B. C. The Buddhists, therefore, were divided into different camps in about 383 B. C. after about one hundred years after the death of Buddha.

It is however, not to be presumed that till they were divided into so many camps, everything was alright with them. Immediately after the death of Buddha, some Bhikṣus were about to violate the Vinaya rules of whom some Subhaṅga is said to be most outspoken. So the elders met in a Saṅgīti in the Saptaparni cave of Rājagṛha and made a compromise. The chief disciple of Buddha-Mahākāśyapa was appointed the Saṅghathera who was to mitigate all religious disputes. Since then, the appointment of a Saṅghathera became a convention with the Buddhist Saṅgha. In the year 383 A. D. when the problem dasavattu cropped up, 'Sarvakāmī' was the Saṁghathera. It is in his time that that Buddhism was divided into two camps—Mthaviravādins and Mahāsaṁghikas.

The Mahāsṁghikas were more in numerical strength and were comparatively young in age and so were more energetic. They were 'Lokottaravādins' from the very beginning. In their opionion, Buddha was no mortal being, he possessed supernatural powers and so even if he died he pervades the whole universe. He possesses a supersensuos and in-explicable essence of existence. Because of being oppressed by the Sthaviravādins the Mahāsaṅghikas came closer to the Hindus. They became more philossophically oriented and declared Buddha as Mahāvastu. It is possibly they who for the first time erected a statue of Buddha in their vihāras. They wrote their scriptures in Sanskrit.

The sthaviravādins, on the contrary, laid their sole emphasis on the Vınaya rules. Abiding by Vinaya rules would enable the bhikṣus, they held, to attain the stage of 'srotāpattı' or going along the course of the current that leads to 'Nirvāṇa'. Gradually they reach a stage called 'Sakṛdāgāmī' that is to say they would have to come only once to get final deliverance and ahead of that, is the stage of 'Anāgāmī' on the attainment of which one does not have to undergo the cycle of the birth and death any longer. After this, the stage of an 'Arhat' is attained. 'Arhat' does not get his final release till a Buddha is born to release him from 'saṁsāra'. He gets the deliverance by virtue of his own deeds. The Mahāsāṅghikas did not lay that much of emphasis on the Vinaya rules. They insisted upon the attainment of 'Jñāna'.

In the begining, a dispute arose as to whether Buddha was a human being or a superhuman personality. The Sthaviravādins considered him a human being, while according to the Mahāsāṅghikas, he a was lokottara being. So the Mahāsāṅghikas were otherwise known as Lokottravādins,

In regard to Buddha-nidānas also they differed. The Sthaviravādins spoke of 24 Buddhas i.e. (i) Dīpaṅkara, (ii) 'Koṇḍinya' (iii) Maṅgala (iv) Sumanasa (v) Revata (vi) Śobhita (vii) Anomadarśin (viii) Padma (ix) Nārada (x) Padmottara (xi) Sumedhā (xii) Sujāta (xiii) Priyadarśin (xiv) Arthadarśin (xv) Dharmadarśin (xvi) Siddhārtha (xvii) Tiṣya (xviii) Puṣya (xix) Vipaśyī (xx) Śıkhī (xxi) Viśvabhū (xxii) Krakucchanda (xxiii) Kanakmuni (xxiv) Kāśyapa.

According to the Mahāsāṅghikas the Buddha-nidāna is somewhat different. They hold that Bodhisattva has to undergo four caryās and each of them involve hundreds of births What the Sthaviravādins have said pertain only to the last part of the last caryā according to them. The four Caryās are (i) Prakṛti-Caryā (ii) Praṇidhāna Caryā (iii) Anuloma-Caryā (iv) Anivartana-Caryā.

(i) Prakṛti-Caryā :

In this 'Caryā', a Bodhisattva is devoted to his parents, the Śramaṇas and Brāhmaṇs, obedient to the elders and a traveller of the path of ten 'kuśalakarmas. He at this stage makes gifts to others, gives religious discourses and worships the Buddas. But his mind is not yet ripe enough to espire after Bodhi.

(ii) Praṇidhāna Caryā :

In this 'Caryā he must take the resolve that he must be a Buddha. It has five parts called 'praṇidhis (i) He must take a resolve to the effect "I shall be a Buddha" (ii) He must take into account "I made a lot of gifts to the Buddhas" (iii) So also he must resolve "whatever time it may take I must be a Buddha" (iv) He must say to himself "I will make the gift of caves and vihāras for the Buddha and the Saṁgha" (v) Ultimately he must realize "the world is anitya."

Then follows the anuloma-Caryā where whatever is favourable to the praṇidhāna-caryā are to be performed. Then comes the fourth stage—or the stage of aṇivartana-caryā. At this stage, one has to be intent on attaining 'bodhi'. Here at this stage, some Buddha for casts as to who of his

Bodhisattva disciples will be the next Buddha. This is technically called 'Vyākaraṇa'. The nidāna of the Sthaviravādins proceeds from such a stage like this. The nidāna of the Mahā-Sanghikas on the other hand, is like this. In the prakṛticaryā, Śākyasimha was aparimita-dhvaja and at that time Śākyamuni was said to have been a Chakravarty King only and he came unto the Lord and took to the path of law. In the Pranidhāna Caryā, Śākyamuni was Śākyamuni Buddha. Śākyamuni, at this stage, was a trader. He came to Lord Buddha and took the resolve that one day he would also be a Buddha and that he would be born in Kapilābastu. In the anulomacaryā, Śākyamuni was a Chakravarty king. In the anivartana caryā, Dīpankara made the forecast (Vyākaraṇa) that Śākyamuni will be a Buddha. After Dipankara, many other Buddhas had echoed it (anuvyākaraṇa).

The Sthaviravādins are content with the twenty-four and two more (Śākyasimha and Maitreya) Buddhas and they just say 'Buddhāyanamaḥ'. But the Mahāsanghikas would say 'oṁ namaḥ Śrīmahābuddhāyātītānāgata-pratyutpannebhyaḥ' and they are not content even with hundreds of crores of Buddhas.

This way the gulf of difference between the two schools became wide. Even at the time of Aśoka, when a conference of the Buddhists were held at Pataliputra, the Mahāsanghikas had no place and they did not recognise it to be a conference at all. Aśoka was a patron of the Sthaviravādins, and the religion that was preached at Cylone was Sthaviravāda. The Mahāsanghikas, however, got their strong bases in Ayodhyā, Mathurā and the Punjab beyond the frontiers of Aśoka's Kingdom.

Gradually, however, both the camps were further sub-divided into many more schools. The Sthaviravādins were initially divided into two schools-Mahīśāsaka and Vajjiputtaka. Mahīśāsaka again was further sub-divided into two-savvathavādī (Sarvāstivādins) and Dharmaguptika, Savvathavādīs again were furthermore sub-divided into Kāśyapīya, Samkāntika and Suttavāda. The Vajjiputtakas were divided into four schools-Dhammatthanīya, Chaṇḍāgārika, Bhaddajānīka and Sammatītya.

The Mahāsanghikas were divided into two-Gokulika and Ekavyokārika. The Gokulıka were divided again into three–Pannatthivāda, Bāhulika and Cetīyavāda. Added to these, there were few other Local schools–Hemavanta, Rajagiriya, Siddhatthaka, Pūrvaśelīya, Aparaśelīya and Vājirīya.

With about forty to fifty years from now, Puṣyāmitra (Puṣpamitra Sunga) invaded Aśoka's kingdom and established a new empire. Puṣyāmitra was of the Brahmanical faith and thus out of revenge against Aśoka, he performed an 'Aśvamedha' sacrifice at Pataliputra. He sought to annihilate the Bauddhas. Aśoka was a patron of the Sthaviravādins and as such they became Puṣyāmatra's target of attack. The Mahāsanghikas, however, escaped his anger and as they mainly lived in in the Punjab or or elsewhere beyond the frontiers of his kingdom, they were not much affected.

In any case, the Buddhists, already a divided house, became much the more weakened due to the oppression made by king Puṣyāmitra. But fortunately for the Mahāsanghikas that on the western--most parts of India at that time, śakas, yavanas and Pahllavas had established

their kingdoms. The Mahāsanghikas tried to influence them and it took them about two hundred years to get their purpose served. The Mahāsanghikas held a conference at Jalandhar during the reign of Kaniṣka and they got their school of thought duly established. King Kaniṣka was a great patron of Mahāyāna Buddhism and it is but reasonable that this conference played a historicel role towards the evolution of Buddhism. Herein possibly the Mahāsanghikas evolved as Mahāyānists and the chief characteristics of the Mahāsanghikas namely the attainment of Buddhahood, the ten bhuūmis of esoteric exercises were accepted by the Mahāyānists. The Mahāyāna concept of Bodhisattvahood and that of 'Karuṇā' were still to grow.

The Mahāsanghikas were 'lokottaṛavādins' as is said in the Mahāvastu-avadāna — "Āryamahāsanghikānām lokottaravādīnām........". The ten bhūmis of esoteric exercises and Buddhahood are spoken of in it. After Mahāvastu-avadāna, the 'Lankāvatārasūtra' was composed and the concept of Bhodisattvahcod had its root in it and was developed upon by Aśvaghoṣa. The Lankāvatāra-sūtra again for the first time raised the qnestion as to whether the 'Tathāgata' is immutable or not ?

The Mahāyāna brought an end to all storts of mutual rifts amongst the Mahāsanghikas.

Nāgārjuna, the great Mahāyāna philosopher carried the Mahāyāna to its metaphysical finish. But, for a proper understanding of the Nāgārjuna (or the Mahāyāna) philosophy and the historical development of Buddhism both Hīnayāna and Mahāyana, it is essential

to know of the further development of 'Sarvāstivāda', a Hīnayāna school into vaibhāsika and sautrāntika schools. The sarvāstivāda has seven treatises on 'Abhidharma' to its credit. They are jñāna-Prasthāna, Dharmaskandha, Sangītiparyāya, Vijñaptivāda, Prakaraṇapāda, Prajñaptisāra and Dhātukāyapādaśāstra. They are again regarded as the Abhidharma treatises of the Vaibhāsikas also. Jñāna-prasthānaśātra was composed by Kātyāyanīputra in about 2nd cont B. C. Vasubandhu wrote a commentary on it in 4th cent. A. D. known as the Abhi-dharmakoṣa. The commentaries that were written on the Abhidharma treatises of the Sarvāstivāda school were called Vibhāsā and the vaibhāṣika school was thus so called. It can well be said therefore that the Vaibhāṣika school originated round about 1st or 2nd cent A. D.

The Sautrāntika came a bit later, possibly at 3rd cent A. D. Kumāralāta (or Kumārarāta) and his disciple Harivarman were possibly the founders of this new school. They did not give much credit to the Abhidharma or Vibhāṣā treatises and laid much emphasis on the sūtras which alone retained Buddha's own sayings, they said, on the contrary. Works of Kumāralāta are yet to be discovered, although the Chinese translation of Satyasiddiśāstra, a treatise composed by Harivarma has been known to exist. The translation is supposed to have been done by the first half of the fifth century A. D.

The Vaibhāṣikas were realists in a sense. The believed that Nirvāṇa was a reale blissful existence although they did not believe in the existence of any soul or individuality. They also accepted the relative existence of the five skandhas and the 'dharmas' or the entities of sensuous

perception and essential reality of things in which they fundamentally differed from the ageold foundation of Buddhism.

By 'dharma', the vaibhāṣikas might be held to have meant phenomenon. That which is endowed with 'Svalakṣaṇa' is called 'dharma'. Dharma is what is grasped by the senses and it is by the particular activities of the respective senses that the particular characteristics (Svalakṣaṇa) are grasped and until they are dully grasped, liberation is not possible. Vasubandhu said :

dharmāṇām pravicayam antareṇa nāsti/
Kleśānām yata upaśāntaye abhyupāyaḥ//

Abhidharmakośa. I. 21. 3.

(without real and due knowledge of the essence of the entities, kleśas cannot be done away with and without the anihilation of the kleśas, Nirvāṇa remains a far cry).

The vaibhāṣikas, with a view to analysing the essential distinction of the entities of sensuous perception have spoken of the seventy-five reals which again can be subdivided into two categories–sāsrava and anāsrava or defiled and pure.

By Sāsrava are meant those (entities) that are otherwise known as 'Saṁskṛtā' and by saṁskṛtā dharmas are meant 'Saṁskṛtā dharma rūpādiskandhapañcakaṁ or the five skandhas e. g. Rūpa, Vedanā, Saṁjñā, Saṁskāra, Vijñāna and all those entities that are essentially of the nature of the five skandhas, Saṁskṛta dharmas or entities are the entities of cnditional orgination. Each and every such entity is born of the plurality of causes.

On the contrary, whatevere is not born of causes i.e. whatever is of unconditioned origination is called anāsrava or asaṁskṛtā dharma or entity. The Sarvāstivāda spoke of seventy-two kinds of Saṁskṛta dharma and three only of asaṁkṛta dharmas.

These seventy-two saṁskṛta elements have again been classified into four categories–rūpa, citta, caitta and citta-v'prayuktā. They all are rooted in the Pañcaskandhas (rūpa, vedanā, Samjñā, Saṁskāra and Vijñāna). The rūpadharmas and the Citta dharmas are born of rūpaskandha and the Vijñāna-skandha respectively. The Caitta-dharma (mental entities) and the Citta-Viprayukta dharmas are rooted in vedanāskandha, saṁjñā-skandha and saṁskāra-skandha.

Rūpa comprises of eleven entities—the five indriyas, their respective five objects and avijñapti. By 'avijñapti is meant the 'serial continuity' of the good or bad entity. When the mind is in a disarray or when in Samādhi and the cause of its origination are the four mahābhūtas of :

Vikṣiptacittakasyāpi yoṅnvandhaḥ śubhāśubhaḥ/
Mahābhūtānyupādāya sā hyavijñaptirucyate//

Abhidharma kośa (ibid 11)

Cittadharma are six in number–the five pravṛttivijñanas and manovijñāna. Really speaking the five pravṛttijñānas and manovijñāna are the limbs, so to say of the citta which can be designated as 'sensesorium commune' : Ṣannām anantarātīm vijñānam yaddhi tanmanah (Abhidharmakoṣa). All entities emanate from manaḥ, it is said in the Dhammapāda 'Mano puvvangamā dhammā mano seṭṭa manomayā.

The caitta-dharmas are forty-six and are classified into six categories.

(a) Citta-mahābhūmika dharma—(ten in number)

(i) Vedanā (ii) Saṁjñā (iii) cetanā

(iv) sparśa (v) chanda (vi) mati

(vii) smṛti (viii) manaskāra (ix) adhimukti

(x) Samādhi.

(b) Kuśalamahābhūmikadharmas (ten in number)

(i) Śraddhā (ii) apramāda

(iii) praśrabdhi (iv) upekṣā

(v) hrī (vi) apatrapā

(vii) alobha (viii) adveṣa

(ix) ahiṁsā (x) vīrya.

(c) Kleśabhūmika-dharma (six in number)

(i) moha (ii) Pramāda

(iii) Kausīdya (iv) aśrāddhya

(v) Styāna (vi) auddhatya.

(d) Akuśalamahābhūmika-dharma (two in number)

(i) ahrīkatā (ii) anapatrapā.

(e) upakleśabhūmika-dharma (ten in number)

(i) Krodha (ii) mrakṣa

(iii) mātsarya (iv) Īrṣyā

(v) Pradāśa (vi) Vihiṁsā

(vii) Upanāha (viii) māyā

(ix) śāṭhya (x) mada.

(f) Aniyatabhūmika-dharma (eight in number)

(i) Vitarka	(ii) vicāra
(iii) Kaukṛtya	(iv) rāga
(v) māna	(vi) Vicikitsā
(vii) dveṣa	(viii) Middha (nidrā).

It has already been said that that the Caittas and Cittaviprayukta dharmas are rooted in Vedanā, Saṁjñā and Saṁskāra—the three skandhas. Vedanā may be either good or bad or it may be completely indifferent by nature and Saṁjñā determines the particular essence of the dharmas. (Saṁjñā nimittodgrahaṇātmikā). Saṁskāra-skandha, on the country, is rooted in the four other skandhas (Saṁskārā-skandhaścaturbhyo'nye Samskārāḥ). It is well explained how the five kinds of the above mentioned Cittadharma are rooted in these

The word, 'bhūmi' means the source of origination and Citta is the mahābhūmi in-as-much-as everything emanates from that. The dharmas that pertain to all the modes of the Citta are called Mahābhūmika-dharma. Those that originate in a Citta when it is in a favourable (Kuśala) condition are called Kuśalābhūmika; and those that are of counter-origin are known as akuśalābhūmika and Kleśabhūmika dharmas. The upakleśabhūmika dharmas like the akuśalabhūmika dharmas originate when the Citta is in an unfavourable condition. The aniyatabhūmikas may originate even when the Citta is in either of the two conditions.

There is another category of the Saṁskṛtadharma known as Citta-Viprayukta Saṁskāra. It, as its name suggests, has no association with either rūpa or the Citta.

The Citta-viprayukta dharmas emanate from the Saṁskāra-skandha and they are prāpti, aprāpti, sabhāgatā, āsamjñika, Samāpatti, Jīvita, Jarā, Sthiti, anityatā (these four go by the name lakṣaṇā), nāmakāya, padakāya, and Vyañjanakāya. These dharmas have no substantiality (Vastūtva) nor are they Caitta by nature although very similar to the Caittas in essence.

Prāpti is of two kinds—lābha and samanvaya or acquisition and possession. By prāpti is meant the act of acquisition or of possession of dharma, āśraya, skandha, āyatana and the like.

Sabhāgatā or nikāya-sabhāgatā signifies the idea of sameness or similarity amongst elements.

Asamjñika-Saṁskāra brings about the extirpation of the flow either of the citta or of the Caitta elements

When the flow of Citta and of elements are thus checked, there arises a stage of perfect mental balance where the mahābhūtas stand on par (mahābhūta-samatā-pādānam). This is called samāpatti and it is of two kinds—āsmjñika-Samāpatti and nirodha-Samāpatti.

Jīvita is a synonym of āyus (or life-force) and it determines the existence of elements. This is the locus so to say of (body) heat and conciousness (ādhāra uṣnavijñānayoḥ).

By 'lakṣaṇā' are meant jāti, jarā, sthithi and anityatā of which each one is considered an individual element.

The three others e. g. nāmakāya, padakāya and vyañjanakāya originate from Saṃjñā, Vākya and akṣara respectively.

The asaṁskṛta or the unconditioned elements i. e. which are not to be grasped by the senses are only three-ākāśa, and the two nirodhas—"ākāśaṁ dvau nirodhau ca". By two nirodhas are meant the pratisaṁkhyā-nirodha and the apratisaṁkhyā-nirodha.

That which does not cover up matter or is not covered up by matter is ākāśa and the two kinds of nirodhas are only the two aspects of nirvāṇa. By 'pratisaṁkhyā-nirodha' is meant the extirpation of all individual 'sāsrava' dharmas severally—"Visaṁyogaḥ pṛthak pṛthak". Such Visaṁyogas are each an entity (dharma), since they exist by themselves. Pratisaṁkyā-nirodha, signifies Prajñā and the knowledge by such prajñā, of the nature and essence of these sāsrava elements. Apratisaṁkyā-nirodha, on the other hand, means the ultimate extirpation of the very causes that go to originate the entities (Utpādatyantavighnaḥ pratyaya-vaikalyāt).

'Apratisṁkhyā-nirodha, therefore, is the ultimate aim of the Vaibhāṣikas because according to them, this very nirodha leads one to absolute Nirvāṇa.

The anaylysis of the entities as given has clearly demonstrated that they are realists. They contend that matter (or form) and the paramāṇu' are real. It should be realised, however, that by paramāṇu, they understand the minutest possible stage of an aggregate of matter and not the atom or monad (dravyaparamāṇu) of the Vaiśeṣikas. The Paramāṇus of the Vaibhāṣikas have no substantiality (dravyatva). The 'paramāṇu' or the minutest possible stage of an aggreegate of matter is not devoid of its 'svalakṣaṇas' and its svalakṣaṇas are eight in number—the four mahābhūtas and the four corresponding things born of

these mahābhūtas (kṣiti, ap, teja, Vāyu and rūpa, rasa, gandha and sparśa). Hence, it has no 'ultimate simplicity'. The paramāṇu cf the Vaiśeṣikas does not die out — it is eternal, while that of the vaibhāṣikas is only temporary since it involves an aggregate of matter only. On the expiry of the previous 'paramāṇu' (aggregate), a new one steps in. The birth, existence and decay of every paramāṇu is determined of causally.

The 'Citta' and Caittadharmas or the mind and the mental phenomena also have no inbependent existence. The mind exists because of consciousness. Consciousness also is temporary. On the decay of the series of one conciousness, the series of another consciousness come in. The consciousness of the previous moment serves as the locus of the consciousness that immediately follows. Citta comes in association of the Caittas.

No dharma whatsoever is ever born of a sigular cause (ekahetusambhūta) and each dharma functions as a cause (Kāraṇahetu) of each other dharma. Causality is, therefore, beset with both—sequence and coexistence. The Sautrāntikas, however, differed with the vaibhāṣikas on this score in-as-much-as they did not admit of the co-existence of dharmas. Another fundamental difference between the Vaibhāṣikas and the Sautrāntikas is that to the Vaibhāṣikas, the three unconditioned elements were positive by nature while negative to the sautrāntikas. According to the Sautrāntikas, ākāśa meant the absence of the things of tactile perception and nirvāṇa meant the absence of the origination and growth Nirvāṇa, therefore, in their opinion is something unreal while in the opinion of the Vaibhāṣikas, it is real, pure (anāsrava) and blissful by nature.

In regard to 'Pudgala' or ātmā', the Vaibhāṣikas' view is very clear. According to them, 'Jīvas' are born of the combination of the formed (Rūpī) and the formless (arūpī), the skandhas and the mahābhūtas. Jīva is an aggregate of elements only, as the army is of individual soldiers. There is no permanent link between them comprising the army. So also is the case with the stream of a river which is nothing but the serial flow of a temporary nature of so many water-atoms. There are, therefore, only elements—skandhas, āyatanas, dhātus and the like and no ātmā or pudgala. The Vaibhāṣikas, therefore, came very close to the Śūnyavādins in denying the existence of pudgala.

The Vaibhāṣika, however, believed in the relative existence of dharmas and that they (dharmas) abided by the past, the present and the future. The present element is only an offshoot of an aggregate of elements of the past and at the same time the cause of a similar aggregate to come to exist in the future. To the Sautrāntikas, dharmas has no such historicity. They proclaimed both pudgala-śūnyatā and dharmaśūnyatā. To them, a 'jīva' is like an empty pitcher containing no ātmā or 'pudgala', while a pitcher (ghaṭa) is only a name (Saṁjñā).

To the Sautrāntikas, truth is two-fold—conventional (Saṁvṛti) and absolute (paramārtha). An entity is a conventional truth; it has no real essence; it is only momentary, it did not exist in the past, nor will it exist in the future. It is undergoing perpetual change at every moment. It is a continuous phenomenon only and there is nothing that abides in the series as there is none in the series of ants. The cause-effect relation supposed to be subsisting in the discrete elements in a series is only a mental creation. So elements

are only a series of images directly perceptible. The Vaibhāṣikas thought that the elements are a matter of direct perception while to the Sautrāntikas, they are deductive. The Sautrāntikas contended that dharmas exist only in our streams of consciousness; they are objectively unreal. The Vaibhāśikas, on the contrary, believed in the essence and reality of elements and so they could advance the theory of direct perception of them.

The Sautrāntikas differed from the Vaibhāṣikas in one more fundamental point. They contended that an element gets destroyed the moment it has come to exist. The Vaibhāṣikas, though they believed in the impartment nature of things, assumed that an element has four stages or the stages of growth, existence, decay and death. It does not die the moment it is born – it has a sequence.

The view of the Vaibhāṣikas may, therefore, be equated with what is known as the doctrine of eternality and that of the 'Sautrāntika' to that of extermination.[1] The Mādhyamika rejected both of these views and took to a middle course for which it was known as the Mādhyamika. Nāgārjuna taught that absolute truth cannot be expressed in terms of what is conveyed by 'astı', nāsti, nitya, anitya, ātmā, or anātmā – astīti śāśvatagrāho nāstītyucchedadarśanam / Śāśvatocchedanirmuktaṁ tattvaṁ saugatasammataṁ //

According to the Vaibhāṣikas and the Sautrāntikas, the pratyayas are the causes of origin of an element i.e. a posterior element comes to exist by way of an effect of a previous element. Nāgārjuna held that no element ever originates or is ever destroyed. The previous element that

is supposed to be the cause of a posterior one, does not contain the essence of it (the posterior element, its effect). They are essentially different from each other — milk is milk and curd is curd A dissimilar element cannot function as the cause of another dissimilar element. No element, therefore, can cause to originate another element and as nothing orginates, nothing is destroyed. This of course does not mean that entities are eternal in-as-much-as impermanence is the key-note of Buddhism – the sprout is only a pariṇāma of an 'earlier' stage – the seed. Neither the seed nor the sprout are static since they are in an eternal flux. The seed is not destroyed on its so-called destruction and the sprout comes to exist. The flux is not a real flux since that is limited to its own kind.

In case, elements are supposed to undergo the stages of origination, existence and decay, time also must be taken to be divided into three stages – past, present and future. Such a division involves movement and in case movement is not admitted of, the concept of time has to be discarded.

Nāgārjuna does not accept the idea of any such movement, in-as-much-as that which is past does not move or that which is to come in future has not gathered any movement as yet. And if past and future are not within one's perview, the question of the present time does not arise at all. Time, therefore, according to Nāgārjuna is without any movement. Time has neither any beginning nor any end. Time is neither stationary nor dynamic since without the idea of movement, one cannot conceive of what is without movement.

Nāgārjuna also has dicarded the idea of reality ascribed to the five skandhas or six, āyatanas. The Hīnayānists

conceived of the six 'dhātus' as the root of one's individuality and the six dhātus are said to be the four mahābhūtas ākāśa and vijñāna. In the opinion of Nāgārjuna, these dhātus can neither be said to be existing nor not existing. They are neither conditioned not unconditioned. They are ''śūnya'.

According to the Vaibhāṣikas and the Sautrāntikas, an element undergoes the three stages of origination, existence and decay and these are the characteristics (lakṣaṇa) of an element. Nāgārjuna branded them as nonsubtantial since one can conceive of them neither wholly nor severally. they are not conceived of wholly because they do not occur in any given moment or in any given time. They are not conceived severally because they do not occur independent of each other. Light, for example, can not be said to originate in time since light exists only in conjuction of what is enlightened One cannot conceive of any stage when light enlightenes itself only. If it be so said that light expels darkness, then there would arise a question when does it do so ? The origination of light and the expulsion of darkness simultaneously happen. It cannot be held that one originates because of the other. So light cannot be held to originate and only this much can be said that at a given moment light exists. It may again be argued that 'light exists, involves a temporal sequence. According to Nāgārjuna, no such sequence is possible in-as-much-as the moment light is seen to exist, its manifestation (of existence) is complete. As time has no sequence, light also cannot have any temporal sequence either. So it has only 'existence' in the present. But nothing can exist without change since change is the sine-qua-non of the very existence. So 'light exists' is also equally untrue. If light does not originate

nor does it exist, it cannot be held to undergo decay. Moreover, if what has decayed cannot undergo any further decay or what is yet to be decayed cannot decay, decay as such, happening in the present is inconceivable. There is no sequence in origination or in decay. In reality, nothing can decay since that would involve one to conceive of a stage where existence and decay should simultaneously occur. So Nāgārjuna says that there is no such stage as that of origination, of existence or of decay. The world is only a dream born of mere casuality.

Hīnayāna did not admit of the soul or pudgala but it did not deny the existence and reality of dharma or elements. There is no actor, action exists although. The Vedānta held that there is no action though the actor is there. Nāgārajuna denied both the alternatives. If there is no 'grāhaka', grāhya cannot be contemplated of and if there is no grāhya, there cannot be any grāhaka. Really speaking, there is neither 'Kāraka' nor Karma, neither the Creator nor the Creation. Both are untrue. The world is only a representation (abhāsa) born of causes and conditions. This representation again exists only relatively and from the absolute point of view, all are without any essence; everything is only Śūnya.

What is 'Saṁsāra, then ? It also does not exist, since it has no beginning and thus no end and if it has none, it cannot exist—there is no birth, decay and death. So 'duḥkha' also does not exist and therefore, karma or the retribution thereof, purity, impurity, rūpa, rasa, gandha 'sparśa', grāhya or grāhaka—nothing exists. The āryasatyas, however, will have their utility, for those who are still in the 'Sādhanamārga' will find their full worth. But

for those who have much advanced and have developed a metaphysical maturity, these are only conventional. In the absolute sense, these are only śūnya. Nirvāṇa, therefore. is only a stage—a stage of supraphenomental existence. Nirvāṇa is neither positive nor negative in essence since in case it were positive it must change and in case it were negative it cannot exist. It is a stage when elements are beyond origination, existence or decay, when the flow of elements (dharmasantāna) has ceased to flow. The Saṁsāra, when it assumes the stage of unconditionedness or the stage of non-essentialness (Savābhava-śūnyatā), it transforms into Nirvāṇa.

Close to its heels, there arose the Yogācāra school of Buddhism otherwise known as Vijñānavāda Asaṅga and Vasubandhu are the two great teachers of this school They possibly flourished in the fourth or the fifth century A. D. The school found by Asaṅga was known as Yogācāra and Vasubandhu gave it the name, 'Vijñānavāda' or Vijñaptimātratāvāda. The esoteric aspect of it justified the name, Yogācāra, while its metaphysical aspect, 'Vijñānavāda'. Asaṅga was more after its esoteric aspect while vasubandhu, the metaphysical one. The school might have had its roots even earlier than Asaṅga. He is said to have been initiated by Maitreya and this Maitreya has been identified by the Japanese scholars with Maitreyanātha—the author of 'Mahāyāna-Uttaratantra', and 'Dharmatāvibhaṅga' available in Tibetan translation only. Asaṅga has two treatises to his credit—'Mahāyāna-Sūtrālaṁkāra' and 'Mahāyāna-Saṁparigrahaśāstra'. The first one is available in Sanskrit and the Second one is Chinese translation only. As 'Maitreya' is not finally identified, Asaṅga is regarded as the founder of this school and his brother Vasubandhu is

the second in command. Vasubandhu has to his credit also three treaties of the Vijñānavāda metaphysics—the Viṁśatikā, the triṁśikā and the Madhyānta-Vibhaṅga-śāstra. After Vasubandhu, to name other ācaryas of this school, one has to refer to Diṅnāga, Sthiramati and Dharmapāla. Sthiramati wrote an elaborate commentary on the Triṁśikā. Dharmapāla was a scholar attached to 'Nālandāmahābihāra'· Śīlabhadra was his disciple with whom the great chinese scholar 'Hsüān Chuang' studied Buddhism. Hsüan Chuang also might be considered as one of the great teachers of this school since he composed an independent treatise known as the Vijñāpatimātratā-siddhi recentty translated into french by Prof. Poussin. In this treatise alone, are given the opinions of the different teachers of this school in a chronological order. It is the type of a commentary on the Triṁśikā-kārikā. The Viṁśatikā-kārika' has also been translated into Chinese by Hsüanchuang Two other translations are also available—one by prajñāruci and the other by paramārtha. An independent commentary was written on the Viṁśatikā-kārikā by Dharmapāla and translated into Chinese by 'I-Tsiug, known as 'Ch'eng-Wei-Shih-pao-Sheng-lün'.

The Yogācāra school fully endorsed the view of the Mādhyamikas. Asaṅga and Vasubandhu, both admitted of the unreal nature of elements; the idea of their birth, existence, decay or death is false. But at the same time, they declared that by this, they did not advocate nihilism. To them, all were but Vijñāna or Citta only ('Vijñaptimātramevedamasadarthāvabhāsanāt') and Vasubandhu with the view to supporting his views quoted Lord Buddha's saying Cittamātraṁ bho jinaputrā Yaduta traidhātukamiti'. They thus added a new meaning to the doctrine of unreality of elements. The concept of 'Śūnyatā' of Nāgārjuna had the

risk of being misinterpreted as nihilism. The concept of Vijñāna as the absolute principle did away with such a risk. Vijñānavāda reestablished Buddhism in the domain of spiritual thought; the world of bliss that people were hankering after for long.

The paramārtha according to Asaṅga neither exists nor does not exist nor is it somewhat other than these two. It neither originates nor decays; it neither develops nor gets purified nor does not get purified and so on : c.f.

na sanna Cāsanna tathā na Cānyathā

na Jāyate Vyeti na Cāvahīyate /

na Vardhate nāpi Viśudhyate punar—

Viśudhyate, tatparamārthalakṣaṇam // (Sūtrālaṁkāra vi)

Vijñānavāda, therefore, in regard to its idea of the paramārtha is in no way different from the Mādhyamikas. Similarly, when Asaṅga (Sūtrālaṁkāra vi) said that there is no ātmā involved in ātmadṛṣṭi, nor are there anything like the pañcaskandhas existing in reality, he almost echoed the views of Nāgārjuna. Everything is a mere conjecture he said, and when one trancends it, one attains Nirvāṇa. Birth and cessation of birth know no difference; Saṁsāra itself attains to the stage of Nirvāṇa : c.f.

na Cātmadṛṣṭi Svayamātmalakṣaṇā

na cāpi duḥsaṁsthitatā vilakṣaṇā /

dvayānna cānyad bhrama eṣa tadita—

statāśca mokṣā bhrama-mātra-Saṁkṣayaḥ //

(Sūtrālaṁkāra vi)

The Vijñānavāda, however, differed from the Mādhyamika in advancing the theory of Vijñāna as the sole

reality. Assanga said that when one realises that an entity is unreal and that the world is only a fiction, one rests in Citta or Vijñāna only This Citta or Vijñāna is the dharmadhātu or the ultimate reality of all entities and when one realises it, one transcends the sense of duality and attains the knowledge of nonduality : c f.

arthān sa vijñāya ca Jalpamātrān
Santiṣṭhate trannibhacittamātre /
Pratyakṣatāmeti ca dharmadhātu—
Stasmādviyukto dvayalakṣaṇena // (ibid)

When again one realises that other than 'Citta' all are unreal, one gradually understands that 'Citta' also is unreal; and with the extirpation of the knowledge of construction, one rests in 'dharmadhātu'; c.f.

Nāstīti cittamtatparametya buddhyā
Cittasya nāstitvamupaiti tasmāt /
dvayasya nāstitvamupetya dhīmān
Santiṣṭhate atadgatidhramadhātau // (ibid)

Asaṅga was not a mere philosopher, he was at the same time a great 'sādhaka'. He, therefore, hinted at the various stages of sādhanā. There are four such stages according to him. In the first stage, one realises that the subject-object relation does not exist in reality All is citta only.

Citta alone functions in a dicotomy-both as subject and as object. In the second stage, the Citta is non-dual. One at this stage transcends the notion of subject -object duality. Then in the third stage one realises that Cittamātratā also is a fiction since when there is no object (grāhya), there cannot be any subject (grāhaka). Should then the, absoluute' be all vaccum ? Asaṅga says 'no', it is not all

vaccum One at the fourth stage, therefore, realises the 'dhhrmadhātu' which may be equated with the 'idealistic world of phenomenon'. So what it boils down to, is that the Vijñaptimātratā is the only truth and how do the elements emanate from this vijñaptimātratā is given in the Trimśikā-kārrikā of vasubandhu. Vasubandhu says that the ātmā, dharma and the like are but 'pariṇāma, of Vijñāna' only. Pariṇāma is three-fold-ālayavijñāna, alambana and Viṣaya-Vijñāpti.

The Ālaya-Vijñāna is the seed of all dharmas so, to say, the repository of all elemental konwledge. The Ālaya is so called in-as-much-as it retains the seed of all sāṁkleśika dharmas that are the root of the phenomenal world-'Sarvasāṁkleśikadharmavījasthānatvādālayaḥ. The Ālaya manifests (pariṇamate) as the subject and as the object. It's subjective pariṇāma is otherwise knon as upādānavijñapti since herein is contained the potency to grasp the knowledge of all elements. Its objective pariṇāma comprises the rest

The upādānavijñapti again manifest into three :-

(i) parikalpita svabhāvābhinveśavāsanā or the Vāsanā-Vīja from which the idea of construction arises (ii) the indriyas and the indriya-sthānas from which the knowledge of 'rūpa' arises; and (iii) 'nāma' or the kind of knowledge that determines the 'Saṁjñā.

Sparśa, manaskāra, vedanā, Saṁjñā and Cetanā, therefore, are the 'pariṇāma' of the Ālaya–vijñāna. From these five alone, the knowledge of all elements arises. 'Sparśa' is born of the conjunction of the triad (trika-Sannipāta)—the indriya, the Viṣaya and the Vijñāna. 'Sparśa', therefore, is only a transformation of the indriya. Manaskāra signifies the onward move of the citta towards the object—Cetasa

ābhoga'. Vedanā means feeling and this feeling is of three kinds—Sukha, duḥkha and aduḥkhia-asukha. Saṁjñā means the determination of object-Viṣayanimittodgrahaṇaṁ, while catanā signifies mental efforts-Manasaḥ ceṣṭā The elements that arise because of the pariṇāma of ālaya-Vijñāna are only impermanent, everchanging. Vasubandhu compares them with the current of a river (Srotasaughavat). The elemental world is only an unceasing a flow of cause and effect and as in the case of a river, one cannot trace its beginning or end so also in the flow of this elemental world, there is no beginning nor any end, The flow of the Ālaya carries with it, the vāsanā of 'puṇya' and 'apuṇya' that are collected by sparśa, manaskara and the like just as the flow of a river carries with it all those that come in contact with it. This is Saṁsāra and its extirpation means 'arhattva'

The second pariṇāma of Vijñāna is that of the 'ālambana of which Vasubandhu says

tadāśritya pravartate

tadālambaṁ mano nāma vijñānaṁ mananātmakaṁ.

Trimśikā-kārikā 5

The 'ālambana' arises being based on ālaya-Vijñāna. It is of the nature of 'mentation' and so it is called mano-vijñāna. Because of the 'pariṇāma' of this 'ālambana', four fold 'kleśas' or affliction arises They are ātmadṛṣṭi, ātmamoha, ātmamāna and ātmasneha.

The third 'pariṇāma' is the Viṣaya-Vijñapti, Viṣaya is of six kinds—rūpa, rasa, śabda, gandha, sparśa and dharma and because of this pariṇāma, the elements come to exist. The dharmas again have been classified into six kinds of Citta-dharmas namely (i) Citta mahābhūmika, (ii) Kuśala, (iii) Kleśa (iv) akuśala (v) upakleśa (vi) aniyatabuūmika.

विंशतिका

अथ वृत्तिः

महायाने त्रैधातुकं विज्ञप्तिमात्रं व्यवस्थाप्यते; 'चित्तमात्रं भो जिनपुत्रा ! यदुत त्रैधातुकमि'ति सूत्रात् । चित्तं मनो विज्ञानं विज्ञप्तिश्चेति पर्यायाः । चित्तमत्र ससंप्रयोगमभिप्रेतम् । मात्रमित्यर्थप्रतिषेधार्थम् ।

विज्ञप्तिमात्रमेवैतदसदर्थावभासनात् ।
यथा तैमिरिकस्यासत्केशउण्ड्रादिदर्शनम् ॥ १ ॥

अत्र चोद्यते—

यदि विज्ञप्तिरनर्था नियमो देशकालयोः ।
सन्तानस्यानियमश्च युक्ता कृत्यक्रिया न च ॥ २ ॥

किमुक्तं भवति ? यदि बिना रूपाद्यर्थेन रूपादिविज्ञप्तिरुत्पद्यते न रूपाद्यर्थात् । कस्मात् क्वचिद्देश उत्पद्यते न सर्वत्र । तत्रैव च देशे कदाचिदुत्पद्यते न सर्वदा । तद्देशकालप्रतिष्ठितानां सर्वेषां सन्तान उत्पद्यते न केवलमेकस्य ।

VIMŚATIKĀ

In the Mahāyāna, the three worlds (Kāmadhātu, Rūpadhātu, and Arūpadhātu) are said to be vijñapti only. There is a sūtra : 'oh Jinaputra ! what is perceived as the three worlds, are only Citta.' Citta, manaḥ, Vijñāna and Vijñāpti are synonymous. The (word), Citta, here, is inclusive of its associates too. The word, 'mātra' is used to exclude matter. So it is said :

'It is all mere ideation because the non-existing things appear as seemingly external objects as persons having bad eyes see non-real hair, texture and the like' (1)

'If consciousness (is the only truth) without the external objects (then) their spatial and temporal determination

स्वप्नोपघातवत्कृत्यक्रिया ।

सिद्धेति वेदितव्यम् । यथा स्वप्ने द्वयसमापत्तिमन्तरेण शुक्रविसर्गलक्षणः स्वप्नोपघातः । एवं तावदन्यान्यैर्दृष्टान्तैर्देशकालनियमादिचतुष्टयं सिद्धम् ।

नरकवत्पुनः

सर्वं

सिद्धमिति वेदितव्यम् । नरकेष्विव नरकवत् । कथं सिद्धम् ।

नरकपालादिदर्शने तैश्च बाधने ॥ ४ ॥

The word, 'pūyanadī' means river full with filth (the compound being) as (in) the word, 'ghṛtaghata' (the jar full with 'ghee' or butter). The ghosts having the same antecedents maturing into retribution, all perceive the river full with filth and such a perception is not confined to any single individual. (The words in the 'Kārikā)' mean that as the river full of filth is perceived, so is pe.ceived a river full with urine and stool (and the hell) inhabited by persons holding staves and swords as well. This way, the indetermination of the streams of consciousness gets established even without admitting the existence of the external objects.

'The usefulness (of the apprehended objects held unreal) is explained on the analogy of a sinful action in a dream.'

As in dream, even without the real union of a man and woman, there occurrs a sin of the nature of discharging semen. In this way, by many other similar illustrations, the fourfold maxim-the spatial and temporal determinations and the like get established.

'On the analogy of hell again'

all are establised. The word, 'narakavat' means as it happens in a hell. (naraka) How are they establisned ? (if asked), it is said.

'On seeing the hell-guards (narakapālas) and in view of the fact of their keeping others in subjugation.'(4)

यथा हि नरकेषु नारकाणां नरकपालादिदर्शनं देशकालनियमेन सिद्धं श्ववायसायसपर्वताद्यागमनगमनदर्शनं चेत्यादिग्रहणेन सर्वेषां च नैकस्यैव तैश्च तद्बाधनं सिद्धमसत्स्वपि नरकपालादिषु समानस्वकर्मविपाकाधिपत्यात् । तथान्यत्रापि सर्वमेतद्देशकालनियमादिचतुष्टयं सिद्धमिति वेदितव्यम् । किं पुनः कारणं नरकपालास्ते च श्वानो वायसाश्च सत्त्वा नेष्यन्ते ? अयोगात् । न हि

The fact that persons living in hells perceive the hell-guards, is due to the rule of spatial and temporal determinations. (The word 'ādi' in the Kārikā (narakapālādi) signifies) the coming and going of dogs, crows, and of the mountain made of iron (supposed to be in a hell). Here such a perception happens to all and not to any single individual. The fact that they are again subjugated to various tortures by these very guards indicate that even if the hell-guards were not there,they would suffer the same fate by virtue of their having the same moral antecedents. In the same way, it is to be understood that the rules like that of spatial and temporal determinations-the fourfold maxim is established.

What reason is there that the hell-guards, the dogs, the crows--these creatures are not treated as those who have been condemned to a hell (although they are found to be living in a hell) ? They cannot be treated as having been condemned to a hell because they do not have the feeling of pains in a hell. Had it been so that those who are in hell, torture each other by turn, then there would not have been some such arrangement that so and so are to be condemned to hell and so and so are the hell-guards. Had it again been so that all are of equal size and of equal strength, then they while torturing each other there would not arouse a sense of any such fear in any boyd's mind. Moreover, how is it possible that one would torture others without himself undergoing it while being on the same ground

ते नारका युज्यन्ते । तथैव दुःखाप्रतिसंवेदनात् । परस्परं यातयतामिमे नारका इमे नरकपाला इति व्यवस्था न स्यात् । तुल्याकृतिप्रमाणबलानां च परस्परं यातयतां न तथा भयं स्यात् । दाहदुःखं च प्रदीप्तायामयोमय्यां भूमावसहमानाः कथं तत्र परान्यातयेयुः ? अनारकाणां वा नरके कुतः सम्भवः ? कथं तावत्तिरश्चां स्वर्गसम्भवः ? एवं नरकेषु तिर्यक्प्रेतविशेषाणां नरकपालादीनां सम्भवः स्यात् ।

तिरश्चां सम्भवः स्वर्गे यथा न नरके तथा ।
न प्रेतानां यतस्तज्जं दुःखं नानुभवन्ति ते ॥ ५ ॥

ये हि तिर्यञ्चः स्वर्गे संभवन्ति ते तद्भाजनलोकसुखसंवर्तनीयेन कर्मणा तत्र संभूतास्तज्जं सुखं प्रत्यनुभवन्ति । न चैवं नरकपालादयो नारकं दुःखं प्रत्यनुभवन्ति । तस्मान्न तिरश्चां संभवो युक्तो नापि प्रेतानाम् । तेषां तर्हि नारकाणां कर्मभिस्तत्र भूतविशेषाः सम्भवन्ति । वर्णाकृतिप्रमाणबलविशिष्टा ये नरकपालादिसंज्ञां प्रतिलभन्ते । तथा च परिणमन्ति यद्विविधां हस्तविक्षेपादिक्रियां कुर्वन्तो दृश्यन्ते भयोत्पादनार्थम् । यथा मेषाकृतयः पर्वता आगच्छन्तो गच्छन्तोऽयःशाल्मलीवने च कण्टका अधोमुखीभवन्त ऊर्ध्वमुखीभवन्तश्चेति । न ते न सम्भवन्त्येव ।

यदि तत्कर्मभिस्तत्र भूतानां सम्भवस्तथा ।
इष्यते परिणामश्च किं विज्ञानस्य नेष्यते ॥ ६ ॥

of iron ablaze ? How is it also that those who are not be condemned to a hell ever be in a hell ?

How do animals again go to heaven ? This way do the individul hell–guards, animals, and ghosts go to hell.

As the animals are born in heaven, so not in a hell (surely) are the ghosts, (the hell–guards) in as-much-as they do not undergo the torture therein.(5)

The animals that are born in heaven are born by virtue of their having performed the deeds that could accrue the merit of attaining the pleasure of such a region and they do enjoy such pleasures. The hell–guards are not so; they

विज्ञानस्यैव तत्कर्मभिस्तथा परिणामः कस्मान्नेष्यते किं पुनर्भूतानि कल्प्यन्ते ? अपि च ।

कर्मणोवासनान्यत्र फलमन्यत्र कल्प्यते ।
तत्रैव नेष्यते यत्र वासना किं नु कारणम् ॥ ७ ॥

येन हि कर्मणा नारकाणां तत्र तादृशो भूतानां सम्भवः कल्प्यते परिणामश्च, कर्मणो वासना तेषां विज्ञानसन्तानसंनिविष्टा नान्यत्र । यत्रैव च वासना तत्रैव

do not undergo the tortures of a hell. So it is not reasonable to hold that (such) animals and ghosts are born in a hell.

Then it must be admitted that because of the deeds of those who are in hell, a certain class of creatures are born who are of different size and of different strength and it is they who earn the title, 'hell-guards'. They, with a view to arousing fear (in the mind of the those who are in hell) bring about such a change in themselves as they are found to perform various actions like stretching out their hands and the like. (It so happens that) mountains of the size of a lamb go and come or the thorns in a silk–cotton tree made of iron go downwards and upwards, at times and it is not that such things do not happen. If by virtue of their own deeds, the birth of such creatures is possible and the manifestation thereof is thought of (in so many ways) then how is it that such manifestation of consciousness is not thought of ?

Why not is it so assumed that such are the manifestations of consciousness alone through deeds thereof and why are externals imagined (to be existing in reality) ?

Moreover,

'The vāsanā of karma and the retribution thereof are imagined to be in two different subsratums and (could you) account for as to why (retribution pertains) not to the same substratum where vāsanā inheres ?(7)

तस्याः फलं तादृशो विज्ञानपरिणामः किं नेष्यते ? यत्र वासना नास्ति तत्र तस्याः फलं कल्प्यत इति किमत्र कारणम् ? आगमः कारणम् । यदि विज्ञानमेव रूपादिप्रतिभासं स्यान्न रूपादिकोऽर्थस्तदा रूपाद्यायतनास्तित्वं भगवता नोक्तं स्यात् । अकारणमेतद्यस्मात् ।

रूपाद्यायतनास्तित्वं तद्विनेयजनं प्रति ।
अभिप्रायवशादुक्तमुपपादुकसत्ववत् ॥ ८ ॥

यथास्ति सत्त्व उपपादुक इत्युक्तं भगवता । अभिप्रायवशाच्चित्तसन्तत्यनुच्छेदमायत्यामभिप्रेत्य । "नास्तीह सत्त्व आत्मा वा धर्मास्त्वेते सहेतुकाः" इति वचनात् । एवं रूपाद्यायतनास्तित्वमप्युक्तं भगवता तद्देशनाविनेयजनमधिकृत्येत्याभिप्रायिकं तद्वचनम् । कोऽत्राभिप्रायः ?

The vāsanā of the very (moral)deeds by reasons of which, such (abovementioned) origin of those who are in hell is contemplated and the (different) manifestations thereof inheres in the very streams of consciousness of them and not to any one else. Then how is it that it is not so contemplated that the retribution and (the above mentioned) manifestation of consciousness pertain to them where Vāsanā inheres in ? (And) what is the reason to think that retribution is there where vāsanā does not exist ?

Āgama (śāstras) are the reasons (for such an imagination). If consciousness alone manifests itself as colour and the like and it is not that colour etc. are so many external reals then the Lord would not have said that colour etc. are of the nature of 'āyatanas' only.

This is unreasonable in as-much-as-'It is with a definite purpose in view that the disciples have been instructed to the effeet that the colour etc. are of the nature of 'āyatana' as in the case the 'upapādaka' creatures.'(8)

As with particular purpose in view, the Lord has said that the upapādaka creatures do axist, so also with a view

यतः स्वबीजाद्विज्ञप्तिर्यदाभासा प्रवर्तते ।
द्विविधायतनत्वेन ते तस्या मुनिरब्रवीत ॥ ९ ॥

किमुक्तं भवति ? रूपप्रतिभासा विज्ञप्तिर्यतः स्वबीजात्परिणामविशेषप्राप्ता-दुत्पद्यते तच्च बीजं यत्प्रतिभासा च सा ते तस्या विज्ञप्तेश्चक्षूरूपायतनत्वेन यथाक्रमं भगवानब्रवीत् । एवं यावत् स्प्रष्टव्यप्रतिभासा विज्ञप्तिर्यतः स्वबीजा-त्परिणामविशेषप्राप्तादुत्पद्यते । तच्च बीजं यत्प्रतिभासा च सा ते तस्या कायस्प्रष्टव्यायतनत्वेन यथाक्रमं भगवानब्रवीदित्ययमभिप्रायः ॥ एवं पुनरभि-प्रायवशेन देशयित्वा को गुणः ?

to assert that in future too the stream of a citta does not cease to exist (he has said such things).

(That the world is only an ideation) is also proved on the basis of (the Lord's) saying–there is no individual nor any soul and all things are only causally determined.' Similarly, the Lord while keeping in view the disciples that were to be instructed this particular doctrine said that colour etc. are āyatanas in essence. So the aforesaid statement is made with a particular idea in view.

What is that which is in view ?

'The seed of its own from which conciousness proceeds and in the form it manifests–these two are described by the Lord as of the nature of āyatana.' (9)

What does it mean ?

The seed of its own that is to say the particular stage of modification whence proceeds the consciousness in the form of colour and the like and the form by which it (consciousness) manifests-these two are both spoken of by the Lord as of the nature of Cakṣurāyatana and rūpāyatana respectively. In the same way, the seed of its own that is to say the particular stage of modification whence proceeds the consciousness of touch and the form by which it manifests–

तथा पुद्गलनैरात्म्यप्रवेशो हि–

तथा हि देश्यमाने पुग्दलनैरात्म्य प्रविशन्ति । द्वयाद्विज्ञानषटकं प्रवर्तते । न तु कश्चिदेको द्रष्टास्ति न यावन्मन्तेत्येवं विदित्वा ये पुग्दलनैरात्म्यदेशना-विनेयास्ते पुग्दलनैरात्म्यं प्रविशन्ति ।

अन्यथा पुनः ।

देशना धर्मनैरात्म्यप्रवेशः

अन्यथेति विज्ञप्तिमात्रदेशना । कथं धर्मनैरात्म्यप्रवेशः ? विज्ञप्तिमात्रमिदं रूपादिधर्मप्रतिभासमुत्पद्यते न तु रूपादिलक्षणो धर्मः कोऽप्यस्तीति विदित्वा ।

these two are both spoken of by the Lord as of the nature Kāya–āyatana' and sparśāyatana respectively and this is what he had in view.

What is the use of having instructed (his desciples) keeping this in view ?

(The result is this that) by such an instruction, one gets initiated to (the doctrine of) pudgala–naiiātmya. Having been so instructed, one gets initiated to(the doctrine of) pudgala–nairātmya. The six kinds of knowledge proceed from the two kinds (of āyatanas). There is neither any one who sees (nor anything that is seen in the case of visual knowledge)and similarly there is neither any one who thinks (nor is there any thing that is thought of); those who know thus are fit to be instructed the doctrince of pudgala-nairātmya and they get initiated in it.

And by a different kind of instruction again, one gets intiated in the doctrine of dharma-nairātmya. Different kind (of instruction) means the instruction on the doctrine of (that the three worlds are) consciousness only. How does

यदि तर्हि सर्वथा धर्मो नास्ति तदपि विज्ञप्तिमात्रं नास्तीति। कथं तर्हि व्यवस्थाप्यते ? न खलु सर्वथा धर्मो नास्तीत्येवं धर्मनैरात्म्यप्रवेशोभवति। अपितु।

कल्पितात्मना ॥ १० ॥

यो बालैर्धर्माणां स्वभावो ग्राह्यग्राहकादिः परिकल्पितस्तेन कल्पितेनात्मना तेषां नैरात्म्यं, न त्वनभिलाप्येनात्मना यो बुद्धानां विषय इति। एवं विज्ञप्तिमात्रस्यापि विज्ञप्त्यन्तरपरिकल्पितेनात्मना नैरात्म्या-प्रवेशात् विज्ञप्तिमात्र-व्यवस्थापनया सर्वधर्माणां नैरात्म्यप्रवेशो भवति न तु तदस्तित्वापवादात्। इतरथा हि विज्ञप्तेरपि विज्ञप्त्यन्तरमर्थं स्यादिति विज्ञप्तिमात्रत्वं न सिध्येतार्थ-वतीत्वाद्विज्ञप्तीनाम् ॥ कथं पुनरिदं प्रत्येतव्यमनेनाभिप्रायेण भगवता रूपाद्या-यतनास्तित्वमुक्तं न पुनः सन्त्येव तानि यानि रूपादिविज्ञप्तीनां प्रत्येकं विषयी भवन्तीति ? यस्मात्।

one get initiated in the doctrine of 'Dharmanairātmaya' ? (Whatever manifests itself in the form of colour and the like is conciousness only, there is no essence or the nature of colour and the like. Knowing thus one gets initiated in the doctrine of 'dharma–nairātyma ')

If it be so that nothing exists, then 'conciousness alone' too should not exist and how is it that it is said to be existing ? (You see) it is not that initiation in dharma–nairātmya means admitting that nothing exists. But it means that 'Nothing exists in the manner it is constructed.' (10)

The non-existence of things (dharma–nairātmya) signifies that the way they are constucted in the subject–object forms by the uninstructed (persons) is wrong and it does not mean that things in their essence which is beyond all linguistic description and which can be perceived by Buddhas alone, do not exist.

So even 'consciousness alone' that is of the nature of construction of some other consciousness (knowledge) is

न तदेकं न चानेकं विषयः परमाणुशः ।
न च ते संहता यस्मात्परमाणुर्न सिध्यति ॥ ११ ॥

इति किमुक्तं भवति ? यत्तद्रूपादिकमायतनं रूपादिविज्ञप्तीनां प्रत्येकं विषयः स्यात्तदेकं वा स्याद्यथा अवयविरूपं कल्प्यते वैशेषिकैः । अनेकं वा परमाणुशः संहता वा त एव परमाणवः । न तावदेकं विषयो भवत्यवयवेभ्योऽन्यस्यावयविरूपस्य क्वचिदप्यग्रहणात् । नाप्यनेकपरमाणूनां प्रत्येकमग्रहणात् । नापि ते संहता विषयीभवन्ति । यस्मात्परमाणुरेकं द्रव्यं न सिध्यति । कथं न सिध्यति ? यस्मात् ।

non–essential and having acquired such a knowledge, the doctrine of no essance cannot be realised; having realised that subject–object nature of a knowledge is only a matter of construction and thus consciousness alone'is the only truth, one understands the non–essential nature of all things and not by way of denying the existence thereof. Otherwise, one consciousness being the object of another consciousness, (the doctrine of) consciousness alone' wculd not have been established since in that case, consciousness would have to admitted as having of content.

How are we to understand that the Lord with this in view, had said of the existence of colour and the like other āyatanas ? (Why should we not surmise that) those which severally form the object of the consciousness of colour and the like are existing reals ? (We must not ever surmise so) because "That (the object) is neither one (as avayavin) nor many in the form of so many atoms. It cannot either be the conglomeration of atoms since atoms do not exist."(11)

What is meant thereby ?

Colour and the similar other āyatanas that severally form the contents of eye–consciousness and the like, should either be one in the form of an 'avayavin' as conjectured by the

षट्केन युगपद्योगात्परमाणोः षडंशता ।

षड्भ्यो दिग्भ्य; षड्भिः परमाणुभिर्युगपद्योगे सति परमाणोः षडंशता प्राप्नोति । एकस्य यो देशस्तत्रान्यस्यासम्भवात् ।

षण्णां समानदेशत्वात्पिण्डः स्यादणुमात्रकः ॥ १२ ॥

अथ य एवैकस्य परमाणोर्देशः स एव षण्णाम् । तेन सर्वेषां समानदेशत्वात् सर्वः पिण्डः परमाणुमात्रः स्यात्परस्पराव्यतिरेकादिति न कश्चित्पिण्डो

vaiśesikas or it may be many as so many atoms or it may merely be a conglomeration of atoms

It cannot be one (avayavin) in as-much-as apart from the parts, nothing is perceptible as a whole. Nor can it be many, since atoms are not perceived severally. Nor do they form the object in a conglomeration, since atom is not established as a substance. Why is it not so established ? Because

'When six atoms (from six different directions) simultaneously come into contact with a single atom, then that single atom must be said to have six spatial dimensions.'

(If a conglomeration of atoms is to be admitted at all then) as and when an atom is admitted to be simultaneously coming in contact with six other atoms from six different directions, it is but obvious that six spatial dimensions of a single atom have to be admitted since the space occupied by one cannot accomodate another.

'And if they are said to be occupying one single space then the (so called) conglomeration remains of the size of an atom only ? (12)

If it is so said that the very space that the single atom occupies also can accomodate the six other atoms (coming from six different directions), then all of them being in the same space, the whole mass becomes of the same size of an

दृश्यः स्यात्। नैव हि परमाणवः संयुज्यन्ते निरवयवत्वात्। मा भूदेष दोषप्रसंगः। संहतास्तु परस्परं संयुज्यन्त इति काश्मीरवैभाषिकास्त इदं प्रष्टव्याः। यः परमाणूनां संघातो न स तेभ्योऽर्थान्तरमिति।

परमाणोरसंयोगात् तत्संघातेऽस्तिकस्य सः।

संयोग इति वर्त्तते।

न चानवयवत्वेन तत्संयोगो न सिध्यति ॥ १३ ॥

atom only and since in that case, they afford no mutual separation, no mass would ever by perceptible i.e. they cannot form any mass of themselves). Moreover, atoms being partless, (as you hold), cannot come into mutual contact.

No, there cannot be any blemish here. The Kāśmīra-Vaibhāṣikas who hold that when in codglomeration, they (the atoms) come into mutual contact are reminded that what is claimed to be the conglomeration of atoms is, in reality, not anything different from them (its eomponent parts)

'If atoms do not unite, how could they unite then even in a conglomeration ?'

Here (to complete the sentence) the word, 'union' has to be inserted. 'And not (merely) because of its being partless, union therewith does not stand.' (13)

Now, if it so happens that atoms although they form into conglomeration cannot mutually unite, then of course, it must not be claimed that the atoms cannot unite because of partlessness in as-much-as even if the conglomeration were of those that have parts (i.e. even if atoms were said to have parts), unity thereof would not necessarily ensue (in its logical course). Hence an atom does not exist qua substance; (and) whether or not unity could be ascribed to an atom.

अथ संघात अप्यन्योऽन्यं संयुज्यन्ते। न तर्हि परमाणूनां निरवयवत्वात्संयोगो न सिध्यतीति वक्तव्यम्। सावयवस्यापि हि संघातस्य संयोगानभ्युपगमात्। तस्मात्परमाणुरेकं द्रव्यं न सिध्यति, यदि च परमाणोः संयोग इष्यते यदि वा नेष्यते—

दिग्भागभेदो यस्यास्ति तस्यैकत्वं न युज्यते।

अन्यो हि परमाणोः पूर्वदिग्भागो यावदधोदिग्भाग इति दिग्भागभेदे सति कथं तदात्मकस्य परमाणोरेकत्वं योक्ष्यते।

'That which has spatial division (dimension) cannot logically be one' and when it is so obvions that an atom is admitted to have spatial divisions like the fore part or the lower part how could an atom of that nature could be established as one (substance) ?

'How could also atom shadow or shield (other objects from our view in case it's spatial divisions were not admitted) ?'

If spatial divisions of each single atom were not admitted, then how could on sun–rise, there would be an interplay of shadow and light. (Had it been a single object), it cannot have any region where there should be no ;light. And if spatial divisions of atoms are not admitted, then could one atom be shielded by another ? There is (surely) no rear part of an atom where another atom comes to unite so that a resistance could grow and in the absence of any such resistence, all (atoms) being of the same spatial dimension, any conglomeration thereof would be of the size of an atom as it has already been discussed.

Why don't you think that shadow and shielding pertains to the mass and not to the atoms ?

छायावृती कथं वा

यद्येकैकस्य परमाणोर्दिग्भागभेदो न स्यादादित्योदये कथमन्यत्र छाया भवत्यन्यत्रातपः। न हि तस्यान्यः प्रदेशोऽस्ति यत्रातपो न स्यात्। आवरणं च कथं भवति परमाणोः परमाण्वन्तरेण यदि दिग्भागभेदो नेष्यते। नहि कश्चिदपि परमाणोः परभागोऽस्ति यत्रागमनादन्येनान्यस्य प्रतिघातः स्यात्। असति च प्रतिघाते सर्वेषां समानदेशत्वात्सर्वः संघातः परमाणुमात्रः स्यादित्युक्तम्। किमेवं नेष्यते पिण्डस्य ते छायावृती न परमाणोरिति ? किं खलु परमाणुभ्योऽन्यः पिण्ड इष्यते यस्य ते स्याताम् ? नेत्याह।

अन्यो न पिण्डश्चेन्न तस्य ते ॥ १४ ॥

(If you say so, then in reply we would ask) is there any mass independent of the atoms that these two could ever be ascribed to ? And we believe not (it does not exist).

'And if there be no mass (independent of atoms) then these two can not be ascribed to it.' (14)

If it is admitted that there is no mass independent of the atoms, it becomes patent that these two cannot be ascribed to it. Whether it is only atoms or a conglomeration thereof, all such conjectures pertain only to the externals of the problems and as such what is the use of all such conjectures, if the very essence of things–colour and the tike can not be disproved ? What is their essence ? Obviously, their being the object of eye (consciousness) and the like and of the quality, 'blue' and the like.

The thing that is to be discussed here is this : whether objects of eye (consciousness) and the like that are (of the quality of) blue and the like are unitary substances or many? What does it matter ?

The blemishes that accrue to them in case they are many are already spoken of (and)

यदि नान्यः परमाणुभ्यः पिण्ड इष्यते न ते तस्येति सिद्धं भवति। संनिवेश परिकल्प एषः परमाणुः संघात इति वा। किमनया चिन्तया। लक्षणं तु रूपादि यदि न प्रतिषिध्यते। किं पुनस्तेषां लक्षणं चक्षुरादिविषयत्वं नीलादित्वं च। तदेवेदं संप्रधार्यते। यत्तच्चक्षुरादीनां विषयो नीलपीतादिकमिष्यते किं तदेकं द्रव्यमथवा तदनेकमिति। कि चातः ? अनेकत्वे दोष उक्तः।

एकत्वे न क्रमेणेतिर्युगपन्न ग्रहाग्रहौ।
विच्छिन्नानेकवृत्तिश्च सूक्ष्मानीक्षा च नो भवेत्॥ १५

यदि यावदविच्छिन्नं नानेकं चक्षुषो विषयस्तदेकं द्रव्यं कल्प्यते पृथिव्यां क्रमेणेति न स्याद् गमनमित्यिर्थः। सकृत्पादक्षेपेण सर्वस्य गतत्वात्। अर्वाग्भागस्य च ग्रहण परभागस्य चाग्रहणं युगपन्न स्यात्। नहि तस्यैव तदानीं ग्रहणंचाग्रहणच युक्तम्। विच्छिन्नस्य चानेकस्य हस्त्यश्वादिकस्यनेकत्र वृत्तिनं स्याद्यत्रैव ह्येकं तत्रैवापरमिति कथं तयोर्विच्छेद इष्यते ? कथ वा तदेकं यत्प्राप्तं च ताभ्यां न च प्राप्तमन्तराले तच्छून्यग्रहणात् ? सूक्ष्माणां चौदकजन्तूनां स्थूलैः समानरूपाणामनीक्षणं न स्यात्। यदि लक्षणभेदादेव द्रव्यान्तरत्वं कल्प्यते नान्यथा। तस्माद-

'If it is one (unitary incharater) then no gradual movement is possible for it cannot be that one is assailed and not asailed at the same time. (At the same time) many objects that are so different from each other could not be held to be existing in the same locus or could the minute ones be not perceived by us.' (15)

If however, what is non-discrete and not many only that can form the object of the eye (conciousness) and therefore, such a thing is taken to be unitary, then there would be no scope for any grudual movement on the earth since one single footsteq would mean covering the whole earth. It cannot be that the front part is covered and the rear one not, at the same time, in as-much-as what (is held one and unitary) cannot be covered and not-covered at the same time. What are discrete and many that is to say

वश्यं परमाणुशो भेदः कल्पयितव्यः । स चैको न सिध्यति । तस्यासिद्धौ रूपादीनां चक्षुरादिविषयत्वमसिद्धमिति सिद्धं विज्ञप्तिमात्रं भवतीति । प्रमाणवशादस्तित्वं नास्तित्वं वा निर्धार्यते । सर्वेषां च प्रमाणानां प्रत्यक्षं प्रमाणं गरिष्ठमित्यसत्यर्थे कथमियं बुद्धिर्भवति प्रत्यक्षमिति ।

प्रत्यक्षबुद्धिः स्वप्नादौ यथा

विनाप्यर्थेनेति पूर्वमेव ज्ञापितम् ।

सा च यदा तदा ।

an elephant, a horse and the like cannot be in different locuses (for the earth, you consider to be one and unitary) and thus whereever one exists there you must say exists another and how could discreteness thereof in that case, be admitted ? How also could that be one (and unitary) since between what is occupied and what is not, there is another region which is perceived as void. The minute worms born in water that are of the same essence of gross animals (because they are unitary) would not be beyond perception. If (however), it is thought that it is the difference of essence that brings about a difference of substance and not otherwise then this difference must be based on atoms and that is not esablished as unitary. That being not thus established, colour etc. cease to be regarded as the objects of eye (consciousness) and the like and as such consciousness alone becomes the only truth.

Existence or non-existence is determined on the basis of the means of valid knowledge and of all the means of valid knowledge, perception is the strongest, and if any external object does not exist then how is it that there is perception of it ?

'Perception happens as in a dream and the like'. It has already been stated that such perception occurs even without the support of any external object.

न सोऽर्थो दृश्यते तस्य प्रत्यक्षत्वं कथं मतम् ॥ १६

यदा च सा प्रत्यक्षबुद्धिर्भवतीदं मे प्रत्यक्षमिति तदा न सोऽर्थो दृश्यते मनोविज्ञानेनैव परिच्छेदाच्चक्षुर्विज्ञानस्य च तदा निरुद्धत्वादिति कथं तस्य प्रत्यक्षत्वमिष्ठम् ? विशेषेण तु क्षणिकस्य विषयस्य तदानीं निरुद्धमेव तद्रुपं रसादिकं वा। नाननुभूतं मनोविज्ञानेन स्मर्यत इत्यवश्यमर्थानुभवेन भवितव्यं तच्च दर्शनमित्येवं तद्विषयस्य रूपादेः प्रत्यक्षत्वं मतम्। असिद्धमिदमनुभूतस्यार्थस्य स्मरणं भवीति। यस्मात्।

"And when that (Perception) occurs, the content thereof is not perceived, and how can you claim that perception has occurred."(16)

And when such perception to the effect that "I perceive this" occurs, the content thereof is no longer perceived, perception is determined by the manovijñāna and the eye-consciousness at that time, must have ceased. In that case, how could you call it a (case of) perception at all? Colour, taste and the like of an everchanging object do cease (at that time i.e. when such perception occurs).

Whatever is not known, cannot be recollected by the manovijñāna and as such (If it is so recollected), it must have been known (earlier) and such knowledge in that case, must be eye-perception; and thus colour and the like other objects are considered to the contents of perception. (But) it is nct correct to say that whatever is recollected is known in as-much-as—

'It has already been demonstrated that consciousness with an image thereof does occur (without even that object existing in reality)' As without the objects, even consciousness of the kind of eye-consciousness bearing the image of an object occurs (and this has already been discussed) and so it is said :

उक्तं यथा तदाभासा विज्ञप्तिः

विनाप्यर्थेन यथार्थाभासा चक्षुर्विज्ञानादिका विज्ञप्तिरुत्पद्यते तथोक्तम् ।

स्मरणं ततः ।

ततो हि विज्ञप्तेः स्मृतिसंप्रयुक्ता तत्प्रतिभासैव रूपादिविकल्पिका मनोविज्ञप्तिरुत्पद्यत इति न स्मृत्युत्पादादर्थानुभवः सिध्यति । यदि यथा स्वप्ने विज्ञप्तिरभूतार्थविषया तथा जाग्रतोऽपि स्यात्तथैव तदभावं लोकः स्वयमवगच्छेत् । न चैवं भवति । तस्मान्न स्वप्न इवार्थोपलब्धिः सर्वा निरर्थिका । इदमाज्ञापकं । यस्मात् ।

"Recollection proceeds from that"
From such consciousness, therefore, the manovijñāpti bearing that very image in association with recollection, comes into being and it is of the nature of construction of colour and the like and as such it does not stand that since there is a recollection, there must have been knowledge of the object too.

(You may say that) if knowledge at the waking stage is also possible without any reference to its object as in the case of a dream, then people should equally feel the negation thereof. But this does not happen. All knowledge of objects, therefore, are not without reference to objects as in a dream. This is not proper in as-much-as :
"The negation of perceived objects in a dream is not known till one awakes from sleep".
In the same manner, the biotic force (Vāsanā) born of a (long persistent) habit of making wrong constructions, lulls people into a slumber, as it were, as in the case of a dream, they also perceive things not existing in reality and till they are awake (from such a sleep) do not realise the exact nature of things. But when they get awake after having attained the supersensuous inderminate

स्वप्ने दृग्विषयाभावं नाप्रबुद्धोऽवगच्छति ।। १७

एवं वितथविकल्पाभ्यासवासनानिद्रया प्रसुप्तो लोकः स्वप्न इवाभूतमर्थं पश्यन्न प्रबुद्धस्तदभावं यथावन्नावगच्छति । यदा तु तत्प्रतिपक्षलोकोत्तरनिर्विकल्पज्ञानलाभत्प्रबुद्धो भवति तदा तत्पृष्ठलब्धविशुद्धलौकिकज्ञानसंमुखीभावाद्विषयाभावं यथावदवगच्छतीति समानमेतत् । यदि स्वसंतानपरिणामविशेषादेव सत्त्वानामर्थप्रतिभासा विज्ञप्तय उत्पद्यन्ते नार्थविशेषात्, तदा य एष पापकल्याणमित्रसंपर्कात् सदसद्धर्मश्रवणाच्च विज्ञप्तिनियमः सत्वानां स कथं सिध्यति असति सदसत्संपर्के तद्देशनायां च ?

अन्योऽन्याधिपतित्वेन विज्ञप्तिनियमो मिथः ।

knowledge which is just the opposite of that (aforesaid stage of slumber i e. which contradicts false knowledge born of wrong construction) and on the heel of it (or having attained such a stage) they develop a pure (though) mundane knwoledge and by virtue of that, they realise properly the negation of objects (and therefore), it is equal (to a dream). If it be so that all knowledges representing the images of external objects proceed from the pariṇāma of its own series, and not caused by external objects then how could the fact that as a rule, knowledges vary with the conditions varying as when one comes in contact with a sinner or with a Kalyānamitra (a Mahāyāna teacher – a friend guiding along the path of welfare) or when one happens to listen to the noble religion (religious discourses) or to an ignoble one, be explained in as-much-as (in your opinion) there exists no such thing as relation with the good or with the bad or the instructions thereof.

(In answer to this, it may be said)

'That Knowledges get conditioned by each other due to their mutual predominence'.

सर्वेषां हि सत्वानामन्योऽन्यविज्ञत्याधिपत्येन मिथो विज्ञप्तेर्नियमो भवति यथायोगम्। मिथ इति परस्परतः। अतः सन्तानानन्तरविज्ञिप्तिविशेषात्सन्तानान्तरे विज्ञप्तिविशेष उत्पद्यते नार्थविशेषात्। यदि यथा स्वप्ने निरर्थिका विज्ञप्तिरेवं जाग्रतोऽपि स्यात्कस्मात्कुशलाकुशलसमुदाचारे सुप्तासुप्तयोस्तुल्यं फलमिष्टानिष्टमायत्यां न भवति ? यस्मात्।

मिद्धेनोपहृतं चित्तं स्वप्ने तेनासमं फलम् ॥ १८

इदमत्र कारणं न त्वर्थसद्भावः। यदि विज्ञप्तिमात्रमेवेदं न कस्यचित्कायोऽस्ति न वाक्। कथमनुक्रम्यमाणानामौरभ्रिकादिभिरुरभ्रादीनां मरणं भवति ? अतत्कृते वा तन्मरणे कथमौरभ्रिकादीनां प्राणातिपातावद्येन योगो भवति ?

As knowledges of all persons have a mutual predominence, these get conditioned by each other as and when called for. The word 'mithah' (in the Kārikā) means mutually. Therefore, from particular consciousness of an individual, a particular consciousness develops in another individual and not from an external object.

If as in a dream, knowledge in the waking stage also proceeds without (any reference to) any external object then how is it that the same result-good or bad does not accure, in future, to both the persons, one who is sleeping and one who is awake, when they both come in contact with the good or with the bad ?

(It does not happen) because

In a dream the 'citta' becomes 'blinded' with tne 'sloth' (of sleep) and so the result is different" . (18)
(And) this is the reason and not the existence of any external object.

If everything is but consciousness only and none possesses any body or speech, then how is it that sheep and

मरणं परविज्ञप्तिविशेषाद्विक्रिया यथा ।
स्मृतिलोपादिकान्येषां पिशाचादिमनोवशात् ।। १९

यथा हि पिशाचादिमनोवशादन्येषां स्मृतिलोपस्वप्नदर्शनभूतग्रहावेश-विकारा भवन्ति । ऋद्धिवन्मनोवशाच्च । यथा सारणस्यार्यमहाकात्यनाधिष्ठानात्स्वप्नदर्शनम् । आरण्यकर्षिमनःप्रदोषाच्च वेमचित्रपराजयः । तथा परविज्ञप्तिविशेषाधिपत्यात्परेषां जोवितेन्द्रियविरोधिनी काचिद्विक्रियोत्पद्यते यया सभागसंततिविच्छेदाख्यं मरणं भवतीति वेदितव्यम् ।

कथं वा दण्डकारण्यशून्यत्वमृषिकोपतः ।

other animals when slaughtered by a shepherd and others meet death ? If it be otherwise how they get themselves associated with the sin due to killing sheep and the like ?

"Death is (the name of) change (only) – an effect of the consciousness of another as loss of memory and the like are caused by the minds of goblins" (19)

As due to the mentations of goblins and others, loss of memory, dreaming and obsession of spirits and evil impact of planets occur, so also due to the mentations of those who possess supernatural power; as (for an example) Ārya Mahākātyāyana had directed 'Sārana' to the incident of dream (to occur) or 'Vemacitra's defeat was caused by the sinful mental attitue of the āraṇyaka the sage. Similarly,due to the predominece of consciousness of other (individuals), there arises some change in another, antagonistic to his own life - energies, by virtue of which we should know that death occurs or that is to say Sabhāga-series (sabhāga-Santati) disintegrate,

"How again was the daṇḍākāraṇya destroyed due the wrath of the sages ?"

यदि परविज्ञप्तिविशेषाधिपत्यात्सत्वानां मरणं नेष्यते ।

मनोदण्डस्य हि महासावद्यत्वं साधयता भगवतोपालिगृहपतिः पृष्ठः । (कच्चित्ते गृहपते श्रुतं केन तानि दण्डकारण्यानि कलिङ्गारण्याणि शून्यानि मेध्यीभूतानि ? तेनोक्तम् । श्रुत मे भो गौतम ऋषीणां मनःप्रदोषेणेति।)

मनोऽण्डो महावद्यः कथं वः तेन सिध्यति ॥ २०

यद्येवं कल्प्यते । तदभिप्रसन्नैरमानुषैस्तद्वासिनः सत्त्वा उत्सादिता न त्वृषीणां मनःप्रदोषान्मृता इत्येवं सति कथं तेन कर्मणा मनोदण्डः काय-वाग्दण्डाभ्यां महावद्यतमः सिद्धो भवति ? तन्मनःप्रदोषमात्रेण तावतां सत्त्वानां मरणात्सिध्यति । यदि विज्ञप्तिमात्रमेवेदं परचित्तविदः किं परचित्तं जानन्त्यथ न ? किं चातः ? यदि न जानन्ति कथं परचित्तविदो भवन्ति ? अथ जानन्ति ।

परचित्तविदां ज्ञानमयथार्थं कथं यथा ।

स्वचित्तज्ञानं

तदपि कथमयथार्थम् ।

If you do not presume that animals die due to the predominence of other's consciousness, then how would you explain as to why did the Lord with a view to demonstrating that mental violence involves enormous sins, ask Gṛhapati upāli 'oh gṛhapati ! have you ever heard as to who had completely, destroyed the daṇḍakāraṇyas, the mātangāraṇyas and the kalingāraṇyas?' To this he replied "I have heard, oh Goutama ! that these woods were destroyed because of the evil designs of the sages.'"

(If you do not admit that death is caused by the consciousness of others' then) how is the extremely sinful nature of mental voiolence ever proved." (20)

If it be so imagined that the animals other than human beings who loved to live there, annihilated those (human beings) who lived there and the mental sin of the

अज्ञानाद्यथा बुद्धस्य गोचरः ॥ २१

यथा तन्निरभिलाप्येनात्मना बुद्धानां गोचरः। तथा तदज्ञानात्तदुभयं न यथार्थं वितथप्रतिभासतया ग्राह्यग्राहकविकल्पस्याप्रहीणत्वात्। अनन्तविनिश्चय-प्रभेदागाधगाम्भीर्यायां विज्ञप्तिमात्रतायाम्।

विज्ञप्तिमात्रतासिद्धिः स्वशक्तिसदृशी मया।
कृतेयं सर्वथा सा तु न चिन्त्या

सर्वप्रकारा तु सा मादृशैश्चिन्तयितुं न शक्यते। तर्काविषयत्वात्। कस्य पुनः सा सर्वथा गोचर इत्याहः।

sages is not responsible for their death, then by such activities how is the mind conceived to be the most sinful in comprison to body and speech ? Because the very sin of their mind have finally caused the death of so many lives

If everything is but consciousness alone, then do the readers of others' minds (in your opinion) can ever read the minds of others or not ? What comes out of this ? (you may ask). (We beg to say that) in case they don't, why are they called readers of others' minds ? And if they can read, then (we beg to say)

"The k. owledge of the readers of others' minds is imperfect. (you may ask how ? to which our reply is that) just imperfect as our knowledge is"

How is that too imperfect ?

"Because of ignorance (reading others' mind is not as perfect as) the knowledge of the Buddha" (21)

As the knowledge of Buddha is essentially indiscribable, so is not theirs, both of them (the knowledge of the mind of one's own and that of others) are imperfect in as-much-as due to wrongly representing the constructions the subject and the object still persists.

बुद्धगोचरः ॥ २२ ॥

बुद्धानां हि सा भगवतां सर्वप्रकारं गोचरः सर्वाकारसर्वज्ञेयज्ञाना-विघातादिति ।

विंशतिका विज्ञप्तिमात्रतासिद्धिः ।
कृतिरियमाचार्यवसुबन्धोः ।

Vijñaptimātratā being very deep in essence and it is of a different nature because of the innumerable 'Viniścayas' involved in it.

"Vijñaptimātratā is explained by me to the extent of my capacity but with this alone, you can't compprehend it in full"; persons like me cannot comprehend each and every aspect of it, in as-much-as it is not a matter of logic. Who else then comprehend it in full (if you ask) we say

This (can be) comprehended by Buddha (alone) (22)
It is comprehened by the Buddhas in all its aspects since in them does exist the power to know everything in all its forms.

अथ त्रिंशिकाविज्ञप्तिभाष्यम्

पुद्गलधर्मनैरात्म्ययोरप्रतिपन्नानामविपरीतपुद्गलधर्मनैरात्म्यप्रतिपादनार्थं त्रिंशिकाविज्ञप्तिप्रकरणारम्भः। पुद्गलधर्मनैरात्म्यप्रतिपादनं पुनः क्लेशज्ञेयावरणप्रहाणार्थम्। तथा ह्यात्मदृष्टिप्रभवा रागादयः क्लेशाः। पुद्गलनैरात्म्यावबोधश्च सत्कायदृष्टेः प्रतिपक्षत्वात् तत्प्रहाणाय प्रवर्तमानः सर्वक्लेशान् प्रजहाति। धर्मनैरात्म्यज्ञानादपि ज्ञेयावरण-प्रतिपक्षत्वात् ज्ञेयावरणं प्रहीयते। क्लेशज्ञेयावरणप्रहाणमपि मोक्षसर्वज्ञत्वाधिगमार्थम्। क्लेशा हि मोक्षप्राप्तेरावरणमिति अतस्तेषु प्रहीणेषु मोक्षोऽधिगम्यते। ज्ञेयावरणमपि सर्वस्मिन ज्ञेये ज्ञानप्रवृत्तिप्रतिबन्धभूतमक्लिष्टमज्ञानम्। तस्मिन्प्रहीणे सर्वाकारे ज्ञेयेऽसक्तमप्रतिहतं च ज्ञानं प्रवर्तत इत्यतः सर्वज्ञत्वमधिगम्यते। अथ वा धर्मपुद्गलाभिनिविष्टाश्चित्तमात्रं यथाभूतं न जानन्तीत्यतो धर्मपुद्गलनैरात्म्यप्रदर्शनेन सफले विज्ञप्तिमात्रेऽनुपूर्वेण प्रवेशार्थं प्रकरणारम्भः। अथवा विज्ञानवद्विज्ञेयमपि द्रव्यत एवेति केचिन्मन्यन्ते; विज्ञेयवद् विज्ञानमपि संवृतित एव न परमार्थत इत्यस्य द्विप्रकारस्याप्येकान्तवादस्य प्रतिषेधार्थः प्रकरणारम्भः।

आत्मधर्मोपचारो हि विविधो यः प्रवर्तते।

लोकशास्त्रयोरिति वाक्यशेषः।

विज्ञानपरिणामोऽसौ।

आत्मधर्मोपचार इति सम्बध्यते। आत्मा धर्माश्चोपचर्यन्त इत्यात्मधर्मोपचारः। स तुनरात्मविज्ञप्तिः धर्मप्रज्ञप्तिश्च। विविध इत्यनेकप्रकारः। आत्मा जीवो जन्तुर्मनुजो माणव इत्येवमादिक आत्मोपचारः। स्कन्धा धातव आयतनानि रूपं वेदना संज्ञा संस्कारा विज्ञानमित्येवमादिको धर्मोपचारः। अयं द्विप्रकारोऽप्युपचारो विज्ञानपरिणाम एव न मुख्ये आत्मनि धर्मेषु चेति। कुत एतत्? धर्माणामात्मनश्च विज्ञानपरिणामाद् बहिरभावात्।

कोऽयं परिणामो नाम? अन्यथात्वम्। कारणक्षणनिरोधसमकालः कारणक्षणविलक्षणः कार्यस्यात्मलाभः परिणामः तत्रात्मादिविकल्पवासना परिपोषाद्रूपादिविकल्पवासनापरिपोषाच्चालयविज्ञानादात्मादिनिर्भासो विकल्पो रूपादिनिर्भासश्चोत्पद्यते। तथात्मादिनिर्भासं रूपादिनिर्भासं च तस्मात् विकल्पात् बहिर्भूतमिवोपादायात्माद्युपचारो रूपादिधर्मोपचारश्चानादिकालिक प्रवतते। विनापि बाह्येनात्मना धर्मैश्च, तद्यथा तैमिरिकस्य केशोण्डुकाद्युपचार

इति । यच्च यत्र नास्ति तत् तत्रोपचर्यते तद्यथा बाहीके गौः । एवं विज्ञान-स्वरूपे बहिश्चात्मधर्माभावात् परिकल्पित एवात्मा धर्माश्च न तु परमार्थतः सन्तीति विज्ञानवद् विज्ञेयमप्युच्यत एवेत्ययमेकान्तवादो नाभ्युपेयः । उपचारस्य च निराधारस्यासंभवादवश्यं विज्ञानपरिणामो वस्तुतोऽभ्युपगन्तव्यो यत्रात्म-धर्मोपचारः प्रवर्तते । अतश्चायमभ्युगमो न युक्तिक्षमो, विज्ञानमपि विज्ञेयवत् संवृतित एव न परमार्थत इति संवृतितोऽप्यभावप्रसङ्गात्,न हि संवृतिर्निरुपादाना युज्यते तस्मादयमेकान्तवादो द्विप्रकारोऽपि निर्युक्तिकत्वात् त्याज्य इत्याचार्य-वचनम् । एवं च सर्वं विज्ञेयं परिकल्पितस्वभावत्वाद् वस्तुतो न विद्यते विज्ञानं पुनः प्रतीत्यसमुत्पन्नत्वाद् द्रव्यतोऽस्तीत्यभ्युपेयम् । प्रतीत्यसमुपन्नत्वं पुन-र्विज्ञानस्य परिणामशब्देन ज्ञापितम् ।

कथमेतद् गम्यते विना बाह्येनार्थेन विज्ञानमेवार्थाकारमुत्पद्यत इति ? बाह्यो ह्यर्थः स्वाभासविज्ञानजनकत्वेन विज्ञानस्यालम्बनप्रत्यय इष्यते न कारणत्वमात्रेण समनन्तरादिप्रत्ययर्बिशेषाप्रसङ्गात् । संचितालम्बनाश्च पञ्चविज्ञानकायास्तदाकारत्वात् । न च संचितमवयवसंहतिमात्रात् अन्यद् विद्यते । तदवयवानपोह्य संचिताकारविज्ञानाभावात् । तस्माद् विनैव वाह्ये-नार्थेन विज्ञानं संचिताकारमुत्पद्यते । न च परमाणव एव संचितास्त-स्यालम्बनं, परमाणूनां अतदाकारत्वात् । न ह्यसंचितावस्थातः संचितावस्थायां परमाणूनां कश्चिदात्मातिशयः । तस्माद् असंचितवत् संचिता अपि परमाणवो नैवालम्बनम् । अन्यस्तु मन्यते । एकैकपरमाणुरन्यनिरपेक्ष्योऽतीन्द्रियो वहवस्तु परस्परापेक्षा इन्द्रियग्राह्याः । तेषामपि सापेक्षनिरपेक्षावस्थयोरात्मातिशयाभावात् एकान्तेनेन्द्रियग्राह्यत्वम् अतीन्द्रियत्वं वा । यदि च परमाणव एव परस्परापेक्षा विज्ञानस्य विषयीभवन्ति एवं सति योऽयं घटकुड्याद्याकारभेदो विज्ञाने स न स्यात् परमाणूनां अतदाकारत्वात् । न चान्यनिर्भासस्य विज्ञानस्यान्याकारो विषयो युज्यतेऽतिप्रसङ्गात् । न च परमाणवः स्वम्भादिवत् परमार्थतः सन्ति अर्वाङ्मध्यपरभागसद्भावात् । तदनभ्युपगमे वा पूर्वदक्षिणापरोत्तरादि दिगभेदोयः स परमाणोर्न स्यात् । ततश्च विज्ञानवत् परमाणोरप्यमूर्तत्वम-देशस्थत्व च प्रसज्यते । एवं बाह्यार्थाभावाद् विज्ञानमेवार्थाकारमुत्पद्यते स्वप्नविज्ञानवद् इत्यभ्युपेतम् । वेदनादयोऽपि नातीताऽनागतास्तदाकारविज्ञान-जनका निरुद्धाजातत्वात् । न च वर्तमाना वर्तमानजनका उत्पद्यमानावस्थायां असत्वात् उत्पन्नावस्थायां विज्ञानस्यापि तदाकारेणोत्पन्नत्वात् न किंचित् कर्तव्यमस्तीति मनोविज्ञानमप्यनालम्बनमेवोत्पद्यते ।

अन्यस्त्वाह । असत्यात्मनि मुख्ये धर्मेषु चोपचारो न युज्यते । उपचारो हि त्रिषु भवति नान्यतमाभावे मुख्यपदार्थे तत्सदृशेऽन्यस्मिन् विषये तयोश्च सादृश्ये । तद्यथा मुख्येऽग्नौ तत्सदृशे च माणवके तयोश्च साधारणे धर्मे कपिलत्वे तीक्ष्णत्वे वा सत्यग्निर्माणवक इत्युपचारः क्रियते । अत्र ह्यग्निर्माणवक इति जातिर्द्रव्यं वोपचर्यते ? उभयथात्युपचाराभावः । तत्र तावन्न जातेः साधारणं कपिलत्वं तीक्ष्णत्वं वा । न च साधारणधर्माभावे माणवके जातेरुपचारो युज्य- तेऽतिप्रसंगात् । अतद्धर्मत्वेऽपि जातेः तीक्ष्णत्वकपिलत्वयोः जात्यविनाभवित्वान् माणवके जात्युपचारो भविष्यति । जात्यभावेऽपि तीक्ष्णत्वकपिलत्वयोर्माणवके दर्शनात् अविनाभावित्वमयुक्तम् । अविनाभावित्वे चोपचाराभावोऽग्नाविव माणवकेऽपि जातिसद्भावात् । तस्मान्न माणवके जात्युपचारः सम्भवति । नापि द्रव्योपचारः सामान्यधर्माभावात् । न हि योऽग्नेस्तीक्ष्णगुणं कपिलो वा स एव माणवके । किं तर्हि ? ततोऽन्यः विशेषस्य स्वाश्रयप्रतिबद्धत्वात् । न विनाग्निगुणेनाग्नेर्माणवके उपचारो युक्त; । अग्निगुणसादृश्यात् युक्त इति चेत् । एवमप्यग्निगुणस्यैव तीक्ष्णस्य कपिलस्य वा माणवकगुणे तीक्ष्णे कपिले सादृश्याद् उपचारो युक्तो न तु माणवकेऽग्नेः गुणसादृश्येनासम्बन्धात् । तस्माद् द्रव्योपचारोऽपि नैव युज्यते । मुख्योऽपि पदार्थो नास्ति, तत्स्वरूपस्य सर्वज्ञाना- भिधानविषयातिक्रान्तत्वात् । प्रधाने हि गुणरूपेणैव ज्ञानाभिधाने प्रवर्तेते तत्स्वरूपासंस्पर्शात् । अन्यथा च गुणवैयर्थ्यप्रसङ्गः । न हि ज्ञानाभिधानव्यति- रिक्तोऽन्यः पदार्थस्वरूपपरिच्छित्त्युपायोऽस्तीत्यतः प्रधानस्वरूपविषयज्ञानाभि- धानाभावात् नैव मुख्यः पदार्थोऽस्तीत्यवगन्तव्यम् । एवं यावच्छब्दे सम्बन्धाभावात् ज्ञानाभिधानाभाव एवं चाभिधानाभिधेयाभावान् नैव मुख्यः पदार्थोऽस्ति । अपि च सर्व एवायं गौणो हि नाम यो यत्राविद्यमानेन रूपेण प्रवर्तते । सर्वश्च शब्दः प्रधानेऽविद्यमानेनैव गुणरूपेण प्रवर्तते अतो मुख्यो नास्त्येव । तत्र यदुक्तं असत्यात्मनि मुख्ये धर्मेषु चोपचारो न युक्त इति तदयुक्तम् ।

विज्ञानपरिणामः कतिभेद इति न ज्ञायते । अतस्तद्प्रभेदोपदर्शनार्थमाह ।

परिणामः स च त्रिधा ॥१॥

यत्रात्माद्युपचारो धर्मोपचारश्च स पुनर्हेतुभावेन फलभावेन च विद्यते तत्र हेतुपरिणामो याऽऽलयविज्ञाने विपाकनिःष्यन्दवासनापरिपुष्टिः । फलपरिणामः

The treatise in thirty Kārikās' on the doctrine of 'vijñaptimātratā' aims at giving a correct exposition of the non-substantiality of the individual (pudgala-nairātmya)[1]

पुनर्विपाकवासनावृत्तिलाभादालयविज्ञानस्य पूर्वकर्माक्षेपपरिसमाप्तौ या निकायसभागान्तरेष्वभिनिर्वृत्तिः निष्यन्दवासनावृत्तिलाभाच्च या प्रवृत्तिविज्ञानानां क्लिष्टस्य च मनस आलयविज्ञानाद् अभिनिर्वृत्तिः । तत्र प्रवृत्तिविज्ञानं कुशलाकुशलम् आलयविज्ञाने विपाकवासनां चाधत्ते । अव्याकृतं क्लिष्टं च मनो निष्यन्दवासनामेव ।

योऽसौ त्रिविधः परिणाम उक्तोऽसावपि न ज्ञायते । अतस्तद्भेद प्रदर्शनार्थमाह ।

विपाको मननाख्यश्च विज्ञप्तिर्विषयस्य च ।

इति । स एष त्रिविधः परिणामो विपाकाख्यो मननाख्यो विषयविज्ञप्त्याख्यश्च । तत्र कुशलाकुशलकर्मवासनापरिपाकवशाद् यथाक्षेपं फलाभिनिर्वृत्तिर्विपाकः क्लिष्टं मनो नित्यं मननात्मकत्मकत्वात् मननाख्यम् । रूपादिविषय प्रत्यबभासत्वात् चक्षुरादिविज्ञानं षट्प्रकारमपि विषयविज्ञप्तिः तत्स्वरूपनिर्देशमन्तरेण न तत् प्रतीयते इत्यतो यस्य यत्स्वरूपं तद्यथाक्रमं प्रदर्शयन्नाह ।

तत्रालयाख्यं विज्ञानं विपाकः सर्वबीजकम् ।। २ ।।

इति तत्रेति योऽयमनन्तरोक्तः त्रिविधः परिणामः । आलयाख्यमित्यालयविज्ञानसंज्ञकं यद्विज्ञानं स विपाकपरिणामः । तत्र सर्वसांक्लेशिकधर्मबीजस्थानत्वाद् आलयः । आलयः स्थानमिति पर्यायौ । अथ वालीयन्ते उपनिबध्यन्तेऽस्मिन्सर्वधर्माः कार्यभावेन तद्वालीयते उपनिबध्यते कारणभावेन सर्वधर्मेष्वित्यालयः । विजानातीति विज्ञानम् । सर्वधातुगतियोनिजातिषु कुशलाकुशल कर्मविपाकत्वाद् विपाकः । सर्वधर्मबीजाश्रयत्वात् सर्वबीजकम् । यदि प्रवृत्तिविज्ञानव्यतिरिक्तम् आलयविज्ञानमस्ति ततोऽस्यालम्बनम् आकारो वा वक्तव्यः । न हि निरालम्बनं निराकारं वा विज्ञानं युज्यते । नैव तन्निरालम्बनं निराकारं

and the non-substantiality of the elements (dharma-nairātmya)[2] for (the sake of) those who have not an adequate understandsng or have misunderstanding with regard to these (two kinds of non-substantiality), The exposition of the non-substantiality of the individual and of the elements is meant for the termination of 'kleśas' (causes of afflictton) and jñeyāvaraṇa (obstacles that cover

वेष्यते किं तद्ध्यपरिच्छिन्नालम्बनाकारम् । किं कारणम् ? यस्मादालय-विज्ञानं द्विधाप्रवर्तते । अध्यात्मम् उपादानविज्ञप्तितो बहिर्धाऽपरिच्छिन्नाकार-भाजनविज्ञप्तितश्च । तत्राध्यात्ममुपा ानं परिकल्पितस्वभावभिनिवेशवासना वा साधिष्ठानम् इन्द्रियरूपं नाम च अस्यालम्बनस्याति सूक्ष्मत्वात्—

असंविदितकोपादिस्थानविज्ञप्तिकं च तत् ।

असंविदितक उपादिर्यस्मिन् असंविदितका चावस्थानविज्ञप्तिर्यस्मिन् तदालय-विज्ञानम् असंविदितकोपादिस्थानविज्ञप्तिकम् ।

उपादानम् उपादिः । स पुनरात्मादिविकल्पवासना रूपादिधर्मविकल्पवासना च । तत्सद्भावादालयविज्ञानेनात्मादिविकल्पो रूपादिविकल्पश्च कार्यत्वेनोपात्त इति तद्वासनात्मादिविकल्पानां रूपादिविकल्पानां चोपादिरित्युच्यते । सोऽस्मिन्न इदं तदिति प्रतिसंवेदनाकारेणासंविदित इत्यतस्तदसंविदितकोपादीत्युच्यते । आश्रयोपादानं चोपादिः । आश्रय आत्मभावः साधिष्ठानम् इन्द्रियरूपं नाम च । तस्य पुनर्यदुपादानम् उपगमनम् एकयोगक्षेमत्वेन तदुपादिः । तत्र कामरूप-धात्वोर्द्वयोर्नामरूपयोरुपादानम् । आरूप्यधातौ तु रूपवीतरागत्वाद्रूपविपाका-नभिनिर्वृत्तेर्नामापादानमेव । किं तु वासनावस्थमेव तत्र रूप न पिवाका-वस्थम् । तत्पुनरुपादानम् इदतया प्रतिसंवेदयितुमशक्यमित्यतोऽसंविदित इत्युच्यते । स्थानविज्ञप्तिर्भाजनलोकसंनिवेशविज्ञप्तिः । साप्यपरिच्छिन्नालम्बना-कारप्रवृत्तत्वाद् असंविदितेत्युच्यते । कथ विज्ञानम् अपरिच्छिन्नालम्बनाकारं भविष्यतीति ? अन्यविज्ञानवादिनामपि निरोधसमापत्त्याद्यवस्थासु तुल्यमेतन् न न निरोधसमापत्त्याद्यवस्थासु विज्ञान नैवास्तीति शक्यते प्रतिपत्तुं युक्तिविरोधात् सूत्रविरोधाच्चेति ।

up the object of knowledge). The 'kleśas' are 'rāga' or attachment and the like that proceed from the (false) view of the self (self taken to be a substantial entity). Since the apprehension of the non-substantiality of the individual stands directly opposed to the false view of the self, one who aims at terminating that (the false view of the self) abandons all the 'kleśas'. By the realisation of the non-substantiality of the elements, one removes the obstacle which screens the object of knowledge, because this realisa-

तत्रालयाख्यं विज्ञानमित्युक्तं विज्ञानं चावश्यं चैत्तैः संप्रयुक्तमित्यतो वक्तव्यं कतमैः कतिभिश्च तच्चैत्तैः सदा संप्रयुज्यते। तथा किं तैः सर्वदा संप्रयुज्यते उत नेत्यत आह।

सदा स्पर्शमनस्कारवित्संज्ञाचेतनान्वितम् ॥ ३ ॥

इति। सदेति यावदालयविज्ञानं तावदेभिः स्पर्शमनस्कारवेदनासंज्ञाचेतनाख्यैः पंचभिः सर्वत्रगैर्धर्मैरन्वितम्। वेदनं वित्। तत्रस्पर्शस्त्रिकसंनिपाते इन्द्रियविकार-परिच्छेदः वेदनासनिश्रयकर्मकः। इन्द्रियविषयविज्ञानानि त्रीण्येव त्रिकं तस्य कार्यकारणभावेन समवस्थानं त्रिकसनिपातः। तस्मिन् सति तत्समकालमेवेन्द्रि-यस्य सुखदुःखादिवेदनानुकूलो यो विकारस्तेन सदृशो विषयस्य सुखादिवेदनीया-कारपरिच्छेदो यः स स्पर्शः। इन्द्रियं पुनर्येन विशेषेण सुखदुःखादिहेतुत्वं प्रतिपद्यते स तस्य विकारः। स्पर्शः पुनरिन्द्रियविकारसादृश्येनेन्द्रियं स्पृशतीन्द्रियेण वा स्पृश्यत इति स्पर्श उच्यते। अत एव विषयविकारपरिछेदात्मकोऽपीन्द्रियविकार-परिछेद उक्तः। वेदनासंनिश्रयत्वमस्य कर्म। एवं ह्युक्तं सूत्रे सुखवेदनीयं स्पर्शं प्रतीत्योत्पद्यते सुखंवेदितमिति विस्तरः। मनस्कारश्चेतस आभोगः। आभुजनमाभोगः। आलम्बने येन चित्तमभिमुखीक्रियते। स पुनरालम्बने चित्त-धारणकर्मा। चित्तधारणं पुनस्तत्रैवालम्बने पुनः पुनश्चित्तस्यावर्जनम्। एतच्च कर्म चित्तसंततेरालम्बननियमेन विशिष्टं मनस्कारमधिकृत्योक्तं न तु यः प्रति-चित्तक्षणं तस्य हि प्रतिक्षणमेव व्यापारो न क्षणान्तरे।

tion is opposed to it. The removal of these two kinds of obstructions is again meant for attaining liberation (nirvāṇa) and omniscience (sarvajñatva).[3] The 'kleśas' are the obstacles to the attainment of freedom and so when they are rooted out, freedom is realised. The 'jñeyāvarana' is non-afflictive ignorance which is an impediment to the rise of (right) knowledge of all that is knowable. When this is lifted off, consciousness of all forms of things proceeds unabated without any attachment (to any object in particular) and as such omniscience is attained. Or, it may also be said that, because those who are deeply engrossed in the reality of the individual and the

elements cannot realise the sole reality of consciousness in its true nature. this treatise has been composed in order to reveal the non-substantiality of the individual and of the elements so that they may gradually enter into the accomplished truth of consciousness alone[4] (or consciousness as the only reality). Or, (it may be said that since) some[5] (sarvāstivādins) hold that like cognition, the object of cognition is also substantially (real), while some others (Mādhyamika) hold[6] that like its object of cognition, it itself is also only a phenomenal (relative) appearance and not an absolute reality, the treatise aims at rejecting these two kinds of extreme views.

Kārikā—ātma-dharmopacāro hi vividho yaḥ pravartate vijñāna-pariṇāmo' sau.

The various constructions (or impositions) as the soul or the elements (which are) prevalent, amongst the people and in the śāstras are but the development of vijñāna or consciousness.

Bhāṣya—The word 'ātma-dharmopacāra' (in the verse) is syntactically connected with vijñānapariṇāma. Ātmadharmopacāra means that the ātman or the soul and 'dharma' or elements are superimposed. This again means (preverted) apprehension of the self and the elements (as substantial entities). The word 'vividha' (in the kārikā) means various kinds; (of constructions). 'ātmopacāra' stands for imposed constructions like ātma or soul; jīva or the living being, jantu or animal, manuja or mānava or human beings and the like. 'Dharmopacāra' means constructions like the 'skandhas', the 'dhātus', the 'āyatanas', ('rūpa' 'vedanā'; saṁjñā, saṁskāra, vijñāna) and the like. Both these two kinds of constructions are superimposed on the development of consciousness, and not on real soul or real elements in

their primary senses. Why so? Because the soul or the elements have no existence independent ot the development of consciousness. What is this development ? Development means being otherwise, the emergence of the effect as distinct from the causal moment, but simultaneous with the cessation of the causal moment.[7] Configurations like soul and matter proceed from the Ālaya-Consciousness that sustains a natural constructive capacity (vikalpa-vāsanā) in regard to soul or matter. Assuming such mental reflexes as soul and matter to be external to this configuration (vikalpa), the age-old superimpositions of soul and matter have proceeded even without any soul or matter (existing) apart, as for an example, the false impositions of hair-webs made by a man with diseased eyes. Imposition means ascribing a thing to where it does not exist[8], as when a bull is ascribed to the man of the *vāhīka* country. Thus vijñāna being (the only reality) and there being no soul or dharma external (to it), the soul or the dharmas (elements) are only constructed and are not fundamentally real, therefore, the extremist view that like conciousness the cognised also are (a reality) should not to be entertained. Upacāra being impossible without (there being) a substratum, the transformation of conciousness has to be regarded as a reality on which soul or elements are superimposed. Therefore, the argument that the consciousness also like the congnised is only a relative existence and not a transcendental reality is not logically tenable. Since a groundless (phenomenal) appearance is unintelligible that would have led to the impossibility of conciousness itself even as an appearance. Thus these two kinds of extreme views should be rejected because of illogicality, so says the Master.

Thus no object of cognition exists as reality because it is a constructed phenomenon; conciousness, on the contrary

has to be considered as substantially real by virtue of its having dependent origination. The dependent origination of conciousness again is expressed by the word, pariṇāma.

(But) how is it tenable that even without an external object, conciousness having the image of an external object, arises ?

An external object is regarded as the object-cause of consciousness by virtue of its effecting an impression, having an image of itself, and not by virtue of its causal efficiency in general, because (in that case) there should not have been other causal subdivisions like the homogeneous cause and the like.

The five (varieties of) sensuous conciousness have their objects in their collective forms (only) in-as-much-as they (the five sense-impressions) correspond to the images thereof (of the objects in collective forms.) But there is no collective form apart from the collocation of its (constituent) parts, because if the parts are excluded, there can be no consciousness, corresponding to the collective form. Thus even without an external object, consciousness, corresponding to the image of the collective form arises.[9] Nor is it tenable that the very atoms, being collocated together form the object of it (consciousness), because these do not correspond to the image in consciousness.[10] Nor do the atoms, when collocated assume any additional excellence (in regard to themselves),over the atoms when these are not so collocated. Therefore, the atoms, when collocated cannot be the object of cognition, as when they are not collocated.

Others[11] however contend that atoms in single and (thus) independent of each other are imperceptible, while in many and (thus) dependent on each other, these are perceptible by the sense-organs. But there being no

excellence in themselves with the difference of the two different stages of their being dependent or independent, these should be either absolutely perceptible or absolutely imperceptible by the sense-organs. Even if the atoms when dependent on each other (when in conjunction with each other) form the object of consciousness, then in that case, in consciousness, there should not have been differences in the image of a pitcher or of a wall and the like in-as-much-as atoms never correspond to such images. Nor is it reasonable (to hold) that a consciousness, embracing something should correspond to the form of something else as that involves an unwarrantable over-extension. Nor are the atoms, like a pillar, basically real in-as-much-as these (too) have converse, central and obverse parts. If that is not admitted, atoms should not have the spatial divisions like eastern, southern, western and northern sides and so on. It would, therefore, mean that like consciousness, atoms are without shape and that these have no spatial dimension. Thus there being no external object, consciousness itself appears as (manifold external) object (artha) and corresponds to the form of itself (ākāra) like a dream-consciousness. The past or the future Vedanā and the like (other skandhas) do not produce any consciousness corresponding to the forms of themselves of the past or of the future, because these have been either ceased to function or have not yet come to exist. Nor do the present ones produce any (consciousness corresponding to the forms of themselves) of the present, because these do not (logically) exist during (the process of) growth; (and) when grown, consciousness itself having grown corresponding to the image thereof, nothing else is left to be done; the *manovijñāna*, (sixth consciousness) therefore, also grows without an objective basis.

Others, however, say (that) there being no primary soul or any (primary) substance, 'upacāra' (or any fancied identification, founded on resemblance i.e., construction) is not posible. 'Upacāra' is possible only when three elements are present i e. the primary substanee, an object similar to it and the attribute, identical to both of them; (and) not in case where any of them is wanting. As for an example, when there is the primary substance, the fire, and the object similar to it, the boy, and the quality, identical to both of them, irascibility or redness; there is the 'upacāra' (or fancied identification), 'agnirmānavaka' or the boy is fire.

(But the question is as to whether), here the 'upacāra' is of the 'jāti', universal or of the 'dravya' or, "individual. In none of these two cases, is the 'upacāra' possible A 'jāti' or genus does not possess any quality like 'tīkṣṇatva' or 'kapilatva' identically present in another object.[12] Nor without any such quality, commonly shared (by both), can there be any upacāra of genus in-as-much-as that would involve an unwarranted widening of the scope.[13]

Though fire as a universal is not a property of the boy, there is the possibility of '*jātyupacāra*' on the 'māṇavaka' or the boy due to the inseparable association of 'tīkṣṇatva' and 'kapilatva' with the 'jāti[14] (of fire). — (says the pūrvapakṣa).

(The siddhānta-pakṣa replies): (This is not tenable because) any such inseparable association cannot be logically established in-as-much-as 'tīkṣṇātva' or kapilatva is found to be existing in the boy even without the universal of fire.[15] (And) if any such inseparable association is tenable at all, then there need not be any 'upacāra,' because in that case, the 'jāti' is equally present in the boy

as in fire.[16] There can, therefore, be no *'jātyupacārā'* on the boy. Nor is there (the possibility of) *'dravyopacāra'* because (in that case) there is no common attribute (idendical to both). (It can not be held that) the same quality of irascibility or redness which is present in the fire is present in the boy.[17] What is it then ? The quality, possessed by the boy is something different from that of the fire, because the uniqueness is limited to its own locus. (So) there should not be any upacāra of agni on mānavaka without the quality of the fire (being present in the boy).

(If you say that) due to the similarity of the quality of fire (with that of the boy, upacāra) is possible. In that case, due to the similarity of 'tīkṣṇatvā' or 'kapilatva – the quality of fire, with that of the boy, there should be the upacāra of tīkṣṇatva or kapilatva – the quality of fire on the quality (tīkṣṇatva or kapilatva) subsisting in the boy, and not of fire on the boy because (the two substrata remain) unrelated through similarity of attributes. Thus even *'dravyopacāra'* is not possible.

Even the primary substance does not exist in-as-much-as niether thought nor language can make its essence an object of reference. Thought and language in regard to the primary substance proceed only by way of its qualities in-as-much-as they cannot contact its essences, for there is no co-relation with its essence [19] Otherwise, the attributes become futile. Nor is there any means other than thought or language to comprehend the essence of a meaning (padārtha, entity); (and) as there is no conceptual understanding or any judgement in regard to the object (in the form of) the essence of the primary substance, it is to be understood that there is no such primary substance. There being

therefore, no co-relation with the relevant word there is no concept or name, corresponding thereto and there being no denotation and the denotated, there is no primary substance.[20] Everything is but non-essential (in nature) and there is no primary substance. 'Non-essential' means what proceeds in the form of a synthetical construction upon something objectively unreal. All words represent the qualities (that are) imagined to be subsisting in the 'pradhāna'.[21] Thus the primary substance does not exist. Therefore, what has been said that 'there being no primary pervading substance and (ultimate) elements, construction (or imposition) is not possible' is not logical.

It is not known as to how many kinds of developments of 'vijñāna' are there, (and) as such with a view to showing the varieties, thereof, it is said

Pariṇāmaḥ sa ca tridhā. (1)

development (of vijñāna is threefold) on which ātmā and the like[22] or Soul & dharmas are imposed (or constructed). It (such a development) may function as a cause or as an effect. Of these, the development functioning as a cause means the reimbursment of the Biotic force (vāsanā) of either of 'vipāka' and 'niṣyanda.''[23] The development, functioning as an effect means the proceeding of the Ālaya-vijñāna towards 'nikāya-sabhāga'[24] (uniform course) as a result of the 'Vipākavāsanā', having assumed its functioning and with the completion of what is called for by previous deeds (moral antecedents), as also, on the niṣyanda-vāsanā having assumed its functioning, the manifestation of the six Pravṛtti-vijñānas and of the afflicted manas from the Ālaya-vijñāna. The pravṛtti-vijñānas' both good and evil (where efforts are implied) holds the vipāka-vāsanā

and the niṣyanda-vāsanā on to the Ālaya-vijñāna. The manas whether afflicted or indifferent (avyākṛta i.e. neither good nor evil; kliṣṭa in the case of an ordinary man and avyākṛta in the case of a holy man) holds only the niṣyanda-vāsanā. What has been spoken of the threefold pariṇāma is not (well) understood either. Thus to specify them, it is said

Vipāko mananākhyaśca vijñaptirviṣayasya ca.

This threefold (pariṇāma) is called, vipāka, manana and viṣayavijñapti. Of these, vipāka means the accomplishment of maturation as the natural outcome of the Biotic force of good or evil deeds (moral antecedents) as foreshadowed (by the antecedents). The afflicted (or defiled) 'manas' is called 'manana' or intellection (of the notion of self-consciousness) because of its perpetual reflection. The eye-consciousness and the like, each having the specific appearance of 'rūpa' and the like are categorised as viṣaya-vijñapti, and these are of six varieties. But for the specific indication of the essence of each (of the three kinds of pariṇāma), these are not (well) under-stood and so with a view to indicating their particular essence chronologically, it is said.

tatrālayākhyaṁ vijñānaṁ vipākaḥ sarvavījakaṁ. (2)

The word, 'tatra' means of what has been just said that pariṇāma is threefold; 'ālayākhya' means the consciousness, called ālayavijñāna—the consciousness which is a pariṇāma of moral causation, (vipāka). It is (called) 'ālaya' because it (functions as) the store-house of the seeds of all dharmas or entities imbued with the nature of restlessness (to manifest). Ālaya and Sthāna or store-house are but synonyms. (or Ālaya is such); Where all the elements (ideas) as manifestations (earlier) reside and are organised

वेदना अनुभवस्वभावा । सा पुनर्विषयस्याह्लादकपरितापकतदुभयाकार-विविक्तस्वरूपसाक्षात्करणभेदात् त्रिधा भवति । सुखा दुःखा अदुःखासुखा च ।

or are held together for future growth. or that (ālaya) as an impelling (or actuating) principle in regard to all elements holds them together. (At the same time) Ālaya is a consciousness in-as-much-as it apprehends[25]. It is (also called) 'vipāka' because of its maturing influence of good or bad (moral) antecedents in regard to all 'dhātus', 'gatis', 'yonis' and 'jātis' It is (also called) Sarva-vījaka because of its functioning as the store-house of the seeds of all elements (ideas).

In case, there be an 'ālaya-vijñāna' as apart from the 'pravṛttivijñānas', then its external support and form have to be ascertained. There can not be a consciousness independent of its object and form.

(Actually So). It is neither sought to be held as independent of its object and form. What (is) then (sought after) ? (It is sought) that its object and form are (never) distinct. What is the reason (thereof) ? Because, Ālaya-Consciousness proceeds in a dichotomy. One is internal by virtue of its apprehending (its own) substrate (upādāna) (and the other is) external by virtue of its apprehending the (unreal) external world of indistinct form. Of these, the internal substrates are the Biotic force of attachment for the constructed (world), the sensation in conformity with the senses and a name that have their locations (in the Biotic force). And due the extreme subtleness of its objective aspect (it is said)

'asaṁviditakopādi-sthānavijñaptikaṁ ca tat'.

'that is the consciousness in which 'upādi' (the substrate)

एवं त्वन्ये मन्यन्ते। शुभाशुभानां कर्मणां फलविपाकं प्रत्यनुभवन्त्यनेनेत्यनुभवः। तत्र शुभानां कर्मणां सुखोऽनुभवः फलविपाकः। अशुभानां दुःखः। उभयेषामदुःखासुखः। अत्र चालयविज्ञानमेव शुभाशुभकर्मविपाकः। तत्संप्रयुक्तैवोपेक्षा परमार्थतः शुभाशुभानां कर्मणां फलविपाकः। सुखदुःखयोस्तु कुशलाकुशल-

and sthāna (avasthāna=bhājana-the external world) are indistinctly apprehended.

'asaṁviditakopādisthānavijñaptika' means the ālays-vijñāna in which the upādi is indistinctly apprehended and the cognition of the world of experience is indistinct as well. Upādi means upādāna or the snbstrate which is but the innate constructive capacity of (the construction of) ātmā and the like and of the dharmas like 'rūpa' and the like[26]. Due to the functioning of that (vikalpa-vāsanā) the ālaya-vijñāna pushes the constructive thought of Soul and the like as also that of rūpa and the like as efficient existence and thus such a vāsanā or the innate constructive capacity is designated as upādi or substrate of the constructive thought of Soul and the like and of rūpa and the like.[27] It is called as having an in distinct substrate in-as-much-as it (upādi) is not felt as in a direct cognition like 'it is here', 'it is that' and the like. Upādi also means the substrate (upādaña)of 'aśraya',āśraya means'selfbeing'(ātmabhāvah),[28] the sensation in conformity with the senses and mentations having their location (in the vāsanā).[29] The substrate-cause of that (āśraya) again or the knowledge of one unified whole is called the upādi. In the 'Kāmadhātu' and in the 'rūpa-dhātu' 'nāma' and 'rūpa' function as the substrate-cause. In the arūpa-dhātu, rūpa having been disinclined for, and thus there having been no scope for rūpa to (undergo the) maturing (influence of moral antecedents) nāma alone (functions as) the substrate cause. But (the

कर्मविपाकजत्वाद् विपाकोपचारः। तत्र सुखोऽनुभवः यस्मिन्नुत्पन्नेऽवियोगेच्छा निरुद्धे च पुनः संयोगेच्छा जायते। दुःखोऽनुभवः यस्मिन्नुत्पन्ने वियोगेच्छा निरुद्धे च पुनरसंयोगेच्छा। अदुःखासुखो यस्मिन्नुत्पन्ने निरुद्धे चोभय न जायते। संज्ञा विषयनिमित्तोद्ग्रहणम्। विषय आलम्बनम्। निमित्तं तद्विशेषो

element of colour is there (in the arūpa-dhātu) in the Biotic force but not (having the potentiality) to mature. That substrate, however, being incapable of being cognised as a reality (idaṁtayā) is called asaṁvidita.

Sthāna vijñāpti means the cognition that is directly intent upon (cognising) the world of experience. That also is called 'assaṁividita' in-as-much-as that functions with no distinct ālambana or ākāra.

How can a vijñāna (which should mean a distinct knowledge) correspond to an indistinct object (or objective aspect) and an indistinct form (or image)? (Why not?). It is just the same as what the other vijñāna-vādins hold[30] in regard to nirodha-samāpatti[31] and the like other stages, and it is not that in nirodha-samāpatti and the similar other stages, that 'vijñāna' is not there and so it can not be flouted (outright). Because it is opposed to reason and the 'Sūtras'.

What is called Ālaya is (but) a vijñāna—it has been so said; (as) a vijñāna must be associated with caitta or mental dharmas and as such it must be enumerated as to with which and with how many mental dharmas, it is universally associated. Is it that it is always associated with them or not? So (in order to asscertain) it is said.

'Sadā sparśa-manaskāra-vit-saṁjñā-cetanānvitam'. (3) (It is also associated with sensation (sparśa = contact bet-

नीलपीताद्यालम्बनव्यवस्थाकारणम् । तस्योद्ग्रहणं निरूपणं नीलमेतन् न पीत-मिति । चेतना चित्ताभिसंस्कारो मनसश्चेष्टा यस्यां सत्यामालम्बनं प्रति चेतस;

ween object, sense organ and conciousness), attention (manaskāra), faculty of feeling (vit = vedanā), concepts (Saṁjñā = capable of coalescing with a word) and will (cetanā = concious efforts). The word, 'Sadā' means as long as the Ālaya-vijñāna functions, it is associated with Sparśa, manaskāra, vit, saṁjñā and cetanā – these five 'Sarvatraga' or universal dharmas or (mental) phenomena. Vit means 'vedanā'. Here sparśa means the decisive understanding (born of) the transformation of the sense-organ due to trika-sannipāta or the tripartite conjuction (content cognised, instrument of congnition and the congising consciousness); and it provides the support to feeling. The sense-organ, the sense-object and consciousness—these three only are (meant by the word), trika or the triad and 'trika-sannipāta' means functional interdependence of that (triad). That being there, the contemporaneous transformation of the sense-organ toward the feeling of pleasure and pain and in co-ordination with such transformation, the decisive understanding of the object (sense-data) corresponding to the image of what is (liable to be) felt as pleasure and the like is called sensation (or sparśa).[32] The distinction(viśesa) by reason of which the sensa-organ assumes the function of pleasure, pain and the like is its transformation. Sparśa is so called because it touches the sense-organ in co-ordination with the transformation of the sense-organ or is touched by the sense-organ. The decisive understanding (born) of the transformation of the object is also called as (what is born) of the transformation of the sense-organ. Its function is to provide support to (the rise of)

प्रस्यन्द इव भवति अयस्कान्तवशादयःप्रस्यन्दवत् । वेदना त्रिविधा सुखा दुःखा अदुःखासुखा च । धर्मश्चतुःप्रकाराः कुशला अकुशला अनिवृताव्याकृता

feeling. It has thus been said in the 'Sūtra' that what, felt as pleasure—originates depending on a sensation gives the feeliug of pleasure.

Manaskāra is the satiety (ābhoga) of the mind. Ābhoga means enjoyment or ābhujana. It is an element by virtue of which the mind is tended toward the object (of experience). It is of the nature of holding the mind on the object. Holding the mind means directing the mind again and again to the object (fixing the attention on the object). This operation is in reference to the manaskāra in which as a rule, a series of mentations in regard to the object (moment) is the support and not (in the sense) that each consciousness-moment has its efficiency limited to itself (that particular moment) and not (extended to) any other moment.[33]

Vedanā or feeling is experience in its essence. It is again of three kinds by reason of the perception of what is agreeable, disagreeable in essence and something distinct from both—pleasure, pain and neither pleasure nor pain. Others however think thus : (It is called) anubhava by reason of its functional essence in regard to the resulting event of moral or immoral anteceds. Of these, the anubhava, of pleasure is the effect produced by the maturing influence of moral deeds, of immoral ones, is pain and of both (in common, indifferent) is neither pain nor pleasure. Here the 'Ālaya-vijñāna' alone is the 'maturing influence' (vipāka) of the moral and immoral antecedents. Upekṣā or equanimity associated with it (ālaya) by itself

निवृताव्याकृताश्च। तत्रालयविज्ञाने विदिति सामान्योपदेशेन न विज्ञायते तिसृणां वेदनानां कतमा वेदना। तथा तदपि किं कुशलमकुशलमनिवृताव्याकृतं निवृताव्याकृतमिति न विज्ञायत इत्यत आह—

उपेक्षा वेदना तत्रानिवृताव्याकृतं च तत्।

is the resulting of event of moral or immoral antecedents.[34] (The sense of) Vipāka is superimposed on pleasure and pain because they are the consequences of good and bad deeds (vipākaja). The 'anubhava' of pleasure means which being there, there is no desire to part with it, and which being extinct, there arises the desire of contact again. The 'anubhava' of pain means which being there, there is the desire to part with it and which being extinct there is the lack of desire of contact with it for a second time. Neither-pain-nor-pleasure means which arising or being extinct, none of them arise.

Saṁjñā or concepts are the determination (udgrahana) of the specific characteristics of the (individual) object; object means the support of cognition. (The word), nimitta means the specific characteristics thereof – the critaria of discrimination in regard to the object of cognition as 'nīla' and 'pīta'. The determination thereof or the definite representation (of colour) as that it is 'nīla' and not pīta (is Saṁjñā).

Cetanā or will is the mental effort that conditions (re-arranges) the mind; which being there, the mind flows in a stream towards the object (of cognition) as does iron towards the mass of a magnet.[36]

Vedanā is of three kinds-pleasure, pain and neither-pleasure-nor-pain. Dharmas are of four kinds—Kuśala, (favourable), akuśala (unfavourable) anivṛta-avyākṛta (un-obscured-in-different) and nivṛtaavyākṛta (obscured-in-

तत्रेत्यालयविज्ञानमेव प्रकृतत्वात्संबध्यते। उपेक्षैवालयविज्ञाने वेदना न सुखा न दुःखा। तयोः परिच्छिन्नालम्बनाकारत्वात्। तयोः रागद्वेषानुशयितत्वाच्च। अनिवृताव्याकृतं च तत्। आलयविज्ञानमिति प्रकृतम्।

तत्रानिवृतग्रहणं निवृतव्यवच्छेदार्थम्। अव्याकृतग्रहणं कुशलाकुशलव्यवच्छेदार्थम्। मनोभूमिकैरागन्तुकैरुपक्लेशैरनावृतत्वादनिवृतम्। विपाकत्वाद्विपाकं प्रति कुशलाकुशलत्वेनाव्याकरणादव्याकृतम्।

तथा स्पर्शादयः।

different), with the Ālaya-consciousness, 'vit' is (said to be associated) by a general statement (because it is of universal association) (and as such) it is not (definitely) known as to which one of the three kinds of 'vedanās (is associated with it). So also it is not known as to whether it (ālaya) is kuśala, akuśala, anivṛta-avyākṛta or nivṛta avyākṛta. So it is said :

'Upekṣā vedanā tatrānivṛta-avyakṛtañca tat"

('Upekṣā' is the 'vedanā' in it and that is also anivṛta-avyākṛta (by nature).

(The word), 'tatra' (in the Kārikā) refers to the Ālaya-consciousness only because that is the subject of discussion here. 'Upekṣā' is always the vedanā in the Ālaya-consciousness and neither pleasure nor pain in-as-much-as these two (have to) correspond to the image of distinctly manifest objects; as also these two have passion (love) and hatred.

That is also 'anivṛta-avyākṛta'. (The word), 'tat' (in the Kārikā) means the 'Ālaya vijñāna'—the context (here) The word, 'anivṛta' is used to exclude 'nivṛta' and the word, avyākṛta is used to exclude kuśala and akuśala (dharmas). It is anivṛta or unobscured because it is not obscured by the non-essential vicious elements of limited

यथा आलयविज्ञानमेकान्तेन विपाकोऽपरिच्छिन्नालम्बनाकारं सदा स्पर्शादिभिरन्वितं, तत्र चोपेक्षैव वेदना निवृताव्याकृतं च, तथा स्पर्शादयोऽप्येकान्तेन विपाका एवापरिच्छिन्नालम्बनाकाराश्चात्मान हित्वा इतरैश्चतुर्भिरालयविज्ञानेन च नित्यमनुगतास्तेषु चोपेक्षैव वेदना अनिवृताव्याकृताश्चालयविज्ञानवत् । न हि

occurance based on the manas. It being of the nature of the maturing influence of moral antecedents does not appear as good or bad in relation to the resulting event and as such it is called avyākṛta or (morally) indifferent.

'tathā sparśādayaḥ'.

(So are sparśa or sensation and the like).

As the Ālaya-consciousness is absolutely a 'maturing influence' and cocresponds to the image of an indistinct object (aspect) and associated with sensation and the like; and equanimity is the only feeling there and itself is unobscured and indifferent; so are sensation and the like absolutely of the nature of a maturing influence and corresponds to the image of an indistinct object- (aspect). These each are associated with the rest of the four other than itself and with the Ālaya-conciousness and equanimity is the only feeling in these and these are indifferent like the Ālayaconciousness What is universally associated with what is of a maturing influence by nature cannot possess the element of 'non-maturing influence' nor what corresponds to the image of an indistinct object (aspect) can ever correspond to the image of a distinct one. So is to be understood elsewhere (with the rest of the elements).

Does that Ālaya-consciousness persist on as one, self-contained (unit) through the whole mundane existence (till liberation) or flow in a stream ?

विपाकेन संप्रयुक्तानामविपाकत्वमपरिच्छिन्नालम्बनाकारेण च परिच्छिन्नालम्बनाकारत्वं संभवति। एवमन्यत्रापि वाच्यम्। किं पुनस्तदालयविज्ञानमैकमभिन्नमासंसारमनुवर्तते। उत सन्तानेन। न हि तदेकमभिन्नमनुवर्तते क्षणिकत्वात्। कि तर्हि—

तच्च वर्तते स्रोतसौघवत्॥४॥

तच्चेत्यालयविज्ञानमेव संबध्यते। तत्र स्रोतो हेतुफलयोर्नैरन्तर्येण प्रवृत्तिः। उदकसमूहस्य पूर्वापरभागाविच्छेदेन प्रवाहो ओघ इत्युच्यते। यथा ह्योघस्तृणकाष्ठगोमयादीनाकर्षयन्गच्छति एवमालयविज्ञानमपि पुण्यापुण्यानेञ्ज्यकर्मवासनानुगतं स्पर्शमनस्कारादीनाकर्षयत्स्रोतसाऽसंसारमव्युपरतं प्रवर्तत इति।

तस्यैवं स्रोतसा प्रवृत्तस्य कस्यामवस्थायां व्यावृत्तिरित्याह—

तस्य व्यावृत्तिरर्हत्त्वे

It persists on not as one, self-contained (unit) because of its momentariness.[88] How then ?

'tacca vartate srotasaughavat.'

(That also exists (flows) like the flow of a stream).

The word 'tacca' (that also) refers to the Ālaya-consciousness. The word 'Srota' (stream) means the uninterrupted progress of cause and effect (functional interdependence). The word, 'ogha' (flow) means the unbroken flowing of the waters without any interval between the anterior and posterior divisions thereof. As the flow of waters drags with it the straws, woods, cow-dung and the like, so also the Ālaya-consciousness in comformity with the Biotic force of good, bad and neutral antecedents (karma) continues unabated in a stream draging on sparśa, manaskāra and the like till the end of (one's mundane existence.)

When does this (Ālaya) that so proceeds in a flow, turn back (towards cessation) ? It is so said [

'tasya vyāvṛttirarhatve.'

किं पुनरर्हत्त्वं यद्योगादर्हन्नित्युच्यते। कस्य पुनर्योगादर्हन्नित्युच्यते। क्षयज्ञानानुत्पादज्ञानलाभात्। तस्यां ह्यवस्थायामालयविज्ञानाश्रितदौष्ठुल्य-निरवशेषप्रहाणादालयविज्ञानं व्यावृत्तं भवति। सैव चार्हदवस्था।

उक्तः सविभङ्गो विपाकपरिणामः। इदानीं मननाख्यं द्वितीयं परिणाममाह। तदाश्रित्य प्रवर्तत इति विस्तरः। तत्र यथा चक्षुरादिविज्ञानानां चक्षुरादय आश्रयत्वेन रूपादयश्चालम्बनत्वेन प्रसिद्धाः नैवं क्लिष्टस्य मनस आश्रय आलम्बनं वा प्रसिद्धम्। न च विज्ञानमाश्रयालम्बननिरपेक्षं युज्यत इत्यतः क्लिष्टस्य मनस आश्रयालम्बनप्रतिपादनार्थं निरुक्तिप्रतिपादनार्थञ्चाह—

तदाश्रित्य प्रवर्तते।
तदालम्बं मनो नाम विज्ञानं मननात्मकम्॥ ५॥

'It turns back when (one is) at the stage of an arhat.'

What again is the stage of an arhat? It is said (to be a stage) by the attainment of which, one is called an 'arhat'. The attainment of what again makes one (known as) an arhat? With the attainment of the knowledge of cessation[8,9] and of (the knowledge) of the undivided (vijñapatimātratā) (one is called an arhat). At that stage, because of eradication of grossness supported by the Ālaya-consciousness, without any residue, the Ālaya-consciousness turns back (towards cessation). That very stage is (called) the stage of an 'arhat.'

Vipāka-pariṇāma with all its manifestations is explained (so far). Now the second 'pariṇāma' called the 'manana' is being discussed: that 'it proceeds on, being based on that' and so on. So far as the visual consciousness and the like (other consciousnesses) are concerned, the eye and the like are commonly known as the āśraya or bases and the rūpa or colour and the like (are commonly known) as the ālambana or object of such consciousness. But in

तदाश्रित्य प्रवर्तत इति तच्छब्देनालयविज्ञानमभिसंबध्यते । तद्वासनाश्रयो ह्यालयविज्ञानमतस्तदाश्रित्य प्रवर्तते सन्तानेनोत्पद्यत इत्यर्थः । अथवा यस्मिन्धातौ भूमौ वाऽऽलयविज्ञानं विपाकस्तदपि क्लिष्टं मनस्तद्धातुक तद्भूमिकं चेति तत्प्रतिबद्धवृत्तित्वात्तदाश्रित्य प्रवर्तते ।

तदालम्बमिति । आलयविज्ञानालम्बनमेव सत्कायदृष्ट्यादिभिः सम्प्रयोगादहं ममेत्यालयविज्ञानालम्बनत्वात् । कथ पुनर्यत् एव चित्तादुत्पद्यते तदेवालम्बनं भवति । यथा तदनिच्छतां केषांचित्कस्याश्चिदवस्थायां यत एव चित्तान्मनो-

regard to the afflicted manas, there is no such āśraya or ālambana of common experience. It is, however, not logical (to hold) that a consciousness is independent of its āśraya and ālambana, and as such with a view to determine the āśraya and the ālambana of the afflicted manas, and to give a correct definition thereof (of the manas) it is so said :

tadāśritya pravartate.

tadālambaṁ mano nāma vijñānam mananātmakaṁ.[5]

(It proceeds on, being based upon that. It has that (ālaya) as its ālambana and is itself called the 'manas' and is of the nature of cogitation).

The word 'tat' in the kārikā, 'tadāśritya pravartate' refers to the ālaya-consciousness. The ālaya-consciousness is the āśraya or the support (base) of the Biotic force of it (manas) and thus (it is so said that), being based upon that (ālaya) it proceeds on or flows on in a stream (of personal life). Or (it may also mean) that in whatever dhātu or bhūmi the ālaya-consciousness, (functions as) the maturing influence, the manas also pertains to that very dhātu and bhūmi, and thus the functioning of the manas being bound up with that (ālaya) (it is said that) it proceeds on, being based on that.

विज्ञानमुत्पद्यते तदालम्बनमेव तदुत्पद्यते । मनो नाम विज्ञानमिति । मन इति नाम आख्या यस्य विज्ञानस्य तदालयविज्ञानमाश्रित्य प्रवर्तते तदालम्बनं च मनो नाम इत्यनेनालयविज्ञानात्प्रवृत्तिविज्ञानाच्च व्यवच्छिनत्ति । तत्पुनः किं स्वभाव-मित्याह । मननात्मकमिति । एवं मननात्मकत्वान्मन इत्युच्यते नैरुक्तेन विधिना ।

(The words that) 'it has that as its ālambana or object (mean that) it has always the ālaya consciousness as its ālambana or object, because of its (ālaya's) universal association with the Satkāyadṛṣti or the false notion of the self and the like in-as-much-as the ālaya-consciousness functions as the ālambana or object of the consciousness of 'I' and 'mine' and the like.

How is it that the very citta or consciousness be regarded as the ālambana from which (alone) it (manas) springs up (into existance) ?

(Because) as (in case) when (even) what one does not like (to associate with) at a certain time[40], the manovijñāna arises having the very citta or consciousness as its ālambana or object from which it comes to exist.[41]

The words 'mano nāma vijñānaṁ' (are to be explained now), mana means a consciousness that is called mana; (and) that proceeeds on being based on (or supported by) ālaya-consciousness (such is the construction of the sentence); and by the words, 'tadālambaṁ mano nāma', it is distinguised from the ālays-consciousness and the pravṛtti-consciousness.

In answer to the query as to what again is its nature, it is said : 'mananātmakaṁ' or that (consistant) cogitation is its nature (or essence). By reason of (its) such cogitation, or 'manana' it is called 'mana' in accordance to the rules of etymology. Being essentially a consciousness, it must,

विज्ञानस्वरूपत्वादवश्यं तच्चैतैः संप्रयुज्यते। इदं तु न ज्ञायते कतमैस्तच्चैत्तैः कियद्भिः; कियन्तं कालं वा संप्रयुज्यत इत्यत आह—

क्लेशैश्चतुर्भिः सहितं निवृताव्याकृतैः सदा।

चैत्ता हि द्विप्रकाराः क्लेशास्तदन्ये च। तदन्येभ्यो व्यवच्छेदार्थमाह क्लेशैरिति क्लेशा अपि षट्। न च तै सर्वैः संप्रयुज्यतेऽतश्चतुर्भिरित्याह। सहितमिति संप्रयुक्तम्। क्लेशा अपि द्विविधाः। अकुशला निवृताव्याकृताश्च। अकुशलेभ्यो विशेषार्थमाह निवृताव्याकृतैरिति। न हि निवृतेन विज्ञानेनाकुशलानां संप्रयोगः सम्भवति।

of necessity, be associated with caittas or mental dharmas. It is however not (precisely) known as to with which ones of the mental dharmas, with how many of them and for how long it is associated and so it is said:

'Kleśaiścaturbhiḥ sahitaṁ nivṛtāvyākṛtaiḥ sadā'

(It is always associated with the four of the kleśas and that are obscured-indifferent (in nature).

Mental phenomena are of two kinds—the kleśas and the rest. (The kārilkā), in order to distinguish (them) from the rest, says 'kleśaiḥ'. Kleśas again are of six kinds. (The manas) does not (universally) associate with all the six (of them) and that is why it is said 'with four'. The word, 'sahitaṁ' means (universally) associated. The kleśas again are divided under two categories (by nature) akuśalā or bad and nivṛtāvyākṛtā or obscured-indifferent. In order to single out from the 'akuśalas', it is said 'obscured-indifferent'. With a consciousness that is obscured (by nature), the (mental phenomena that are) bad can never (universally) associate. They (the kleśas) are (said to be) nivṛta or obscured because they are afflicted. They are (said to be) (morally) indifferent in-as-much-as they are not manifest (as yet) as good or bad. The word, 'sadā' means always i e. so

निवृत्ताः क्लिष्टत्वात् । अव्याकृताः कुशलाकुशलत्वेनाव्याकरणात् । सदेति सर्वकालम् । यावदस्ति तावत्तैः सम्प्रयुक्तम् ।

सामान्यनिर्देशाद्विशेषतो न ज्ञायन्त इति विशेषतो निर्दिशति ।

आत्मदृष्ट्यात्ममोहात्ममानात्मस्नेहसंज्ञितैः ॥ ६ ॥

उपादानस्कन्धेष्वात्मेति दर्शनमात्मदृष्टिः सत्कायदृष्टिरित्यर्थः । मोहोऽज्ञानम् । आत्मन्यज्ञानमात्ममोहः । आत्मविषये मान आत्ममानोऽस्मिमान इत्यर्थः । आत्मनि स्नेह आत्मप्रेमेत्यर्थः । तत्रालयविज्ञानस्वरूपे संमूढः सन्नालयविज्ञाने

long it proceeds on, it proceeds on as associated with these (kleśas).

The kārikā makes only a general statement and it is not specifically known (as to which these kleśas are) and as such it is being specifically mentioned (thus) :

'ātma-dṛṣṭyātma-mohātma-mānātma-snehasaṁjñitaiḥ.'[6]

(It is associated) with ātma-dṛsti, ātma-moha, atma-māna and ātma-sneha).

To view the 'elements attached to life' (upādāna-skandhas) as the soul is (called) ātmadṛṣṭi meaning satkāyarṣṭi or the false view of self. 'Moha' means ignorance; the ignorance in regard to the' self' is called ātmamoha. The sense of 'ego' in regard to the self is (called) ātma-māna meaning asmimāna. Love for the self means ātma-sneha meaning ātma-prema. (To explain it further) : being ignorant of the essence of the ālaya-conciousness, one nurtures the false view of the 'self' in regard to the ālaya conscious-neas. Due to such a false view of the 'self' (what emerges as) the feeling of elevation (or pride) in one's mind is (called) asmimāna. These three elements being there, the

आत्मदृष्टिमुत्पादयति । आत्मदर्शनाद्या चित्तस्योन्नतिः सोऽस्मिमानः । एतस्मिन्त्रये सति आत्माभिमते वस्तुनि योऽभिष्वङ्ग. स आत्मस्नेहः ।

आह च—

अविद्यया चात्मदृष्ट्या चास्मिमानेन तृष्णया ।
एभिश्चतुर्भिः सक्लिष्टं मननालक्षण मनः ॥
विपर्यासनिमित्तं तु मनः क्लिष्ट सदैव यत् ।
कुशलाव्याकृते चित्ते सदाहकारकारणम् ॥

एते हि

आत्ममोहादयः क्लेशा मनोवन्नवभूमिकाः ।

इह च सामान्येनाभिधानान्न ज्ञायते किं स्वभूमिकैरेव सम्प्रयुज्यते उतान्यभूमिकैरपीत्यत आह—

यत्रजस्तन्मयैः

attachment to the object viewed with the sense of I or mine is (called) ātmasneha. It is also said :

The manas that has cognition as its functioning is always afflicted with these four kleśas, namely avidyā or ignorance, ātmadṛṣṭi or the false view of the 'self', asmimāna the sense of ego or pride, and tṛṣṇā or thirst. This afflicted manas is the root of all mistakes and is always the source of all egoity in regard to kuśala or good and avyākṛta or (morally) indifferent mind (personal life).

These again :

ātma-mohādayaḥ kleśāḥ manovannavabhūmikāḥ.

(ātma-moha and the like other kleśas pertain to all the nine bhumis like manas).

This also being a general statement, it is not understood, as to whether the manas is associated with the kleśa s

इति । यत्र जातो यत्रज: । तन्मयैरिति यत्र धातौ भूमौ वा जातस्तद्धातुकै: तद्भूमिकैरेव च संप्रयुज्यते, नान्यधातुकैरन्यभूमिकैर्वा । किं पुनश्चतुर्भिरेव क्लेशै: संप्रयुज्यते । नेत्याह ।

अन्यैः स्पर्शाद्यैश्च

that pertain to the same bhūmi as the manas or with those that pertain to other bhūmis as well; so it is said :

'yatrajastanmayaiḥ'

(It is associated with only those that pertain to where it is born).

The word, 'yatraja' means where it is born. The word, 'tanmayaiḥ' means with those that pertain to the dhātus or bhūmis in which ('dhātu or bhūmi') it is born, it is associated; (and) not with those that pertain to other dhātus or bhūmis.

(In aswer to the query as to) whether it is associated only with these four kleśas; it is said that not (merely with these four but)

'anyaiḥ sparśādyaiśca.'

(also with others—sparśa and the like).

The context, here, is that(the manas)is associated (with these). The word 'ca' (in the kārikā) gives the sense of collectiveness. The word, 'sparsādyaiḥ means sparśa, manaskāra, vedanā, saṁjña and cetanā. These five (mental) phenomena by virtue of their being universal are associated with all kinds of conciousness. Of these again, it is associated only will those that pertain to the dhātus or bhūmis, where it is born and not with those that pertain to other dhātus or bhūmis. Or the word, 'anyaiḥ' in the kārikā is

संप्रयुज्यते इति सम्बध्यते। च शब्दः समुच्चयार्थः। स्पर्शाद्यैरिति स्पर्शमनस्कारवेदनासंज्ञाचेतनाभिः। एते हि पञ्च धर्माः सर्वत्रगत्वात्सर्वविज्ञानैः संप्रयुज्यन्ते। एतैरपि यत्र जातस्तन्मयैरेव संप्रयुज्यते नान्यधातुभूमिकैः। अथ वान्यैरिति मूलविज्ञानसंप्रयुक्तेभ्यो व्यवच्छेदार्थम्। मूलविज्ञाने ह्यनिवृताव्याकृताः स्पर्शादयः। क्लिष्टे तु मनसि मनोवन्निवृताव्याकृताः। यदि तत्क्लिष्टं मनः कुशलक्लिष्टाव्याकृतावस्थास्वविशेषेण प्रवर्तते न तस्य तर्हि निवृत्तिरस्ति। अनिवृत्ते च तस्मिन्कुतो मोक्ष इति कथं न मोक्षाभावः प्रसज्यते ? न प्रसज्यते यस्मात्।

अर्हतो न तत्।

न निरोधसमापत्तौ मार्गे लोकोत्तरे न च॥ ७॥

अर्हतस्तावदशेषक्लेशप्रहाणात्क्लिष्टं मनो नैवास्ति। तद्धि भावाग्रिकभावनाप्रहातव्यक्लेशवदर्हत्त्वप्राप्त्यानन्तर्यमार्गेणैव प्रहीयते तदन्यक्लेशवदर्हत्त्वावस्थायां

used to distinguish them as apart from those that are associated with the mūlavijñāna (or ālaya-conciousness). In the mūlavijñāna, sparsa and the other klesas are anivṛtāvyākṛta or unobscured-indifferent. But in the Kliṣṭa manas, however, they are obscured-indifferent as in the sixth mana.

Now if the afflicted manas proceeds on indiscriminately in kuśala, akuśala and avyākṛta stages, then it should have no cessation. (And) in case it has no cessation, where is liberation then ? And thus (in answer to the query as to) why should it not involve the negation of liberation, it is said

'arhato na tat.

na nirodha-samāpattu mārge lokottare na ca.' (7)

The arhat does not have it. Not in the stage of nirodha-samāpatti (a force stopping conciousness and producing the highest semiconcious dreamy trance), nor in the lokottara mārga (or transcendental stage) (is it ever present).

नैव विद्यते । आकिञ्चन्यायतनवीतरागस्याध्यनागामिनो निरोधसमापत्तिलाभिनो मार्गबलेन निरोधसमापत्तेर्लभ्यत्वान्मार्गवन्निरोधसमापत्त्यवस्थायामपि निरुध्यते; निरोधाच्च व्युत्थितस्य पुनरालयविज्ञानादेव प्रवर्तते । मार्गे लाकोत्तरे न चेति । लोकोत्तरग्रहणं लौकिकव्यवच्छेदार्थम् । लौकिके तु मार्गे क्लिष्टं मनः प्रवर्तत एव । नैरात्म्यदर्शनस्यात्मदर्शनप्रतिपक्षत्वान्न लोकोत्तरमार्गे प्रवर्तितुमुत्सहत ।

The 'arhat',by reason of his completely doing away with all the kleśas gets rid of the afflicted manas. It dies out by virtue of the (influence of the) ānantarya-mārga that comes immediately with the attainment of the stage of the 'arhat' like (any other) 'kleśas' that are liable to be destroyed by the repeated cultivation (bhāvanā) by the topmost of all beings (bhāvāgrika). It like other 'klesas' does not exist at the stage of the 'arhat'. It is destroyed in regard to the 'anāgāmin' or one, devoid of any desire when at the stage of ākiñcanyātana (non-clinging to anything specific (or) when he has attained the stage of 'nirodha samāpatti', it is destroyed alongwith the mārgas through which nirodha-samāpatti is likely to be attained. When he rises from the 'nirodha'(i.e. when he comes back to the world of determinates), it (again) proceeds from the ālaya consciousness. Nor (does it exist) in the transcendental mārga. The word, lokottara (in the kārikā) is used in order to eliminate the laukika or worldly mārgas; because in the 'laukika mārga' the afflicted manas persists on.

(The kliṣṭa means)(right) becomes incapable to proceed on in the 'lokottara-mārga' in-as-much-as the false view of the self stands in direct confrontation with the cognition of non-self. Due to the non-simultaneousness of two directly opposites), it dies out in the 'lokottara-mârga'. But in case

विपक्षप्रतिपक्षयोरयौगपद्याल्लोकोत्तरमार्गे तन्निरुध्यते। तस्मादपि व्युत्थितस्य पुनरालयविज्ञानादेवोत्पद्यते।

द्वितीयः परिणामोऽयम्

उद्दिष्टो निर्दिष्टश्चेति निगमयति। द्वितीयपरिणामानन्तरं तृतीयपरिणामो वक्तव्य इत्यत आह

तृतीयः षड्विधस्य या

विषयस्योपलब्धिः सा

तृतीयो विज्ञानपरिणाम इति वाक्यशेषः। षड्विधस्येति षट्प्रकारस्य रूपशब्दगन्धरसस्प्रष्टव्यधर्मात्मकस्य विषयस्य या उपलब्धिर्ग्रहणं प्रतिपत्तिरित्यर्थः। सा पुनः किं कुशला अकुशला अव्याकृतेत्यत आह—

कुशलाकुशलाऽद्वया ॥ ८ ॥

of one who comes back (to the world of the determinates), it again proceeds on from the ālaya-consciousness.

dvitīyaḥ pariṇāmo'yaṁ.

(This the second kind of pariṇāma)

It signifies that (which was) intended (to be explained) & has also been set forth. After the second kind of pariṇāma (having been explained) the third kind of pariṇāma should be explained and so it is said :

'tṛītya ṣaḍvidhasya yā

viṣayasyopalabdhiḥ sā'

The third kind (of pariṇāma) is what is the perception of the six kinds of objects (of congition).

The syntactical arrangement of the kārika is that 'sā tṛtīyo vijñānapariṇāma'—that is the third kind of pariṇāma. The word, 'ṣaḍvidhasya' means the preception or grasping or the definite cognition of the six kinds of

कुशलाऽकुशलाऽद्वयेत्याव्याकृतापि । अलोभाद्वेषामोहैः संप्रयुक्ता कुशला । लोभद्वेषमोहैः संप्रयुक्ताऽकुशला । कुशलाकुशलैरसंप्रयुक्ता अद्वया न कुशला नाकुशलेत्यर्थः । सा पुनः कीदृशैश्चैतसिकैः संप्रयुज्यते कियन्तो वा तत्संप्रयोगिगणश्चैतसिका इत्यत आह—

सर्वत्रगैर्विनियतैः कुशलैश्चैतसैरसौ ।
संप्रयुक्ता तथा क्लेशैरुपक्लेशैस्त्रिवेदना ॥ ९ ॥

objects viz. rūpa (visual sense-data), śabdha (auditory sense-data) gandha (olfactory sense-data) rasa (taste-sense-data) spraṣṭavya (tactile sense-data) and dharma (non-sensuous). (In answer to the question as to) whether this again is good or bad or indifferent it is said :

'Kuśalā akuślā-advayā.' (8)

(It is) good, bad and neither of two meaning indifferent. When it is associated with alobha or absence of love or adveṣa or absence of hatred and amoha or absence of ignorance, it is kuśala or good. When associated with lobha or love, dveṣa or hatred and moha or ignorance, it is akuśala or bad. When it is associated with neither good nor bad it is indifferent. (In answer to the question as to) what kind of mental phenomena, it is associated with and how many are such mental phenomena, it is said .

Sarvatragairviniyataiḥ Kuśalaiścaitasairasau
Samprayuktā tathā kleśairupakleśaistrivedanā. (9)

It is associated with the Sarvatraga (or those that are universally associated and viniyata (or those that are of limited association), with the kuśala or good mental forces and with kleśas or afflictions and with upakleśas (or the vicious elements of limited occurance) and it has all the three kinds of feelings.

य एते सर्वत्रगा उद्दिष्टास्ते न विज्ञायन्त इत्यतस्तत्प्रदर्शनार्थमाह—

आद्याः स्पर्शादयः

आदौ निर्दिष्टत्वादाद्याः सर्वत्रगा इत्यर्थः । तथा हि—

सदास्पर्शमनस्कारवित्संज्ञाचेतनान्वितम् ।

इति प्रथमतो निर्दिष्टाः । स्पर्श एषामादिरिति स्पर्शादयः । ते पुनः स्पर्शमनस्कारादयः पञ्च धर्माः सर्वं चित्तमनुगच्छन्तीति सर्वत्रगाः । तथा ह्येत आलयविज्ञाने क्लिष्टे मनसि प्रवृत्तिविज्ञानेषु चाविशेषेण प्रवर्तन्ते । विनियतानधिकृत्याह—

छन्दाधिमोक्षस्मृतयः सह ।

समाधिधीभ्यां नियताः

विशेषे नियतत्वाद्विनियताः । एषां हि विशेष एव विषयो न सर्वः । तत्र छन्दोऽभिप्रेते वस्तुन्यभिलाषः । अभिप्रेते वस्तुन्यभिलाष इति प्रतिनियतविषयत्वं

What again is meant by 'Sarvatraga' is not known and as such with a view to signify them, it is said :

ādyāḥ sparśādayaḥ

(The foremost are sparśa and others)

They are called the foremost because they have been so stated at the beginning, meaning thereby the sarvatraga : They as are (in the kārikā)

'sadā sparśa-manaskāra-vit-saṁjñā-cetanānvitaṁ'.

have been set forth earlier. 'Sparśa' is the foremost amongst them and as such they are spoken of as 'sparśa and others'. They again, sparśa, monaskāra and the like-these five elements are associated with every kind of consciousness and that is why they are designated as sarvatraga (or universals). To explain it further, they are associated with the Ālaya-vijñāna, the kliṣta manas and the (six)

ज्ञापित मवत्यनभिप्रेते छन्दाभावात् । दर्शनश्रवणादिक्रियाविषयत्वेन यदभिमतं वस्तु तदभिप्रेतम् । तत्र दर्शनश्रवणादिप्रार्थना छन्दः । स च वीर्यारम्भसंनिश्रय-दानकर्मकः । अधिमोक्षो निश्चिते वस्तुनि तथैवावधारणम् । निश्चितग्रहणमनिश्चित प्रतिषेधार्थम् । युक्तित आप्तोपदेशतो वा यद्वस्तु असंदिग्धं तन्निश्चितं येनैवाकारेण तन्निश्चितमनित्यदुःखाद्याकारेण तेनैवाकारेण तस्य वस्तुनश्चेतस्यभिनिवेशन-

pravṛtti-vijñānas without any discrimination. In regard to the Viniyata (mental forces) it is said :

Chandādhimokṣasmṛtayaḥ saha Samādhībhyāṁ niyatāḥ (The faculties of desire, inclination, memory, along with concentration and understanding (discrimination) are the niyata (viniyata = mental forces of limited association.)

These are called Viniyata or limited because of their being tied to a particular (consciouness). They are called viniyata because their objects (of association) are specified and not universal Of these, 'chanda' means 'desire' for the object intended. As it means desire for the object intended, it signifies that its object is self-governed (specified) in-as-much-as there is no desire for what is not intended. 'Intended' means what is agreeable by virtue of its being an object of visual or auditory or the like other functions. With regard to such (an object), the seeking of a sight or hearing thereof is chanda. It functions in the form of providing the necessary basis for efficiency and effort (to gratify such a seeking).

"'Adhimokṣa' or inclination means determining a thing in the manner it has been determined (earlier). Here the word, 'determined' (earlier) is used to exclude what is not so determined. Adhimokṣa means the retention of the thing and the disposition thereof in the form of anitya (or

मेवमेतन्नान्यथेत्यवधारणमधिमोक्षः । स चासंहार्यतादानकर्मकः । अधिमुक्तिप्रधानो हि स्वसिद्धान्तात्परप्रवादिभिरपहर्तुं न शक्यते । स्मृतिः संस्तुते वस्तुन्यसंप्रमोषश्चेतसोऽभिलपनता । संस्तुत वस्तु पूर्वानुभूतम् । आलम्बनग्रहणाविप्रणाशकारणत्वादसंप्रमोष. । पूर्वगृहीतस्य वस्तुनः पुनः पुनरालम्बनाकारस्मरणमभिलपनता । अभिलपनमेवाभिलपनता । सा पुनरविक्षेपकर्मिका । आलम्बनाभिलपने सति चित्तस्यालम्बनान्तरे आकारान्तरे वा विक्षेपाभावादविक्षेपकर्मिका । समाधिरुपपरीक्ष्ये वस्तुनि चित्तस्यैकाग्रता । उपपरीक्ष्य वस्तु गुणतो दोषतो वा एकाग्रता एकालम्बनता । ज्ञानसंनिश्रयदानकर्मक: । समाहिते चित्ते यथाभूतपरिज्ञानात् । धीः प्रज्ञा । साप्युपपरीक्ष्य एव वस्तुनि प्रविचयो योगायोगविहितोऽन्यथा वेति । प्रविचिनोतीति प्रविचयः । यः सम्यङ्मिथ्या वा

a changing entity) or duḥkha (or misery) in the form as it was determined earlier without any doubt either by way of reasoning or on the testimony of authority. It functions in the form of what affords non-destructibility (of impressions). One being primarily based on 'inclination' can not be swayed away from his own convictions by the discourses or others

Smṛti means the indelibility (of the mind) in regard to the appreciated object—the articulation of the mind. The appreciated object means what has been experienced earlier. The indelibility is due to (such an object) being the means to the negation of the loss of the impression of the thing as the object of cognition. The repeated recollection in the form of an object of what has been experienced earlier is artculation. Articulation is speaking out.[42] It functions in the form of doing away with confusion. It functions in the form of doing away with confusion in the sense that there being an articulation (concept) of the object, there is no scope left for the citta to move unto another object or form and as such there is no confusion.

संकीर्णस्वसामान्यलक्षणेष्विव धर्मेषु विवेकावबोधः । युक्तिर्योगः । स पुनराप्तोपदेशोऽनुमानं प्रत्यक्षं च । तेन त्रिप्रकारेण योगेन यो जनितः स योगविहितः । स पुनः श्रुतमयश्चिन्तामयो भावनामयश्च । तत्राप्तवचनप्रामाण्याद्योऽवबोधः स श्रुतमयः । युक्तिनिध्यानजश्चिन्तामयः । समाधिजो भावनामयः । अयोगोऽनाप्तोपदेशोऽनुमानाभासो मिथ्याप्रणिहितश्च समाधिस्तेनायोगेन जनितोऽयोगविहितः । उपपत्तिप्रतिलम्भिको लौकिकव्यवहारावबोधश्च न योगविहितो नायोगविहितः ।

Samādhi means the concentration of the mind on the object of investigation. The object of investigation is in reference either to its merits or demerits. Concentration means (to have) one and the same object (in mind). It functions in the form of providing the basis of knowledge in-as-much-as it is (only) for the concentrated mind that right knowledge is possible.

'Dhī' means understanding (discrimination): That also is but the discriminating knowledge only with regard to the object of investigation either in accordance with reason (Yoga) or not-reason (ayoga) or otherwise. Discriminating knowledge means what Descriminates. It is discriminating understanding of what may be true or false or mixed in regard to entities both particular and general.

Yoga means reason. It again is of three kinds–testimony of the authority, inference and perception. In accordance with reason (Yoga-vihita) means what is bruoght about in accordance with these three kinds of reason. This again is of three kinds—śrutamaya, cintāmaya, and bhāvanāmaya. Of these, the understanding based on testimony of the authority is śrutamaya. 'Cintāmaya' means what is brought about by the employment of reason. 'Bhāvanāmaya' means what is experienced in Samādhi or concentration.

एषा च संशयव्यावर्तनकर्मिका । संशयव्यावर्तनं प्रज्ञया धर्मान्प्रविचिन्वतो निश्चयलाभादिति । एते हि पञ्च धर्माः परस्परं व्यतिरिच्यापि प्रवर्तन्ते । एवं यत्राधिमोक्षस्तत्र नावश्यमितरैरपि भवितव्यम् । एवं सर्वत्र वाच्यम् । उक्ताः विनियताः । तदनन्तरोद्दिष्टास्त्विदानीं कुशला वक्तव्या इत्यत आह—

श्रद्धाथ ह्रीरपत्रपा ॥ १० ॥

अलोभादित्रयं वीर्यं प्रश्रब्धिः साप्रमादिका ।
अहिंसा कुशलाः

एत एकादश धर्मा इति वाक्यशेषः । तत्र श्रद्धा कर्मफलसत्यरत्नेष्वभिसंप्रत्ययः प्रसादश्चेतसोऽभिलाषः । श्रद्धा हि त्रिधा प्रवर्तते । सति वस्तुनि

'Ayoga' means the testimony of the positively untrustworthy persons, (positively) false inference and falsely applied samādhi and what is caused by such 'ayoga' (non-reason) is designated as 'ayogavihita.' What abuses (all) reasoning (but) which gives rise to a conventional understanding is neither Yoga-vihita nor ayoga-vihita (neither true in the absolute sense nor is it entirely false). This functions in the form of removing doubts (and) removal of doubts (is possible) by way of investigating the entities by proper understanding and thus having discriminated them.

These five entities proceed even independent of each other. Thus where there is 'adhimokṣa', there need not be the other entities. This also is to be understood in regard to all (the other forces). The 'viniyatas' are thus explained. Then of what has been mentioned (earlier) the kuśalas are to be explained and so it is said :

Śraddhātha hrīrapatrapā.[10]

alobhāditrayaṁ vīryaṁ praśrabdhiḥ sāpramādikā.

ahiṁsā kuśalāḥ.

(Śraddhā or the faculty of belief in retribution, the purity of mind being the reverse of passion), hrī or humility

गुणवत्यगुणवति वा सम्प्रत्ययाकारा। सति गुणवति च प्रसादाकारा। सति गुणवति च प्राप्तुमुत्पादयितु वा शक्येऽभिलाषाकारा। चेतसः प्रसाद इति। श्रद्धा हि चित्तकालुष्यवैरोधिकीत्यतस्तत्सम्प्रयोगे क्लेशोपक्लेशमलकालुष्यविगमाच्चित्तं श्रद्धामागम्य प्रसीदतीति चेतसः प्रसाद उच्यते। सा पुनश्छन्दसंनिश्रयदानकर्मिका। ह्रीरात्मानं धर्मं वाऽधिपतिं कृत्वावद्येन लज्जा। सद्भिर्गर्हितत्वादनिष्टविपाकत्वाच्च पापमेवावद्यम्। तेनावद्येन कृतेनाकृतेन वा या चित्तस्यावलीनता लज्जा सा ह्रीः। इयं च दुश्चरितसंयमसंनिश्रयदानकर्मिका। अपत्राप्यं लोकमधिपतिं कृत्वावद्येन लज्जा। लोके ह्येतद्गर्हितं मां चैवंकर्माणं विदित्वा गर्हिष्यतीत्य-

(feeling shy in reference to oneself), apatrapā or aversion to things objectionable, alobha or absence of love (desire), adveṣa or absence of hatred and amoha or absence of ignorance (alobhādi-traya). Vīrya or courage in good actions, praśrabdhi or mental dexterity, sāpramādikā or equanimity(upekṣā),apramāda meaning acquiring & preserving good qualities and ahiṁsā or causing no injury are the (eleven) kuśala or universally good moral forces (present in every favourable moment of consciousness).

These eleven entities (are universally good mental forces)—such is the syntactical arrangement of the sentence. Of these, śraddhā means the well-grounded belief in the law of moral causation (karma),truth (āryasatyas) and the ratnas (Buddha, dharma & saṁgha—the tri-ratna); it is the clarity (of the mind) and the desire of the mind. Śraddhā proceeds in three ways -(one) in the form of belief in the things that are real, the virtuous (beneficial) and the non-virtuous. (The other) in the form of the purity (clarity of the mind) in regard to the real and the virtuous (The third) in the form of desire for what is possible to obtain or to cultivate in regard to the real and the virtuous. (To explain) the purity of the mind. Śraddhā by virtue of its being opposed to

श्लोकादिमयादवद्येन लज्जते। इदमपि दुश्चरितसंयमनसंनिश्रयदानकर्मकम्। अलोभो लोभप्रतिपक्षः। लोभो नाम भवे भवोपकरणेषु च याऽसक्तिः प्रार्थना च। तत्प्रतिपक्षोऽलोभो भवे भवोपकरणेषु चानासक्तिः वैमुख्यं च। अयं च दुश्चरिताप्रवृत्तिसंनिश्रयदानकर्मकः। अद्वेषो द्वेषप्रतिपक्षो मैत्री। द्वेषो हि सवेत्त्सु दुःखे दुःखस्थानीयेषु च धर्मेष्वाघातः। अद्वेषो द्वेषप्रतिपक्षत्वात्सत्त्वेषु दुःखे दुःखस्थानीयेषु च धर्मेष्वनाघातः। अयमपि दुश्चरिताप्रवृत्तिसनिश्रयदानकर्मकः। अमोहो मोहप्रतिपक्षः। अयथाभूतसंप्रतिपत्तिर्मोहः। कर्मफलसत्यरत्नेष्वज्ञानम्। मोहप्रतिपक्षत्वादमोहस्तेष्वेव कर्मफलसत्यरत्नेषु संप्रतिपत्तिः। अयमपि दुश्चरिताप्रवृत्तिसंनिश्रयदानकर्मकः। वीर्यं कौशीद्यप्रतिपक्षः। कुशले चेतसोऽभ्युत्साहः। न तु क्लिष्टे। क्लिष्टे तूत्साहः कुत्सितत्वात्कौशीद्यमेव। एतच्च कुशलपक्ष परिपूरणपरिनिश्रयकर्मकम्। प्रश्रब्धिः दौष्ठुल्यप्रतिपक्षः कायचित्तकर्मण्यता। दौष्ठुल्यं कायचित्तयोरकर्मण्यता सांक्लेशिकधर्मबीजानि च। तदपगमे प्रश्रब्धि-

(or curative to) the impurity (restlessness) of the mind and as such by way of application (association) thereof, the mind having been free from kleśa or the elements of moral defilement, upakleśa or the vicious elements of limited occurrence, mala or impurities, kāluṣya or excitement (restlessness) realises sraddhā and thus gets purified and as such it is called the purity of the mind. This functions in the form of providing the (necessary) basis for chanda or desire. Hrī means the element of shyness in reference to oneself and the elements (that refer to oneself) by reason of thesr being disagreeable (in being so referred to). Disagreeable means what is sinful by reason of being censured by the good and bearing undesirable results (by way of moral retribution). The element of shyness or feeling humiliated by reason of such disagreeable acts whether performed or not performed (by oneself, even hearing thereof, constitutes sin) is hrī. It functions by way of providing the necessary basis for (one's) refraining from bad conduct (performing evil deeds).

सद्भावात् । तत्र कायकर्मण्यता कायस्य स्वकार्येषु लघुसमुत्थानता यतो भवति । चित्तकर्मण्यता सम्यङ्मनसिकारसंप्रयुक्तचित्तस्याह्लादलाघवनिमित्त यच्चैतसिकं धर्मान्तरं तद्योगाच्चित्तमालम्बने प्रवर्ततेऽतस्तच्चित्तकर्मण्यतेत्युच्यते । कायस्य पुनः स्प्रष्टव्यविशेष एव प्रीत्याहृतः कायप्रश्रब्धिर्वेदितव्या । प्रीतमनसः

Apatrāpya means aversion (to things objectionable) by virtue of (their) disagreeableness in reference to the world at large. One feels averse to (these) for fear of infame to the effect that this is censured by the people (world at large) and thus knowing me as one having performed this act will condemn me (in the like manner). This also functions by way of providing the necessary basis for (one's) refraining from bad conduct.

Alobha is what is opposed to lobha or love (greed). Lobha means attachment to and desire for the mundane life and the accesories thereof. What is opposed to it is alobha—disinterestedness or disinclination to the mundane life and the accessories thereof. This also functions in the form of providing the necessary basis for (one's) disinclination to bad conduct.

Adveṣa is what is opposed to dveṣa or what is maitrī or benevolence. 'Dveṣa' means injury inflicted on living beings causing actual pain or contributing to its possible sources (potential pain). Adveṣa, by reason to its being opposed to dveṣa is non-injury to living beings, thus not causing actual pain or contributing to its possible sources (potential pain). This also functions in the form of providing the necessary basis for (one's) disclination to bad conduct.

'Amoha' is what is opposed to 'moha'. 'Moha' means improper understanding. (It means) ignorance in regard

कायः प्रश्रभ्यतइति सूत्रे वचनात् । इयं तद्वशेनाश्रयपरावृत्तितोऽशेषक्लेशावरण-निष्कर्षणकर्मिका । साप्रमादिका सहाप्रमादेन वर्तत इति साप्रमादिका । का पुनरसौ । उपेक्षा । कुत एतत् । एकान्तकुशलत्वात् सर्वकुशलानां चेह निर्देशा-धिकाराच्छ्रद्धादिवत् साक्षादनिर्देशात् तद्व्यतिरिक्तान्यकुशलाभावाच्च उपेक्षैव

to the law of moral causation (karmaphala), truth (āryasatya) and the ratnas. By reason of its being opposed to 'moha' or ignorance, 'amoha' is the right understanding in regard to the law of moral causation, truth and the ratnas. This also functions in the form of providing the necessary basis for (one's) disinclination to bad conduct.

'Vīrya' is opposed to 'kausīdya' or langour (lack of enthusiasm bordering on laziness). (It means) the element of endeavour (or application of efforts) in regard to what is kuśala or good and not in regard to what is defiled. The application of efforts in regard to what is defiled is langour by reason of vileness. This also functions by way of providing the necessary basis for the fulfilment of the group (pakṣa) of kuśala entities.

'Praśrabdhi' is dexterity of body and mind (and) is opposed to grossness (sources of langour and lassitude). Grossness means indexterity of body and mind and it forms the seeds of the mental states imbued with affliction, which being extinct, 'praśrabdhi' arises. Of these, the dexterity of the body means the feeling of lightness of body and the sense of urgency (up and doing) in regard to bodily functions.

The dexterity of the mind is a differet kind of mental dharma or phenomenon (as opposed to Sāṁkleśikadharma, that has been spoken of earlier) which is the source of joy and lightness (of the mind) well-harnessed by the faculty

धिश्चायते । तत्राप्रमादः प्रमादप्रतिपक्षः । अलोभाद्यावद्वीर्यं प्रमादः । यैरलोभा-
द्वोभिस्त्रिश्रित्याकुशलान्धर्मान्प्रजहाति तत्प्रतिपक्षाश्च कुशलान्धर्मान्भावयति तेऽलो-
भादयोऽप्रमादः । अतएव प्रमादप्रतिपक्षः प्रमादस्यातो विपरीतत्वात् । स पुनः
लौकिकलोकोत्तरसम्पत्तिपरिपूरणकर्मकः । उपेक्षा चित्तसमता चित्तप्रशठता
चित्तानाभोगता । एभिस्त्रिभिः पदैरुपेक्षा या आदिमध्यावसानावस्था द्योतिता ।
तत्र लय औद्धत्यं वा चेतसो वैषम्यम् । तस्याभावादादौ चित्तसमता ।
ततोऽनभिसंस्कारेणाप्रयत्नेन समाहितचेतसो यथाभियोगं समस्यैव वा प्रवृत्तिः सा

of will (or determination) by virtue of which the mind proceeds on to its ālambana or object—(aspect) and hence it is called mental dexterity. The dexterity of the body again is to be understood only when the favourable (good) tactile sense-data is brought about with delight[43] in-as-much-as it is so said in the Sūtras that body of one attaints dexterity in case of one having delight in mind. It functions in the form of drawing away (destroying) the entire 'Kleśāvarṇa' by way of āśraya-parāvṛtti or retracing of the Ālaya-Consciousness[44] under the influence thereof (kaya-citta-karmaṇyatā).

Sāpramādikā means what exists with carefulness (carefully conforming to the standard of keeping within limits = not going astray). What is it again ? (It is) upekṣā or equanimity. Why so ? Because it is a universal good moral force and because it has the claim of being pointed to as an indispensible condition of all 'kuśala' entities and because it has not been enumerated as a specific element like 'śradhā' and because no element of kuśala is ever possible without any reference to it, upekṣā is to be understood here (in the kārikā, by the word, sāpramādikā). The word, 'apramāda, means what is opposed to 'pramāda'—or the faculty of carelessness. 'Pramāda' stands for the elements

चित्तप्रशठता । सा पुनरवस्था लयौद्धत्यशंकानुगताचिरभावित्वात् । ततो भावना-
प्रकर्षगमनात्तद्विपक्षविदूरीभावात्तच्छङ्काभावे लयौद्धत्यप्रतिपक्षनिमित्तेष्वाभोगम-
कुर्वतोऽनाभोगावस्था चित्तस्यानाभोगता । इयं च सर्वक्लेशोपक्लेशानवकाश-
संनिश्रयदानकर्मिका । अविहिंसा विहिंसाप्रतिपक्षः । वधबन्धनादिभिः सत्त्वा-

beginning from alobha right upto vīrya (exclusive). 'Apramāda' means alobha and the like other elements by virtue of which one relinquishes the akuśala elements and takes to what is opposed to them—the kuśala elements. Thus it is known as what is opposed to pramāda—pramāda being just the contradictory element thereto. It functions as the fulfilment of the attainment of mundane and super-mundane virtues.

Upekṣā or equanimity means cittasamatā or calmness of the mind, citt-praśaṭthatā or the faculty of preserving the state of mental calmness and citta-anābhogatā or the mental state unyielding to the attraction of any object. By these three words, the three-fold stages of equanimity is implied. To explain, the mind when it is obsessed with (something) and is (thus) lost with such obsession (way-wardness = auddhatya) and said to be self-possessed (disturbed = vaiṣamya). At the first stage (of equanimity) when there is no such obsession or loss of mental balance, there exists mental calmness Then the (easy) flow of the mind that is well-composed (self-contained) and whose calmness (is maintained) with perseverance, without any preparation (anabhisaṁskāra) or effort (prayatna) (to that effect i.e. flows spontaneously) is called 'cittapraśaṭhatā.'

This (particular) stage, however, pervades (anugata) with the apprehension of obsession and the consequent loss of mental balance because of its transitoriness.[45] Then after

नामविहेठनमविहिंसा सत्त्वेषु करुणा । कं रुणद्धीति करुणा । कमिति सुखस्याख्य सुखं रुणद्धीत्यर्थ । कारुणिको हि परदुःखदुखी भवतीति । इयं चाविहेठनकर्मिका । उक्ता एकादश कुशलास्तदनन्तरोद्दिष्टास्तु क्लेशा इत्यतस्तानधिकृत्याह ।

क्लेशा रागप्रतिघमूढयः ॥ ११ ॥

having reached the summit of meditation and (thus) having done away with the elements that are opposed to it (equanimity) and (therefore) there being no further apprehension of falling back (again) and (thus) because of not having yielded to the (repeated) attraction of the conditions favouring obsession and the consequent loss of mental balance (auddhatya = waywardness) (the mind reaches) a state, free from attraction (of object) and this is called the mental state unyielding to the attractions of objects. This functions in the form of providing the necessary basis for the annihilation of all klesas and upaklesas.

'Avihiṁsā' or absence of injury is what is opposed to 'Vihiṁsā' or injury. (Avihiṁsā) means not to injure the living beings by means of killing them or tying them up. It means compassion (karuṇā) for all beings. 'Karuṇā' means what obstructs the scope of 'kaṁ'. 'Kaṁ' stands for sukha or (personal) pleasure or happiness and thus what obstructs (personal) pleasure or happiness is called 'karuṇā' or compassion. A compassionate person feels pained at the pain of others. This functions in the form of non-injury. The eleven kuśala-dharmas are thus explained and after that, the 'Kleśas' are intended (to be explained) and thus bearing upon them, it is said :

'Klesā rāga-pratigha-mūḍhayaḥ' (11)

मानदृग्विचिकित्साश्च

इति रागश्च प्रतिघश्च मूढिश्च रागप्रतिघमूढयः। तत्र रागो भवभोगयोरध्यवसानं प्रार्थना च। स पुनर्दुःखसंयोजनकर्मकः। दुःखमत्रो-पादानस्कन्धास्तेषां कामरूपारूप्यतृष्णावशादभिनिर्वृत्तिः। अतो रागस्य दुःख-संयोजनं कर्म निर्दिश्यते। प्रतिघः सत्त्वेष्वाघातः सत्त्वेषु रूक्षचित्तता येनाविष्टः सत्त्वनां वधबन्धनादिकमनर्थं चिन्तयति। स पुनरस्पर्शविहारदुश्चरितसंनिश्रय-दानकर्मकः। स्पर्शः सुखं तेन सहितो विहारः स्पर्शविहारः न स्पर्श-विहारोऽस्पर्शविहारः दुःखसहित इत्यर्थः। आघातचित्तस्यावश्यं दौर्मनस्यसमुदा-चाराच्चित्तं तप्यते। चित्तानुविधानाच्च कायोऽपि तप्यत एवेति सर्वेर्यापथेषु (सर्वेषां पथेषु ?) सदुःखसविघातोऽस्पर्शविहारोभवति। प्रतिहतचित्तस्य च न किंचिद्दुश्चरितं विदूर इति प्रतिघोऽस्पर्शविहारदुश्चरितसंनिश्रयदानकर्मक उक्तः।

māna-dṛgvicikitsāśca.

(Rāga or attachment, 'pratigha' or animosity, mūḍhi or ignorance, (stupor), māṇa or pride, dṛk or the five kinds of false constructions, and vicikitsā or the wrong interpretation of the law of moral causation, ot truth (āryasatya) and of theratnas, are the 'kleśas').

The (compounded) word, 'rāga-pratigha-mūḍhayaḥ in the kārikā stands for 'rāga', pratigha, and mūḍhi. Of these, 'rāga' means absorption in and seeking for existence (mundane life) and enjoyment thereof. It functions in the form of tying up with duḥkha or unrest (that brings about suffering). 'Unrest' here means the elements of attachment to life; in-as-much-as they emerge under the sway of the thirst for the sensuous plane of existence (kāma-dhātu), the world of reduced matter (rūpa-dhātu) and the immaterial worlds (arūpadhātu). Hence it is said that attachment functions in the form of tying up with unrest.

'Pratigha' or animosity means injury to living beings and harshmindedness to (the living beings), being possessed

मोहोऽपायेषु सुगतौ निर्वाणे तत्प्रतिष्ठापकेषु हेतुषु तेषां चाविपरीते हेतुफलसम्बन्धे यदज्ञानम्। अथ च संक्लेशोत्पत्तिरंनिश्रयदानकर्मकः। तत्र क्लेशकर्मजन्मात्मकस्त्रिविधः संक्लेशः। तस्योत्पत्तिः पूवपूवसंक्लेशनिमित्त उत्तरोत्तरस्य संक्लेशस्यात्मलाभः। उत्पत्तेः सनिश्रयदानकर्मं। मूढस्यैव हि मिथ्याज्ञानसशयरागादिक्लेशपौनर्भविककर्मजन्मनां प्रवृत्तेर्नामूदस्यैति।

मानः। मानो हि नाम सर्व एव सत्कायदृष्टिसमाश्रयेण प्रवर्तते। स पुनश्चित्तस्योन्नतिलक्षणः। तथा ह्यात्मात्मीयभावं स्कन्धेष्वध्यारोप्यायमहमिदं ममेत्यात्मानं तेन तेन विशेषेणोन्नमयति अन्येभ्योऽधिकं मन्यते। स चागौरवदुःखोत्पत्तिसंनिश्रयदानकर्मकः। अगौरवं गुरुषु गुणवत्सु च पुद्गलेषु स्वब्धता कायवाचोरप्रश्रृतता दुःखोत्पत्तिः पुनरत्र पुनर्भवोत्पत्तिः। स च पुनश्चित्तोन्नतिस्वरूपाभेदेऽपि चित्तोन्नतिनिमित्तभेदात्सप्तधा भिद्यते। मानोऽतिमान इत्येवमादि। हीनात्कुलविज्ञानवित्तदिभिः श्रेयानस्मि कुलविज्ञानवित्तादिभिरिति या चित्तस्योन्नतिः सदृशेन वा कुलादिभिरेव सदृशोऽस्मीति या चित्तस्योन्नतिः स मानः।

by which one thinks in terms of evil acts like killing or tying up of animals. It funciions in the form of providing the necessary basis for evil deeds not associated (aśparśavihāra). The word 'sparśa' here stands for happiness and the word 'sparśavihāra' means associated with happiness and thus 'asparśavihāra' means not associated with happiness that is to say associated with pain.

The mind under irritation invariably displays evil-mindedness and as such the mind undergoes pain. The body also being, as a rule, in obedience to the mind obviously undergoes pain and thus in all levels and modes of being (īryāpatheṣu) one is with pain, bitterness and non-association of pleasure. To mind, having bitterness (towards living beings), no evil deed is ever far off and, therefore, animosity is said to be functioning as providing the

– अतिमानः। कुलविज्ञानवित्तादिभिः सदृशात्त्यागशीलपौरुषादिभिः श्रेयानस्मि श्रेयसा वा कुलविद्यादिभिः सदृशोऽस्मि विज्ञानवित्तादिभिरित्ययमतिमानः। श्रेयसः कुलविज्ञानवित्तैरहमेव श्रेयान्कुलविज्ञानवित्तैरिति या चित्तस्योन्नतिरयं मानातिमानः। अस्मिमानः। पञ्चसूपादानस्कन्धेष्वात्मात्मीयरहितेष्वात्मात्मीयाभिनिवेशाद्या चित्तस्योन्नतिः सोऽस्मिमानः। अभिमानः। अप्राप्त उत्तरे विशेषाधिगमे प्राप्तो मयेति या चित्तस्योन्नतिः सोऽभिमानः। ऊनमानः। बह्वन्तरविशिष्टात् कुलविद्यादिभिरल्पान्तरहीनोऽस्मि कुलविद्यादिभिरिति या चित्तस्योन्नतिरयमूनमानः।

necessary basis for evil deed and non-association with pleasure.

Moha or stupor means the faculty of ignorance in regard to evils, the 'sugata', the Nirvāṇa and the coditions that establish one in those stages and the true (aviparīta = undistorted) cause-effect relation (between them) This also functions in the form of providing the necessary basis for the emergence of passions (saṁkleśa). Saṁkleśa or passion is threefold—the elements of moral difilement, the elements of antecedents (good or bad instincts) and life (various conscious activities). The emergence thereof (saṁkleśa) means the being of the successive (moments) saṁkleśa due to each preceding (moment of) saṁkleśa. The function of providing the necessary basis for the emergence (as has been spoken of) (means that); it is only the ignorant who proceed on to false understanding, doubt (in regard to the noble truths and the like), attachment and similar other elements of moral defilement, the elements of moral antecedents and life (or various conscious activities) and not those who are not ignorant or wise.

मिथ्यामानः। अगुणवतो गुणवानस्मीति या चित्तस्योन्नतिः स मिथ्यामानः। अगुणा हि दौःशील्यादयस्ते यस्य विद्यन्ते सोऽगुणवान्। तस्माद् गुणवानस्मीत्यनेन हि दानशीलाद्यभावेऽपि गुणवत्त्वमभ्युपगतं भवतीत्यतो निर्वस्तुकत्वान्मिथ्यामान इत्युच्यते। दृगिति सामान्यनिर्देशेऽपि क्लेशाधिकारात्पञ्चैव क्लेशात्मिकाः सत्कायदृष्ट्यादिकाः दृष्टयः संबध्यन्ते। न लौकिकी सम्यग्दृष्टिरनास्रवा। आसां तु क्लिष्टनितीरणाकारत्वादविशेषेऽप्यालम्बनाकारभेदात्परस्परतो भेदः। तत्र सत्कायदृष्टिर्यत्पञ्चसूपादानस्कन्धेष्वात्मात्मीयदर्शनम्।

Mānaḥ : Māna or pride means what being based on the false view of the self proceeds. It is characterised by the false sense of elevation of the citta (stream of personal life). To explain it further, having imposed the sense of 'I' and 'mine' on the 'Skandhas' (the five elements of life) (and considering them) as this is 'I' and this is 'mine' and in this way one elevates oneself or considers oneself as superior to others. It functions in the form of providing the necssary basis for the emergence of inglorification and pain. 'Inglorification' means indifferece to the persons (streams of personal life) who are respectable and virtuous (and thus) not being humble in words and deeds (towards them) and emergence of pain means the emergence of (the commotion of) the world-process (arising again in the limited state of being).

Although in essence, it is one as elevation of the citta (self or stream of personal life) but as there is difference in manner thereof, it is sub-divided into seven (varieties), like māna, 'atimāna' and the like.

The elevation of the 'citta' because of pedigree, knowledge and wealth as when one thinks in relation to one's inferior as 'I am superior to him by virtue of pedigree, knowledge and wealth' or as when one considers oneself

अन्तग्राहदृष्टिस्तेष्वेव पञ्चसूपादानस्कन्धेष्वात्मात्मीयत्वेन गृहीतेषु यदुच्छेदतः शाश्वततो वा दर्शनम् मिथ्यादृष्टिः । यया मिथ्यादृष्ट्या हेतुं वापवदति फलं क्रियां वा सद्वा वस्तु नाशयति सा सर्वदर्शनपापत्वान्मिथ्यादृष्टिरित्यु-

in relation to one's equal as 'I am equal to him by virtue of pedigree and the like' is called 'māna'.

'Atimānaḥ' (pride that excels pride) : Atimāna means the elevation of the self as when one thiks that 'I am by virtue of sacrifice, morality and manliness, superior to one who is equal to me in respect of pedigree, knowledge and wealth or (when one thinks that) 'I am by virture of knowledge and wealth equal to one who is superir in respect of pedigree'.

'I alone am by virtue of pedigree, knowledge and wealth, superior to one who is superior to others in respect of pedigree, knowledge and wealth'—such an elevation of citta is called 'pride that excels pride exceeding pride' (manātimāna).

'Asmimānaḥ' : Asmimāna is the elevation of the citta born of the intentness (clinging) of 'I' and 'mine' on to the five elements of attachment to life which are devoid of (the sense of) 'I' and 'mine'.

The elevation of one's mind (self) as when one in relation to (the objects of) special achievements which are (still) beyond and not achieved (as yet) thinks 'I have attained it' is called abhımāna or a false pride (superiority-complex = boastfulness).

Ūnamāna : (or the pride in feeling oneself slightly ınferior) : The elevation of one's mind (self) in relation

न्यते । दृष्टिपरामर्शः । पञ्चसूपादानस्कन्धेष्वग्रतो विशिष्टतः श्रेष्ठतः परमतश्च यद्दर्शनम् । शीलव्रतपरामर्शः । पञ्चसूपादानस्कन्धेषु शुद्धितो मुक्तितो नैर्याणि-

to one who is much superior by reason of pedigree, learning etc. when one thinks 'I am slightly inferior (to him) by reason of pedgree, learning etc.' is called ūnamana. Mithyāmāna or false pride (empty pride) : The complex of the mind to the effect that 'I am virtuous in relation to the vicious is called 'Mithyāmāna' or false pride. Bad conduct and the like are the vices and who possesses such vices is called a vicious (man). Therefore when (in relation to such a man) one thinks that 'I am virtuous', it so appears that even without (having the virtue of) sacrifice and good conduct, and as such bereft of any substantiality (such boasting) is called mithyāmāna or false pride.

Dṛk of false view : Although it is a general statement but still as the topic under discussion is an element of moral defilement, all the five defiled views like the false view of self and the like are meant, and not the 'uninfluenced' (anāsrava) right mundane view. Amongst them, although in principle there is no difference in regard to their all being defiled judgements but still as there is difference in regard to the different aspects they conform with, they differ from each other. Of these, the false view of the self (satkāyadṛṣṭi) is the view of 'I' and 'mine' in regard to the five elements of attachment to life.

The false view of nihilism or eternalism in regard to what has been viewed as 'I' and 'mine' with regard to these five elements of attachment to life is called antargrāhadṛṣṭi (false view of siezing the extremes).

कतरश्च यद्दर्शनम् । विचिकित्सा । कर्मफलसत्यरत्नेषु विमतिः । विविधा मतिर्विमतिः । स्यान्न स्यादिति । प्रज्ञातश्चेयं जात्यन्तरमेवोक्ता ।

Mithyādṛṣṭiḥ or false view : (It is a view) by reason of which false view (one) refutes the cause (moral antecedents or the effect or action (the law of moral Causation) or denies (the existence of) what exists in reality (a thing-itself). It is called 'mithyādṛṣṭi' in-as much-as it soils (falsifies) every kind of right view.

Dṛṣṭiparāmarśaḥ or siezing the false view : (It means) the view in relation to the five elements of attachment to life (i.e. the soul) as the ultimate, unique, the most premi-nent and the excellent (truth).

Śīlavrata-parāmarśaḥ : (or clinging to the śīlas or customs and vrata or rituals as the final truth) : (It means) the false view in regard to the five elements of attachment to life as of being pure, free and transcending the spheres of limited existence.[46]

Vicikitsā (or the wrong interpretation of the moral law of causation) : (It means) the mental state of unsettledness in regard to the moral antecedents, the retribution (thereof) the truths (noble truths) and the 'ratnas'. The mental state of unsettledness means cherising different kinds of view—whether 'it' exists or does not exist and the like. It is said to be essentially different from prajñā or right understanding (wisdom of the highest order).

The six kinds of kleśas or the elements of moral defile-ment (thus) explained and (now) of what have been

उक्ताः षट्क्लेशास्तदनन्तरोद्दिष्टास्त्विदानीमुपक्लेशा वक्तव्या इत्यत आह—

क्रोधोपनहने पुनः ।
म्रक्षः प्रदाश ईर्ष्याथ मात्सर्यं सह मायया ॥ १२ ॥
शाठ्यं मदो विहिंसा अह्रीरत्रपा स्त्यानमुद्धवः ।
आश्रद्धयमथ कौशीद्यं प्रमादो मुषिता स्मृतिः ॥ १३ ॥
विक्षेपोऽसंप्रजन्यं च कौकृत्यं मिद्धमेव च ।
वितर्कश्च विचारश्चेत्युपक्लेशा द्वये द्विधा ॥ १४ ॥

तत्र कोधो वर्तमानमपकारमागम्य यश्चेतस आघातः। अयं चाघातस्वरूपस्वात्प्रतिघान्न भिद्यते। किन्त्वस्य प्रतिघस्यावस्थाविशेषे प्रज्ञप्तत्वात्प्रतिघांशिकः। वर्तमानमपकारमागम्य यश्चेतस आघातः सत्वासत्वविषयोदण्डदानादिसंनिश्रयदानकर्मकश्च स क्रोध इति प्रज्ञप्यते। उपनाहो वैरानुबन्धः क्रोधादूर्ध्वं ममानेनेदमपकृतमित्यस्य वैरात्मकस्यानुशयस्यानुत्सर्गः प्रबन्धेन प्रवर्तनमुपनाहः। अयं चाक्षान्तिसंनिश्रयदानकर्मकः। अक्षान्तिरपकारामर्षणं प्रत्यपकारचिकीर्षा च। अयमपि क्रोधवत्प्रद्वेषावस्थाविशेषे प्रज्ञप्यते। अतः प्रज्ञप्तिसन्नेव वेदितव्यः। म्रक्ष आत्मनोऽवद्यप्रच्छादना छन्दद्वेषभयादीन्निराकृत्य काले तद्धितैषिणा चोदकेन तत् त्वमेवंकारीत्यनुयुक्तस्य मोहांशिकमवद्यप्रच्छादना म्रक्षः। मोहांशिकत्वं तु म्रक्षस्य प्रच्छादनाकारत्वात्। अयं च

enumerated (in the kārikā) i.e. upakleśas are to be explained and so it is said :

> Krodhopanahane punaḥ
> Mrakṣaḥ pradāśa īrṣyātha mātsaryaṁ saha mayayā (12)
> Śāṭhyaṁ mado vihiṁsā ahrīratrapā styānamuddhavaḥ
> Āśraddhyamatha kauśīdyam pramādo muṣitā smṛtiḥ(13)
> Vikśepo saṁprajanyam Ca kaukṛtyam middhameva Ca
> Vitarkaśca vicāraścetyupakleśa dvaye dvidhā (14)

The faculty of anger (violence—krodha), of breaking friendship (upanāha), of hypocrisy (deceit = mrakṣa), of harshness of words (pradāsa), of jealousy (īrṣya), of envy (mātsarya), of deceit (māyā), of perfidy (trikery = śāṭhya),

कौकृत्यास्पर्शसनिश्रयदानकर्मकः। धर्मतैषा यदवद्यं प्रच्छादयतः कौकृत्यमुत्पद्यते। कौकृत्याच्चावश्य च दोर्मनस्येन सप्रयोगादस्पर्शविहार इति। प्रदाशश्चण्ड-वचोदाशिता। चण्डं वचः प्रगाढं पारुष्यं मर्मघट्टनयोगेन दशनशीलो दाशी तद्भावो दाशिता। अयं च भावप्रत्ययः स्वार्थिकः। चण्डेन वचसा प्रदशतीति चण्डवचोदाशिता। अय च क्रोधोपनाहपूर्वकश्चेतस आघातस्वभाव इति प्रतिघांशिक एव न द्रव्यतो भिद्यते। अयं च वाग्दुश्चरितप्रसवकर्मकः। अस्पर्शविहारकर्मकश्च। तद्वतः पुद्गलस्य दुःखसवासत्वात्।

ईर्ष्या। परसम्पत्तौ चेतसो व्यारोषो लाभसत्काराध्यवसितस्य लाभसत्कार-कुलशीलश्रुतादीन्गुणविशेषान् परस्योपलम्भ्य द्वेषांशिकोऽमर्षकृतश्चेतसो व्यारोष ईर्ष्या। स्वमाश्रयं व्याप्य रोषो व्यारोषः। दौर्मनस्यसप्रयोगात्तत्पूर्वकश्चा-स्पर्शविहार इति दौर्मनस्यास्पर्शविहारकर्मिकोच्यते। मात्सर्यं दानविरोधी

of complacency (self-admiration = mada), of causing harm (menacing = vihimsā), not feeling indignant at the offences done of oneself (ahrī), of not feeling indignant to others at offences done (atrapā), of indolence (sloth = styāna), of being addicted to pleasure and sports (uddhave = auddhatya = sanguine temperament), of disturbed mind (aśraddham), of mental heaviness (kauśidya), of carelessness (pramāda), of eclipsed memory (muṣitā smṛti), of distraction (vikṣepa), of lacking in comprehension (asamprajanya), of repenting, (kaukṛtya), absentmindedness (middha), of a searching state of mind (vitarka), of a fixing state of mind (vicāra), these are the upakleśas or the vicious elements of limited occurrence; of these, the two pairs (kaukṛtya-middha, and vitarka-vicara) are two-fold each (good and bad i. e., neither definitely good not definitely bad elements).

Of these, 'krodha' or the faculty of anger means the mental violence in reference to an injury persently inflicted. It being essentially violence, does not differ from pratigha or animosity. But it being an appellation to a specific

चेतस आग्रहः । उपात्तं वस्तु धर्मामिषकौशलात्मकम् । येन पूजानुग्रहकाम्यया-र्थिनेऽनर्थिने वा दीयते तद् दानम् । तस्मिन् सति दानाभावात्तद्विरोधीत्यु-च्यते । लाभसत्काराध्यवसितस्य जीवितोपकरणेषु रागांशिकश्चेतस आग्रहो-ऽपरित्यागेच्छा मात्सर्यम् । इदं चासंलेखसंनिश्रयदानकर्मकम् । असंलेखः पुनर्मात्सर्येणानुपयुज्यमानानामप्युपकरणानां सञ्चयाद् द्रष्टव्यः । माया परवञ्चना याभूतार्थसंदर्शनता । लाभसत्काराध्यवसितस्य परवञ्चनाभिप्रायेणा-न्यथावस्थितस्य शीलादेरर्थस्यान्यथा प्रकाशना । इयं च सहिताभ्यां रागमोहाभ्याममूतान्गुणान्प्रकाशयतस्तयोः समुदितयोः प्रज्ञप्यत इति क्रोधादि-वत्प्रज्ञप्तित एव न द्रव्यत इति मिथ्याजीवसंनिश्रयदानकर्मिका । शाठ्यं स्वदोषप्रच्छादनोपायसंगृहीतं चेतसः कौटिल्यम् । स्वदोषप्रच्छादनोपायः परव्यामोहनम् । तत्पुनरन्येनान्यत्प्रतिसरन्विक्षिपति । अपरिस्फुटं वा प्रतिपद्यते ।

state of animosity it is only, an aspect (form) of animosity. (Thus) the mental violence in reference to an injury presently inflicted, directed towards sentient and insentient being and which functions as providing the necessary basis for inflicting punishment and the like is designated as krodha or the faculty of anger.

Upanāha or the faculty of breaking friendship means what is a corrolary to (consequence of) animosity. In succession to anger, one remorses (to the effect that) 'this one did harm to me' (and such a) lack of forbearance imbued with animosity when proceeding in contiguity is called upanāha. It functions in the form of providing the necessary basis for the lack of forgiveness. Lack of forgiveness means (passionate) intolerance at offences (done to one) and the design for counter-violence (or revenge). It is also like 'krodha' but a name given to a specific condition of pradveṣa. Thus it has to be understood existing only in name.[47]

अत एव शाठ्यं म्रक्षाद्भिद्यते। स हि स्फुटमेव प्रच्छादयति न कापवा। इदमपि लाभसत्काराध्यवसितोपायाभ्यां रागमोहाभ्यां स्वदोषप्रच्छादनार्थं परव्यामोहनाय प्रवर्तते। तयोरेव सहितयोः प्रज्ञप्यते। इदं च सम्यगववादलाभ-

Mrakṣa means the faculty of concealing one's offences. At the timely allegation made by a well-wisher and an inspirer of beings who has subdued 'chandas', dveṣa, bhaya and the like against one to the effect that 'you have committed such and such (offences)', the deceitful attempt of one to conceal one's offences is called mrakṣa. Mrakṣa being of the nature of hiding is (said to be) deceiful. This functions in the form of providing the necessary basis for repentance and pain. It is quite natural that attempts of concealing offences would cause repentance; and because of repentance it has to be associated with mental pain (sorrow = affliction) and thus it is said to be painful. Pradāsa means the faculty of biting by harsh words. Harsh words involve enormous violence. By striking at the vitals of the heart, it is (held to be) biting by nature and so (it is) designated as what bites and the functioning thereof is called 'biting' (by harsh words). The affix (tā) used in the 'bhāvavācya' conveys the sense of the base itself (and nothing more). Thus (the faculty of) biting by harsh words means what bites by means of harsh words. This also emerges in succession to 'anger' and 'breaking of friendship' and by nature, it is a mental violence and as such it is a mere aspect of animosity from which it does not differ in substance (it is a mere designation). It functions in the form of giving rise to vocal misbehaviour & involves pain in-as-such-as the person yielding to it falls a victim to suffering.

परिपन्थिकर्मकम् । सम्यगववादस्य यो लाभो योनिशोमनसिकारस्तस्यान्तरायं करोति । मद: स्वसंपत्तौ रक्तस्योद्धर्षश्चेतस: पर्यादानम् । कुलारोग्ययौवनबल-रूपैश्वर्यबुद्धिमेधाप्रकर्ष: स्वसंपत्ति: । उद्धर्षो हर्षविशेष: । येन हर्षविशेषेण चित्तमस्वतन्त्रीक्रियते तेन तदात्मतन्त्रीकरणात्पर्यात्तं भवतीत्येतदुक्तं चेतस: पर्यादानमिति । अयं च सर्वक्लेशोपक्लेशसंनिश्रयदानकर्मक: । विहिंसा सत्त्व-विहेठना । विविधैर्वधबन्धनताडनतर्जनादिभि: सत्त्वानां हिंसा विहिंसा ।

Īrṣyā or the faculty of jealousy is one's all-encompassing (absorbing) mental wrath (intolerance) at the attainment of others; one having attempted to attain position and gain for oneself (but having, failed) when finds that others have attained gain, position, familial distinction, learning and the like other virtues feels an all-encompassing mental wrath (intolerance) born of anger imbued with animosity (which) is termed īrṣyā. It is (called) all-encompassing wrath in-as-much-as it pervades one's whole being. It being inseparably associated with evil disposition (and)) as it emerges in succession to it and as it involves (mental) pain, it is said to be functioning in the form of a mental affliction and causing pain.

Mātsaryaṁ or the faculty of envy means the (passionate) attachment (to things) of the mind as opposed to (the virtue of) sacrifice. Things obtained are either of spiritual welfare or of physical enjoyment by way of which one out of respect (for others) or out of desire to do favour (to others) makes a gift unto one, whether seeking or not is (called) sacrifice. That (mātsarya) being there, there is no scope (left) for sacrifice and as such it is said to be opposed to sacrifice. (Thus) the passionate attachment or lack of desire to part with the elements of livelihood on the part of one having fixed all his attention on gain and position

विहेठयन्तेऽनया सत्वा वधबन्धनादिभिर्दुःखदौर्मनस्योत्पादनादिति सर्वसत्वविहेठना। सा पुनः प्रतिघांशिको निर्घृणता सत्वेषु चित्तरूक्षता सत्वविहेठनकर्मिका विहिंसेत्युच्यते। आह्रीक्यं स्वयमवद्येनालज्जा। तस्मिन्कर्मण्यात्मानमयोग्यं मन्यमानस्यापि याऽवद्येनालज्जा साऽह्रीक्यं ह्रीविपक्षभूतम्। अनपत्राप्यम्। परतोऽवद्येनालज्जा। लोकशास्त्रविरुद्धमेतन्मया क्रियत इत्येवमवगच्छतोऽपि या तया पापक्रियया लज्जा साऽपत्राप्यविपक्षभूतमनपत्राप्यम्। एतच्च द्वयमपि

(estimation) is called mātsarya. It functions in the form of providing the necessary basis for 'asaṁlekha,. Asalṁekha means the (undue) accumlation of the elements (of livelihood) even not coming under the perview of mātsarya.

'Māyā' or the faculty of deceit means deceiving others by way of displaying things not corresponding with facts It means the display of 'śīla' and the like other moral precepts in an inconsistent manner by one devoted to worldly gain and (social) estimation with a view to deceive others. It displāys the qualities not existing in reality (and is) prompted by 'rāga' (attachment) and moha (ignorance) both functioning together (and); it is a name given to these two emerging in consonance and as such it exists only in name as krodha and the like and not in substance. It functions in the form of providing the necessay basis for the actions of one indulging in falsehood (mithyajīva).[48]

Śāṭhya or the faculty of perfidy means the crookedness of the mind resorted to as a measure to cover up one's defects. (The undertaking of) the measures to cover up one's defects means bewildering (deceiving) others. This again means confusing (others) by way of replacing something for something else; or it involves ambiguity. Śāṭhya,

सर्वक्लेशोपक्लेशसाहाय्यकर्मकम् । रागद्वेषमोहप्रकारेषु सर्वासत्कार्यप्रभवहेतुषु रागद्वेषयोरयौगपद्याद्यथासंभवं प्रज्ञप्यते न तु स्वतन्त्रमस्ति । स्त्यानं चित्तस्याकर्मण्यता स्तैमित्यम् । स्तिमितस्य भावः स्तैमित्यं यद्योगाच्चित्तं जडीभवति स्तिमितं भवति नालम्बनं प्रतिपत्तुं समुत्सहते । एतच्च सर्वक्लेशोपक्लेशसाहाय्यदानकर्मकम् । मोहांशे प्रज्ञप्तत्वाच्च मोहांशिकमेव न पृथग्विद्यते । औद्धत्यं चित्तस्याव्युपशमः । व्युपशमो हि शमथस्तद्विरुद्धोऽव्युपशमः । स पुनरेष रागानुकूलपूर्वहसितरसितक्रीडिताद्यनुस्मरतश्चेतसोऽव्युपशमहेतुः शमथपरिपन्थकर्मकः । आश्रद्ध्यं कर्मफलसत्यरत्नेष्वनभिसंप्रत्ययः श्रद्धाविपक्षः । श्रद्धा ह्यस्तित्वगुणवत्व-

therefore, differs from 'mraksha' in-as-much as it (mraksha) clearly conceals (things) and not by way of artifice (or skilfully hiding things). It also proceeds to deceive others with a view to covering up one's defects prompted by 'rāga' and 'moha' – the two-fold means resorted to by one devoted to (the attainment of) worldly gain and (social) estimation. It is an appelation to these two (functioning) together. It functions in the form of an obstruction to the attainmet of right confidence (or) it stands in the way of natural (human) attention (or disposition) as derived from right confidence.

Mada or the faculty of complacency (or self-admiration) means what seizes the mind—the great delight of oneself devoted to self-attainment. Self-attainment means attainments of excellence in regard to lineage, health, youth, strength, beauty, wealth, talent and intellect. Great delight means joyful exaltation by virtue of which the mind loses its self-containedness and thus that (the mind) being seized up by it (delight), is called what seizes the mind. It functions in the form of providing the necessary basis for all the elements of moral defilement and the vicious elements of limited occurance as well.

शक्यत्वेष्वभिसंप्रत्ययः प्रसादोऽभिलाषश्च यथाक्रमम् । अश्रद्धा तद्विपर्ययेणास्तित्वगुणवत्वशक्यत्वेष्वनभिसंप्रत्ययोऽप्रसादोऽनभिलाषश्च । कौसीद्यसनिश्रयदानकर्मकम् । अश्रद्दधानस्य कुशलप्रयोगच्छन्दाभावात्कौसीद्यसनिश्रयदानकर्मकत्वम् । कौसीद्यं कुशले चेतसोऽनभ्युत्साहो वीर्यविपक्षः । कुशले कायवाङ्मनःकर्मणि निद्रापार्श्वशयनसुखमागम्य यो मोहांशिकश्चेतसोऽनभ्युत्साहः । एतच्च कुशलपक्षप्रयोगपरिपन्थिकमकम् । प्रमादो यैर्लोभद्वेषमोहकौसीद्यैः क्लेशाद्रागद्वेषमोहादिकाच्चित्तं न रक्षति कुशलं च तत्प्रतिपक्षभूतं न भावयति । तेषु लोभद्वेषमोहकौसीद्येषु प्रमादः प्रज्ञप्यते । अयं चाकुलशवृद्धिकुशलपरिहाणिसनिश्रयदानकर्मकः । मुषिता स्मृतिः क्लिष्टा स्मृतिः क्लिष्टेति क्लेशसप्रयुक्ता । इयं च विक्षेपसंनिश्रयदानकर्मिका । विक्षेपो रागद्वेषमोहांशिकश्चेतसो विसारः । विविधं क्षिप्यतेऽनेन चित्तमिति विक्षेपः । यै रागद्वेषमोहैश्चित्तं समाध्यालम्बनाद्बहिः क्षिप्यते तेषु यथासंभवं विक्षेपः प्रज्ञप्यते । एष च वैराग्यपरिपन्थिकर्मकः । असप्रजन्यं क्लेशसंप्रयुक्ता प्रज्ञा । यया सविदिता कायवाक्चित्तचर्या अतिक्रमप्रक्रमादिषु वर्तते

Vihiṁsā or the faculty of causing harm is what causes harm to all living beings. It means injury (inflcted on) beings by way of killing them, tieing them up, beating them or by frightening them. It is a harm to all living beings in-as-much-as all of them are injured by it by reason of the fact that they undergo suffering (physical) and mental pain because of their being killed or tied up.

This again is unkindness to all beings—the harshness of the mind, imbued with animosity and it functions in the form of causing harm to living beings and as such it is called vihiṁsā.

Ahrī or the faculty of not feeling indignant at the offences done by oneself means not feeling indignant to oneself at the offences committed by oneself. The lack of the feelings of indignance at the offences (done by oneself) even considering oneself unfit for that act is called ahrī—as opposed to hrī or the faculty of shamefulness.

करणीयाकरणीयाज्ञानात् । एतच्चापत्तिसंनिश्रयदानकर्मकम् । कौकृत्यं चेतसो विप्रतिसारः । कुत्सितं कृतमिति कुकृतम् । तद्भावः कौकृत्यम् । इह तु कुकृतविषयश्चेतसो विलेखः कौकृत्यं चैतसिकाधिकारात् । एतच्च चित्तस्थितिपरिपन्थिकर्मकम् । मिद्धमस्वतन्त्रवृत्तिचेतसोऽभिसंक्षेपः । वृत्तिरालम्बने प्रवृत्तिः । साऽस्वतन्त्रता चेतसो यतो भवति तन्मिद्धम् । कायचित्तसन्धारणासमर्था वा वृत्तिश्चेतसोऽस्वतन्त्रता सा यतो भवति तन्मिद्धम् । अभिसंक्षेपश्चेतश्चक्षुरादीन्द्रियद्वारेणाप्रवृत्तिः । एतच्च मोहांशे प्रज्ञपनान्मोहांशिकं कृत्यातिपत्तिसंनिश्रयदानकर्मकं च ।

Anapatrāpya is the faculty of not feeling ashamed to others of the offences (done by oneself) means lack of any fear of calumny by others for having committed offences. One's feeling not indignant at the sinful act committed by oneself even fully knowing that such an act is against all public opinion and all scriptural injunctions is called 'anapatrāpya' as opposed to 'apatrāpya' or the faculty of aversion to things objectionable. These two also function in the form of providing assistance to the emergence of all the elements of moral defilement and the vicious elements of limited occurrance. It is a name given to simultaneous interaction of 'rāga', 'dveṣa', 'moha' and the like other elements that are (said to be) the source of all evil acts, as called for, (even) though 'rāga' and dveṣa' may not always simultaneously interact and it has no independent status.

'Styāna' or the faculty of indolence means the lack of mental dexterity or the state of inertia (inactive temperament). The state of an inert is called intertia, by the association of which the mind loses all animation and becomes inert and shows no endeavour to ccgnise its content It also functions in the form of providing assistance (to the emergence) of all the elements of moral defilement

वितर्कः पर्यषको मनोजल्पः प्रज्ञा चेतनाविशेषः। पर्येषकः किमेतदिति निरूपणाकारप्रवृत्तः। मनसो जल्पो मनोजल्पः। जल्प इव जल्पः। जल्पोऽर्थकथनम्। चेतना प्रज्ञाविशेष इति। चेतनायाश्चित्तपरिस्पन्दात्मकत्वात्। प्रज्ञायाश्च गुणदोषविवेकाकारत्वात्तद्वशेन चित्तप्रवृत्तेः। कदाचिच्चित्तचेतनयोर्वितर्कप्रज्ञप्तिः। कदाचित्प्रज्ञाचेतसोर्यथाक्रममनभ्यूहाभ्यूहावस्थयोः। अथवा चेतनाप्रज्ञयोरेव वितर्कप्रज्ञप्तिस्तद्वशेन चित्तस्य तथाप्रवृत्तत्वात्। स एव चित्तस्यौदारिकता। औदारिकतेति स्थूलता वस्तुमात्रपर्येषणाकारत्वात्। एष च नयो विचारेऽपि द्रष्टव्यः। विचारोऽपि हि चेतना प्रज्ञाविशेषात्मकः। प्रत्यवेक्षको मनोजल्प एव। इदं तदिति पूर्वाधिगतनिरूपणात्। अत एव च चित्तसूक्ष्मतेत्युच्यते।

and the vicious elements of limited occurrance as well. It is a name given to an aspect of 'moha' and thus it exists as an aspect of 'moha' and has no independent existence.

Auddhatya or the faculty of being addicted to sports and pleasure means the lack of mental calmness (inquietude). Mental calmness means absence of passion (tranquility); what is opposed to it is called inquietude. This again is the source of (all) mental roughness (disorder) in case of one recollecting the previous occasion of joy, pleasure, and sports and the like, that favour (the emergence of) all passions and it functions in the form of functioning counter to mental quietude.

Āśraddhya or the faculty of disturbed mind meaas the unsettled belief in the law of moral causation (karmaphala), the truth (the four noble truths) and in the 'ratnas' (the three-fold ratnas—the Buddha, the dharma and the saṃgha) as opposed to śraddhā or the faculty of settled mind. 'Śraddhā' means the settled belief in the reality (of moral causation), the clarity of understanding (unstained

एतौ च स्पर्शस्पर्शविहारसंनिश्रयदानकर्मकौ। अनयोश्चौदारिकसूक्ष्मतया व्यवस्थापनात्पृथक्करणम्। द्वये द्विधेति। द्वयं च द्वय च द्वये। ते पुनः कौकृत्य-मिद्धे वितर्कविचारौ च। एते च चत्वारो धर्मा द्विधा क्लिष्टा अक्लिष्टाश्च।

attitude) in regard to the effectiveness (of the four Noble truths) and longing for the accessibility (of the there ratnas). 'Aśraddhā' being opposed to that means non-belief in the reality, (of moral causation) non-clarity of attitude to the effectiveness of the truths and non-desire for the accessibility (of the ratnas). It functions in the form of provididg scope for langour (kausīdya). It is said to be providing scope for langour in the sense that one lacking in 'śraddhā has no determination to employ oneself in action. Langour (mental heaviness) is opposed to endeavour (courage in good actions = vīrya) (and) it means lack of enthusiasm in regard to (the application of efforts in) good actions. The lack of endeavour, in the case of one, given to pleasure, to sloth and to satisfaction of the senses, in regard to good actions—physical, mental or vocal (is called langour). This functions in the form of an impediment to the applition of oneself on to the direction of good actions. Pramāda or the faculty of carelessness (inadvertance) means that by reason of which one does not guard one's mind against rāga, dveṣa, moha and the like other elements of moral defilement, born of 'lobha' dveṣa, moha and kausīdya and (by raason of which one) does not contemplate of kuśala elements that are opposed to these (elements of moral defilement). Pramāda is a name assigned to these, lobha, dveṣa, moha and kausīdya. This functions in the form of providing for the augmentation of defilement and decline of moral forces.

तत्राकुशलमकृत्वा कुशलं च कृत्वा यश्चेतसो विलेखस्तत्संक्लिष्टं कौकृत्यम् । यत्कुशलमकृत्वा तत्कौकृत्यमक्लिष्टम् । मिद्धमपि क्लिष्टचित्ताविद्धं क्लिष्टचित्त-संप्रयुक्तं च क्लिष्टम् । अक्लिष्टचित्ताविद्धमक्लिष्टचित्तसंप्रयुक्तं चाक्लिष्टम् । कामव्यापादविहिंसादिवितर्काः क्लिष्टाः । नैष्कम्यादिवितर्का अक्लिष्टाः । एवं

Muṣitā smṛti or the faculty of eclipsed memory means afflicted memory (stained by elements of defilement). 'Afflicted' means what is universally associated with the forces of moral defilement. It functions in the form of providing scope for distraction (or wavering). Distraction means the scattering or spreading about of the mind imbued with rāga, dveṣa and moha. It is called distraction because the mind gets thrown into various directions by reason of it. 'Distraction' is an appellation to 'rāga', 'dveṣa' and 'moha' in accordance with the circumstances (as emphasis is laid on any one of them) by virtue of which the mind is thrown out of the object of concentration. It functions in the form of an impediment to one's being free from passion.

Asaṁprajanya or the faculty of lacking in comprehension means understanding vitiated by passion (or affliction), by reason of which the course of conduct—'physical, vocal and mental' is not well comprehended and thus it (the course of conduct) proceeds beyond limits (or digresses) because there is the lack of understanding as to what is to be done or what is not be done. It functions in the form of providing the necessary basis for obstruction (to right knowledge).

Kaukṛtya means the mental faculty of repentance. Kaukṛtya means the mode of kukṛta or the evil that is done. In this context, however, Kaukṛtya as it is (used)

परोपघातोंपायविचारः क्लिष्टः । परानुग्रहोपायविचारोऽक्लिष्टः । तत्र ये कौकृत्य-मिद्धवितर्कविचाराः क्लिष्टाः त एवोपक्लेशा नेतरे । तत्र यथा रूपशब्दाद्युपलब्धिः ष्ट्प्रकारा यथासंभवं सर्वैश्चैतसिकैः संप्रयुज्यते सर्वत्रगैर्विनियतैः कुशलैः क्लेशै-रुपक्लेशैश्च एव त्रिवेदना तिसृभिश्च वेदनाभि संप्रयुज्यते सुखया दुःखया अदुःखा-

with reference to a mental state, means the scraping of the mind. It functions in the form of an obstruction to the stability of the mind.

Middha or the faculty of absent-mindedness means the lack of self-willed function—withholding the mind. Function means the (mind) proceeding toward its object; (and) due to what the mind loses its self-will-(-ed function) is called middha or the faculty of absent-mindedness (sloth or indolence). Middha means the particular mental state which fails to maintain the physical and mental (balance) and (thus) due to which the mind loses its self-willingness. The withholding of the mind means the mind not proceeding by way of the sense-organs like the eye and the like. It is an aspect of 'moha' or ignorance in-as-much-as it has reference to 'moha' and it functions in the form of providing the necessary basis for the transgression of what ought to be done.

Vitarka or the faculty of a searching state of mind means an 'indistinct murmur of the mind (manojalpa) (which is) searching (paryeṣaka) (after its object). It is a 'move of will' (cetana-viśeṣa) and a certain thought prajñā-viśeṣa) (as well).[49]

Manojalpa or the indistinct murmur of the mind means speaking inarticulately. It is called jalpa or speech in-as-much-as it has the likeness of a speech. Jalpa means

सुखया च सौमनस्य दौर्मनस्योपेक्षास्थानीयेषु रूपादिषु तदुत्पत्तेः । कुशला अकुशला अव्याकृता च । आलयविज्ञानं तु सर्वत्रगैः पञ्चभिरेव संप्रयुज्यते नान्यैस्तत्र चोपेक्षैव वेदना अनिवृताव्याकृतं च । क्लिष्टं मनः सर्वत्रगैः पञ्चभिश्चतुर्भिश्च क्लेशैरात्ममोहादिभिः तत्रोपेक्षैव वेदना निवृताव्याकृतं चेति ।

talking (defining) things. (The idea that) it is a move of will and a certain thought as well is being explained now. It is a move of will in the sense that it involves mental activity and 'will' is of the nature of mental activity. (And) it is a certain thought in the sense that the mind proceeds in accordance with prajñā which is of the nature of discrimination of good and evil (qualities). Sometimes the name, 'vitarka' is assigned to the mind and to the will and sometimes to thought and the mind in reference to the stages of reasoning (conscious plane) and non-reasoning (initial stage) respectively thereof or the name, vitarka is assigned to both, will and a certain thought in-as-much-as the mind proceeds in accordance with that.

This is the coarseness (audārikatā) of the mind. Coarseness means grossness in-as-much-as it is of the form of merely searching after its object. This principle is also applicahle to vicāra or the faculty of a fixing state of the mind. Vicāra also is a move of will and a certain thought (as well), it is (also) an indistinct murmur of the mind but it attempts to fix (pratyavekṣaka) its object in-as-much-as it involvs ascertainment like 'this is that' of what was understood earlier. So it is (held to be) characterised by the refinement (sūksmatā) in the form of providing the necessary basis for what is agreeable to senses and otherwise (pleasure and pain). These two are differentiated from each other by virtue of their being severally designated as gross and

इदमिदानीं चिन्त्यते । किं पञ्चानां चक्षुर्विज्ञानादीनां युगपदालम्बनप्रत्यय-सान्निध्येऽप्यालयविज्ञानादेकस्यैवोत्पत्तिर्भवति न द्वयोर्बहूनां वा । यथैके मन्यन्ते ।

subtle (respectively). (The words), 'dvaye dvidhā' (the two pairs are two-fold each) (are being explained now). The two pairs (dvaye) means two and two—kaukṛtya, middha, vitarka and vicāra. These four elements are two-fold each—afflicted and non-afflicted. The scraping (repentance) of the mind at not having performed evil (deeds) or at having performed good (deeds) is called afflicted kaukṛtya. The scraping of the mind again at not having performed good (deeds) is called non-inflicted kaukṛtya. 'Middha' also when pervaded by an afflicted mind is afflicted by virtue of its association with the afflicted mind and non-afflicted when pervaded by a non-afflicted mind and thus associated with a non-afflieted mind. Desire, malice and injury and such other vitarkas are afflicted.[51] Non-attachment and the like other vitarkas are non-afflicted ones. Similarly, the means (resorted to) for injurying others is a vicāra afflicted; (while) the means of favouring others is a vicāra non-afflicted. Of the Kaukṛtya, middha, vitarka and vicāra that are afflicted, only those are regarded as upakleśa or vicious elements of limited occurance and not others. As the apprehension of rūpa or colour, śabda or sound and the like—six-fold in all, each of which is invariably associated with all its respective mental elements and all the Sarvatraga, viniyata kuśala elements, the kleśas and upakleśas as well. So also it is associated with all the three-fold feeling — pleasure, pain, and non-pain–non-pleasure. It (apprehension) is also kuśala, akuśala and avyākṛata in-as-much-as such an apprenhension arises in

न द्वयोर्न बहूनां वा युगपत्समनन्तरप्रत्ययाभावादेकस्यैव विज्ञानस्योत्पत्तिर्भवति। न चैकं विज्ञानं बहूनां समनन्तरप्रत्ययत्वं प्रतिपत्तुमुत्सहते। उतानियमेन यथैकस्यैव प्रत्ययसान्निध्यमेकमेवोत्पद्यते एवं द्वयोर्बहूनां च प्रत्ययसान्निध्ये उत्पत्तिर्भवतीत्यत आह।

regard to colour and the like that are suitable to (the rise of) agreeable, non-agreeable and indifferent (equanimity) feelings The Ālaya consciousness is invariably associated only with the five 'sarvatraga' elements and with none else and the feeling there is only equanimity and it is anivrta or unobscured and avyākṛta or (morally) indifferent.

The Kliṣṭa (afflicted) manas is invariably associated with the five 'sarvatraga' (mental) elements, and the four kleśas like ātmamoha and like. The feeling there is equanimity and it is nivṛta or obscured and (morally) indifferent (by nature). Now it has to be investigated upon as to whether five pravṛtti-vijñānas having their ālambana-pratyayas (object-cause) simulaneously present, appear severaly or dually or collectively. Some people think that they appear neither dually nor collectively in-as-much-as (even though ālambana-pratyayas appear simultaneously) all the samanantarapratyayas (causa materialis) or the homogeneous causes cannot simultaneously function & there arises one single vijñāna at a particular time. One single consciousness cannot play the part of the samanantara-pratyayas of two or of many. Or (as against this view) should we contemplate (that) disregarding any such fixed principle, whenever there accurs the appearance of (a particular set of) pratyayas of a particular consciousness, there originates a particular consciousness (and) when of two,

पञ्चानां मूलविज्ञाने यथाप्रत्ययमुद्भवः ।
विज्ञानानां सह न वा तरङ्गाणां यथा जले ॥ १५ ॥

पञ्चानामिति चक्षुरादिविज्ञानाना तदनुचरमनोविज्ञानसहितानाम् । पञ्चानां चक्षुरादिविज्ञानाना बीजाश्रयत्वात्तत उत्पत्तेर्गतिषु जन्मोपादानाच्चालयविज्ञानं मूलविज्ञानमित्युच्यते । यथाप्रत्ययमुद्भव इति यस्य यस्य यः प्रत्ययः संनिहितस्तस्य तस्य नियमेनोद्भव आत्मलाभः । सह न वेति युगपत्क्रमेण वा । तरङ्गाणां यथा जल इति । आलयविज्ञानात्प्रवृत्तिविज्ञानाना युगपदयुगपच्चोत्पत्तौ दृष्टान्तः । यथोक्तम् । तद्यथा विशालमते [सन्धिनिर्मोचनसूत्रे ५.५] महत

two and when of many many with a view to explaining that it is said.

Pañcānām mūlavijñāne yathāpratyamudbhava
Vijñānānām saha na vā tarāṇgāṇām yathā jale (15)

The five cognitions (based) on the root consciousness make their appearance collectively or severally as callled for by the presence of the causes as the waves (rise) in water.

The word, 'pañcānām' (in the kārikā) means (the appearance) of the five cognitions, the ocular and the like accompanied by their universally concomitant consciousness called the 'manovijñāna'. The 'Ālayavijñāna' is designated as the 'mūlavijñāna' (in the kārikā) in view of its being the storehouse of the seeds of the ocular and the like other five cognitions and because of their manifestation therefrom as also because of its functioning as the substrate (upādāna) of life (arising in contiguity) to another. The word, 'yathāpratyamudbhava' (in the kārikā) means the appearance in contiguity of each (of the cognitions) in accornance with the presence of their respective causes (pratyayas). (The words), 'saha na vā' mean collectively or severally. (The

उदकौघस्य वहत: स चेदेकस्य तरङ्गस्योत्पत्तिप्रत्यय: प्रत्युपस्थितो भवत्येकमेव तरङ्गं प्रवर्तते। स चेद्द्वयोस्त्रयाणां संबहुलानां तरङ्गाणामुत्पत्तिप्रत्यय: प्रत्युपस्थितो भवति। यावत्संबहुलानि तरङ्गाणि प्रवर्तन्ते। न च तस्योदकौघस्य स्रोतसा वहत: समुच्छित्तिर्भवति न पर्युपयोग: प्रज्ञायते। एवमेव विशालमते तदोघस्थानीयमालयविज्ञानं संनिश्रित्य प्रतिष्ठाय स चेदेकस्य विज्ञानस्योत्पत्तिप्रत्यय: प्रत्युपस्थितो भवति एक एवमेव चक्षुर्विज्ञानं प्रवर्तते। स चेद्द्वयोस्त्रयाणां स चेत् यावत्पञ्चानां विज्ञानानामुत्पत्तिप्रत्यय: प्रत्युपस्थितो भवति सकृद्यावत्पञ्चानां प्रवृत्तिर्भवति। अत्र गाथा—

आदानविज्ञानगभीरसूक्ष्मो ओघो यथा वर्तति सर्वबीजो।
बाला न एषो मयि न प्रकाशि मोहैव आत्मा परिकल्पयेयु:॥

clause) 'tarangānām yathā jale' serves as an illustration of the appearance of the five pravṛttivijñānas collectively or severeally from the Ālaya-vijñāna

So it is said (in the Sandhivinirmocana sūtra 5.5) "So oh ! of supreme intelligence, if there is the cause for the appearance of a single wave in a massive flow of water, then a single wave appears. If of two or of three or of many, then all appear at once. (But even then) the water flowing in a stream does not get extinct (does not cease to exist as apart from the waves) (but that) it (simply) has no utility (is not so perceived)

Like this, oh ! one of supreme intelligence, based on the waterlike 'Ālaya-vijñāna', if there is the single cause of a single cognition, a single cognition arises. Thus a single ocular cognition arises. If of two or of three or of all the five (on the other-hand) then all the five cognitions arise. There is a gāthā (in this context) :

Like a mass of water, the ādāna-vijñāna, deep and subtle—the seed-house of all that proceeds. The ignorant

इति । न हि विज्ञानप्रतिनियमेनालम्बनप्रत्ययवत्समनन्तरप्रत्यय इष्यते सर्वविज्ञानोत्पत्तौ सर्वस्य विज्ञानस्य तत्समनन्तरप्रत्ययत्वाभ्युपगमात् । अत एकस्मादपि समनन्तरप्रत्ययादालम्बनप्रत्ययसान्निध्ये द्वयोबहूनां च विज्ञानानामुत्पत्तिर्न निरुध्यते । किं चात्र कारणं यत्समनन्तरप्रत्ययप्रतिनियमाभावे पञ्चानां च युगपदालम्बनप्रत्ययसान्निध्ये एकेनैवोत्पत्तव्यं न पञ्चभिरपीति । तस्मादालम्बनसद्भावे पञ्चानामपि चोत्पत्तिरित्यभ्युपेयम् ।

इदमिदानीं वक्तव्यम् । किं मनोविज्ञानं चक्षुरादिविज्ञानैः सह प्रवर्तते विना वा उत नैवेत्यत आह—

till it is not clear to them, due to ignorance, consider it the soul.

The Samanantara-pratyaya or the substrate-cause, however, is not as existing counter to a cognition as the ālambana-pratyaya in-as-much-as in relation to the rise of a cognition, the cognition itself admittedly functions as the substrate-cause. There being, therefore, the (necessary) ālambana-pratyaya or the object-causes, there is no bar to the two or more sensations proceeding from one and the same samanantara-pratyaya (manas or intellect). What is the reason here that there being no samanantara-pratyaya, counter-existing to a cognition there should arise only one cognition or all the five (even) if the ālambana-pratyayas of (all) the five cognitions are simultaneously present ? (i.e, there is no reason whatsoever). Thus it must be admitted that all the five cognitions arise in case the ālambana-pratyayas are there. Now it has to be discussed as to whether the manovjuana operates along with ocular and the (similar) other cognitions or without them or whether it at all operares or not. So it is said :

मनोविज्ञानसंभूतिः सर्वदासंज्ञिकादृते ।
समापत्तिद्वयान्मिद्धान्मूर्छनादप्यचित्तकात् ॥ १६ ॥

इति । सर्वदेति सर्वकालं चक्षुरादिविज्ञानैः सह विना वेत्यर्थः । अस्योत्सर्गस्यापवादमारभते आसंज्ञिकादृते समापत्तिद्वयान्मिद्धान्मूर्च्छनादप्यचित्ताकादिति । तत्रासंज्ञिकमसंज्ञिसत्वेषु देवेषूपपन्नस्य यश्चित्तचैतसिकानां धर्माणां निरोधः । समापत्तिद्वयमसंज्ञिसमापत्तिर्निरोधसमापत्तिश्च । तत्रासंज्ञिसमापत्तिस्तृतीयध्यानाद्वीतरागस्य नोर्ध्वमवीतरागस्य निःसरणसंज्ञापूर्वकेण मनसिकारेण मनोविज्ञानस्य तत्प्रयुक्तानां च चैत्तानां यो निरोधः सोऽत्रासंज्ञिसमापत्तिरित्युच्यते । निरुध्यतेऽनेनेति निरोधः । स पुनः ससंप्रयोगस्य मनोविज्ञानस्य समुदाचारनिरोध

Manovijñānasambhūtiḥ sarvadāsamjñikādṛte
Samāpattidvayanmiddhānmūrcchanādapyacittakāt (16)

The manovijñāna operates all the time except with the non-attached and barring the two-fold concentration and also when one is intensely devoid of consciousness or when one undergoes the stupefying stage of insensibility.

The word, sarvadā in the kārikā means always i.e., along with the ocular and the (similar) after eognition and without them as well. As an exception to this general statement, it is said 'asaṃjñikādṛte samāpattidvayanmiddhānmūrcchanādapyacittakāt.' The word, 'āsṁjñika' means, the cessation of the mind and the mental entities in a state of the mental life of those who are in the realm of 'āsaṁjñika'-sattva' or where the consciousness of the 'self' is lost.[52] The word, 'samāpattidvaya' means the asamjñika-samāpatti (or a force that makes one lose the consciousness of the self) and the nirodha-samāpatti (or a force that stops the consciousness and produces the highest semi conscious-dreamy trance). Of these, the 'āsaṁjñika-samāpatti' means the cessation of (the flow of) the manovijñāna and

आश्रयस्यावस्थाविशेषः। स च समापत्तिचित्तादनन्तरं चित्तान्तरोत्पत्तिविरुद्ध आश्रयः प्राप्यत इति समापत्तिरित्युच्यते। निरोधसमापत्तिराकिञ्चन्यायतनवीतरागस्य शान्तविहारसंज्ञापूर्वकेण मनसिकारेण ससंप्रयोगस्य मनोविज्ञानस्य क्लिष्टस्य च मनसो यो निरोधः। इयमप्यसंज्ञिसमापत्तिवदाश्रयस्यावस्थाविशेषे प्रज्ञप्यते। अचित्तकं मिद्धं गाढमिद्धोपहतत्वादाश्रयस्य तावत्कालं मनोविज्ञानाप्रवृत्तेरचित्तकमित्युच्यते। अचित्तिका मूर्च्छा। आगन्तुनाभिघातेन वातपित्तश्लेष्मवैषम्येण वा यदाश्रयवैषम्यं मनोविज्ञानप्रवृत्तिविरुद्धम्। तत्राचित्तिका

its concomitant mental entities of one who has given up all attachment pertaining only upto the third stage of meditation but still having the will that has its accomany-ing element (of desire) of going beyond (to the other stage above the third). 'Nirodha' (samāpatti) (or a force of suppression) is so called because one suppresses (the consciousness of the self) by the virtue of it. This again is a particular stage of the 'āśraya' (or the substratum, the ālaya) that puts a stop to the functioning of the manovijñāna with all its associates. It is called 'samāpatti' or attainment, because one after having attained the mental state attainable in it gets on to the state of āśraya or the substratum that works counter to the rise of any other state of mind. 'Nirodha-samāpatti' means the cessation of (the flow of) the manovijñāna with all its associates and the afflicted 'manas' in regard to one who has reached on to the stage of 'akiñcanyāyatana' (non-clinging to anything specific i.e., when thought of anything specific or even of ākāśa is transcended) and who has taken the resolve of dwelling in a peaceful state (of existence). It is also (conventionally) known to be a particular stage of the āśrays (ālaya) like the 'āsaṁjñikasamāpatti'. 'Acittikaṁ middhaṁ' (in the Kārikā) or sloth or indolence devoid of conscious-

मूर्च्छोपचर्यते। एताः पञ्चावस्था वर्जयित्वा तदन्यासु सर्वास्ववस्थासु मनोविज्ञानप्रवृत्तिर्वेदितव्या। एवमासंज्ञिकादिषु मनोविज्ञाने निरुद्धे तदपगमे पुनः कुत उत्पद्यते यत्तस्य कालक्रिया न भवति। तत्पुनरालयविज्ञानदेवो-पद्यते। तद्धि सर्वविज्ञानबीजकमिति। यत्र विज्ञानपरिणामे आत्मधर्मोपचारः स पुनस्त्रिधे-त्युद्दिश्य विस्तरेण त्रिविधोऽपि निर्दिष्टः।

ness means that when at the stage of intense sloth, the āśraya is impaired and the manovijñāna stops flowing (and) as such it is called acittaka or devoid of consciousness 'acittikā mūrchā' (or the stupefying stage of insensibility means that) the loss of balance in the āśarya due to accidental imbalance in the three humours of the body— the wind, the bile and phelegm—is counter to the rise of 'manovijñāna'. On this (loss of balance in āśraya) is constructed (fancied indetification founded on resemblance) the acittikā mūrchā(or the stupefying stage of insensibility). Leaving as de these five states, it is to be understood that manovijñāna functions in all other conditions.

(It may be argued that) how does the 'manovijñāna' having been ceased to function in the āforesaid states of 'āsaṃjñika' and like starts functioning again with the removal of such conditions ? (The answer is that) in-as-much-as it did not have total extinction, it again springs up into existence from the 'ālaya-vijñāna'. That one (ālaya) is the seed of all consciousness. Upon this 'vijñāna-parināma', are conttructed the soul & the various substances. With a view to illustrating the three-fold nature of this (Vijñāna-prināma), all the three kinds have been duly explained. Now with a view to explaining that there is no soul or substance apart from the development of vijñāna (vijñānaiparināma) and that what is ascribed to be soul or

इदानीमात्मधर्मोपचारो यः प्रज्ञप्यते स विज्ञानपरिणाम एव न विज्ञान-परिणामात्स पृथगस्त्यात्मा धर्मा वेति यत्प्रतिज्ञात तत्प्रसाधनार्थमाह ।

विज्ञानपरिणामोऽयं विकल्पो यद्विकल्प्यते ।
तेन तन्नास्ति तेनेदं सर्वं विज्ञप्तिमात्रकम् ॥ १७ ॥

इति योऽयं विज्ञानपरिणामस्त्रिविधोऽनन्तरमभिहितः सोऽयं विकल्पः । अध्यारोपितार्थाकाराः त्रैधातुकाश्चित्तचैत्ता विकल्प उच्यते । यथोक्तम्—

अभूतपरिकल्पस्तु चित्तचैत्तास्त्रिधातुकाः

इति । तेन त्रिविधेन विकल्पेनालयविज्ञानक्लिष्टमनःप्रवृत्तिविज्ञानस्वभावेन ससंप्रयोगेण यद्विकल्प्यते भाजनमात्मा स्कन्धधात्वायतनरूपशब्दादिकं वस्तु तन्नास्तीत्यतः स विज्ञानपरिणामो विकल्प उच्यते असदालम्बनत्वात् । कथं पुनरेतद्विज्ञायते तदालम्बनं असदिति । यद्धि यस्य कारणं तस्मिन्समग्रे चाविरुद्धे

substance is but essentially the development of vijñāna itself as it has been stated earlier, it is said :

Vijñāna pariṇāmo'yam vikalpo yadvikalpyate
tena tannāsti tenedam sarvaṁ vijñaptimātrakaṁ (17)

All constructions by reason of their being constructed are but the development of vijñāna and thus (tena) that (what is constructed) does not exist and therefore (tena) all this is but consciousness alone.

What is called the Vijñānapariṇāma and what has been later stated as of being three-fold in kind is what is known as construction. Construction means the mind and the mental states belonging to the three worlds on which are superimposed, the various objects and the forms thereof. As it is said (in the Madhyāntavibhangaśāstra) :

The mind and the mental states of the three worlds are but the constructions of the (essentially) non-existent.

च तदुत्पद्यते नान्यतः। विज्ञानं च मायागन्धर्वनगरस्वप्नतिमिरादावसत्यालम्बने जायते। यदि च विज्ञानस्यालम्बनप्रतिबद्ध उत्पादः स्यात् एवं सति मायादिष्वर्थाभावान्न विज्ञानमुत्पद्यते। तस्मात् पूर्वकान्निरुद्धात् तज्जातीयविज्ञानाद् विज्ञानमुत्पद्यते न बाह्यादर्थात् तस्मिन्नसत्यपि भावात्। दृष्टा चाभिन्नेऽप्यर्थे प्रतिपत्तॄणां परस्परविरुद्धा प्रतिपत्तिः। न चैकस्य परस्परविरुद्धानेकात्मकत्वं युज्यते। तस्मात् अध्यारोपितरूपत्वाद् विकल्पस्यालम्बनं असदिति प्रतिपत्तव्यम्।

In-as-much-as what is constructed as the objective world, the soul, the skandhas, the dhātus, the āyatanas, rūpa (or matter), śabda and the like other things by virtue of the three-fold construction of the nature of the ālaya-vijñāna, the afflicted manas, and the (six) pravṛtti-vijñānas with their associates, do not (essentially) exist, the development of vijñāna is also but construction; because it has no real object-cause. (It may be argued that) how is it known that the object-cause is not real? (Because) whatever is the cause of something must be invariably functioning and in full and only then that 'something' comes into being and not otherwise. But vijñāna or consciousness arises even without any (real) object-cause as in the cases of an illusioury city of the Gandharvas or of dreams, or of one having ocular defects. If the rise of consciousness was ever invariably bound up with any (real) object-cause, then no consciousness would ever arise in an illusion and the like other circumstances, because there is no (real) object. Consciousness therefore, appears contignously with the (elements of) the consciousness of the same clay that got extinct in the previous moment (but functioning as the substrate-cause) and not from any external object in-as-mcch-as it (consciousness) appears even wsthout them.

अनेन तावत् समारोपान्तं परिहृत्यापवादान्तपरिजिहीर्षया आह—

तेनेदं सर्वं विज्ञप्तिमात्रकम्

इति। तेनेति तस्मात्। यस्मात् परिणामात्मकेन विकल्पे न यद्विकल्प्यते तेन तन्नास्ति, तस्माद् विषयाभावात् सर्वं विज्ञप्तिमात्रकम्। सर्वमिति त्रैधातुकमसंस्कृतं च। मात्रशब्दस्तदधिकविषयव्यवच्छेदार्थः। ककारः पादपूरणार्थः। यदि सर्वं विज्ञप्तिमात्रकमेव न ततोऽन्यः कर्ता करणं वास्ति।

Moreover, it is well-known that in regard to one and the single object, amongst different observers, mutually contradicting consciousnesses arise. One and the same (object) cannot logically be of the nature of (giving rise to) manifold (consciousness) contradicting each other. Thus in view of its nature of superimposition, the object-cause of a construction has to be deemed unreal.

Thus far (an attempt is made) to refute (the validity) of superimposition and with a view to avoiding any wrong imputation, it is said (in the Kārikā)

'therefore all this is but consciousness alone'

The word, 'tena', in the 'Kārikā' means 'therefore' i e., in-as-much-as by reason of its being constructed by 'vikalpa' of the nature 'pariṇāma' or development of vijñāna, it (what is constructed) does not exist Therefore, there being no object, all is but consciousness. The word, 'sarva' (in the kārikā) means all belonging to the three worlds including the 'asaṁskṛta' entities also. The word, 'mātra' aims at precluding things other than it. The suffix, 'ka' (in mātrakaṁ) is only an expletive. If everything is but consciousness alone and there is no such entities like the agent or the instrument, then how are such constructions

कथं मूलविज्ञानाद् अनधिष्ठिताद् असति करणे विकल्पाः प्रवर्तन्त इत्याह—

सर्वबीजं हि विज्ञानं परिणामस्तथा तथा।
यात्यन्योन्यवशाद् येन विकल्पः स स जायते। १८॥

तत्र सर्वधर्मोत्पादनशक्त्यनुगमात् सर्वबीजम्। विज्ञानमित्यालयविज्ञानम्। विज्ञानं ह्यसर्वबीजादप्यस्तीति। अतः सर्वबीजमित्याह। विज्ञानाद् अन्यदपि कैश्चित् प्रधानादि सर्वबीजं कल्प्यत इति विज्ञानमित्याह। अथ वा एकपदव्यभिचारेऽपि विशेषणविशेष्यत्वदर्शनान्नायं दोषः। परिणामस्तथा तथा यात्यन्योन्यवशादिति। पूर्वावस्थातोऽन्यथाभावः परिणामः। तथा तथेति तस्य तस्य विकल्पस्यानन्तरोत्पादनसमर्थावस्थां प्राप्नोतीत्यर्थः। अन्योन्यवशादिति तथा हि चक्षुरादिविज्ञानं स्वशक्तिपरिपोषे वर्तमानं शक्तिविशिष्टस्यालयविज्ञान-

made, the mūlavijñāna having no directing agency nor there being any instrumental cause thereto? In answer (to this apprehension), it is said:

Sarvavījaṁ hi vijñānaṁ pariṇamastathātathā
Yātyanyonyavaśād yena vikalphaḥ sa sa jāyate (18)

The (Ālaya)-consciousness is the seed of all and development (thereof) appears contemporaneously (with the previous moment of sensation (vikalpa) in-as-much-as sensations appear mutually depending on each other.

The word, 'sarvavījaṁ' is used to signify its capability of bringing into appearance all elements (of existence). The word, vijñānam means the Ālaya-vijñānaṁ. It is said to be 'sarvavijaṁ' to signify that there is a consciousness as (distinctly) different from the kind of (ordinary) consciousness not functioning as the seed of all appearances. The word, 'vijñānaṁ' is used because some people conceive of 'pradhāna' as distinct from 'vijñāna' as the root of all appearances. Or even it there be transgression in regard

परिणामस्य निमित्तं सोऽपि आलयविज्ञानपरिणामः चक्षुरादिविज्ञानस्य निमित्तं भवति। एवमन्योन्यवशाद् यस्मादुभयं प्रवर्तते तस्मादालयविज्ञानाद् अन्येनानधिष्ठिताद् अनेकप्रकारो विकल्पः स स जायते। तत्र च वर्तमाने जन्मनि यथालयविज्ञानात् प्रवृत्तिविज्ञानस्योत्पत्तिर्भवति तथा ख्यातम्।

to a single word (if a word is used in excess) there need not be any blemish in-as-much-as it could be justified on the ground of its being related to other words as the qualifier or the qualified. The experession, 'pariṇāma-astathā tathā yātyanyongavaśāt' or that the development accordingly appears mutually depending on each other means as follows. Pariṇāma or development means trans-formation as distinct from the previous state of being. The words, 'tathā tathā' mean that a particular mental sensation matures upto a stage capable of giving further rise to the same constructed image. The word, 'anyonya-vaśād' means that the eye-consciousnesss and the like while engaged in the act of nourishment of its own potency functions as a cause to the development of the potentially efficient Ālaya-consciousness as also the Ālaya-consciousness becomes a cause to the rise of the eye-consciousness and the like.[53] In this manner, being mutually dependent on each other, these two kinds of consciousness appear. Thus from the Ālaya-conciousness (even) having no other directing agency, different kinds of cognitions appear.

It is well illustrated as to how in the present life the pravṛtti-vijñānas proceed from the Ālaya-vijñāna. Now it is being explained as to how after this present life which is but consciousness alone being extinct, the future life would be linked up with the present.

इदानीं विज्ञप्तिमात्रे अनागतं जन्म वर्तमानजन्मनिरोधे सति यथा प्रतिसन्धीयते तत् प्रदर्शयन्नाह—

कर्मणो वासना ग्राहद्वयवासनया सह।
क्षीणे पूर्वविपाकेऽन्यद्विपाकं जनयन्ति तत् ॥ १९ ॥

इति। पुण्यापुण्यानेञ्जचेतना कर्म। तेन कर्मणा यदनागतात्मभावाभिनिर्वृत्तये आलयविज्ञाने सामर्थ्यमाहितं सा कर्मवासना। ग्राहद्वयम्। ग्राह्यग्राहो ग्राहकग्राहश्च। तत्र विज्ञानात्पृथगेव स्वसन्तानाध्यासितं ग्राह्यमस्तीत्यध्यवसायो ग्राह्यग्राहः। तत्र विज्ञानेन प्रतीयते विज्ञायते गृह्यत इति योऽयं निश्चयः स ग्राहकग्राहः। पूर्वोत्पन्नग्राह्यग्राहकग्राहाक्षिप्तमनागततज्जातीयग्राह्यग्राहकग्राहोत्पत्तिबीजं ग्राहद्वयवासना। तत्र कर्मवासनाभेदाद् गतिभेदेनात्मभावभेदः बीजभेदादंकुरभेदवत्। ग्राहद्वयवासनायास्तु सर्वकर्मवासनानां यथास्वं आक्षिप्तात्मभावोत्पादने प्रवृत्तानां सहकारित्वं प्रतिपद्यते। तद्यथा अवादयोऽङ्कुरस्योत्पत्ताविति। एवं च न केवलाः कर्मवासना ग्राहद्वयवासनानुगृहीता विपाकं जनयन्तीत्युक्तं भवति। अत एवाह-ग्राहद्वयवासनया सहेति।

Karmano vāsanā grāhadvayavāsanayā saha
Kṣīne pūravipāke anyadvipākaṁ janayanti tat (19)

The vasanā or the the biotic force of deeds (moral antecedends) alongwith the two-fold grāha-vāsanā or the biotic force inherent in the two-fold aspect of a self-conscious idea, give rise to the vipāka or the accomplish ment of maturation, the previous one having been worn away.

Deeds are of three-fold nature — good, bad, and indifferent. Such deeds (as moral antecedents) deposit their potency on the Ālaya-vijñāna for the rise of the future life. This is called 'Karmavāsanā'. The two-fold 'grāha' means the object-aspect and subject-aspect (of a self-conscious idea).[54] The apprehension of an object

क्षीणे पूर्वविपाकेऽन्यद्विपाकं जनयन्ति तदिति । पूवजन्मोपचितेन कर्मणा य इह विपाकोऽभिनिवृत्तस्तस्मिन् क्षीणे इति आक्षेपकाले पर्यन्तावस्थिते यथाबलं कर्मवासना ग्राहद्वयवासनासहिता उपभुक्ताद्विपाकाद् अन्यद्विपाकं तदेवालय-विज्ञानं जनयन्ति, आलयविज्ञानव्यतिरेकेणान्यस्य विपाकस्याभावात् । क्षीणे पूर्वविपाक इत्यनेन शाश्वतान्तं परिहरति । अन्यद्विपाकं जनयन्तीत्युच्छेदान्तम् । चक्षुरादिविज्ञानव्यतिरिक्तमालयविज्ञानमस्ति तदेव च सर्वबीजकं न चक्षुरादि-विज्ञानमिति । कुत एतत् । आगमाद् युक्तितश्च । उक्तं हि भगवताभिधर्मसूत्रे ।

अनादिकालिको धातुः सर्वधर्मसमाश्रयः ।
तस्मिन् सति गतिः सर्वा निर्वाणाधिगमोऽपि वा ॥

न चालयविज्ञानमन्तरेण संसारप्रवृत्तिर्निवृत्तिर्वा युज्यते । तत्र संसारप्रवृत्तिः निकायसभागान्तरेषु प्रतिसन्धिबन्धः । निवृत्तिः सोपधिशेषो निरुपधिशेषश्च निर्वाणधातुः । तत्रालयविज्ञानादन्यत् संस्कारप्रत्ययं विज्ञान न युज्यते । संस्कारप्रत्ययविज्ञानाभावे प्रवृत्तेरप्यभावः संसारस्य । आलयविज्ञानानभ्युपगमे प्रतिसन्धिविज्ञानं वा संस्कारप्रत्ययं परिकल्प्येत संस्कारभाविता वा षड्विज्ञान-कायाः । तत्र ये संस्काराः प्रातिसन्धिकविज्ञानप्रत्ययत्वेनेष्यन्ते, तेषां चिरनिरुद्ध-

is falsely attributed to its parallel duration as something independent of consciousness. (And) the selt conscious distinct idea that it is consciousness that perceives or knows or grasps is the subject-aspect. 'Grāha-dvaya-vāsanā' means the seed (or force) deposited (in the Ālaya) by the object and subject (subject-object aspect of a self-conscious idea) that had risen earlier and is capable of giving rise to the yet-to-be similar subject-object aspect(of self-conscious idea). Origination differ in accordance with the difference of karma-vāsanā and of the 'gatis' of life, as sprouts differ with the difference of seeds. The 'grāhadvaya-vāsanā' functions only as an accessary (force at work) in the process of the manifestation of future life as foreshadowed by the biotic force inherent in the moral antecedents like water and the like

त्वात्, निरुद्धस्य चासत्वात् असतश्च प्रत्ययत्वाभावान्न संस्कारप्रत्ययं प्रतिसन्धि-विज्ञानं युज्यते। प्रतिसन्धौ च नामरूपमप्यस्ति न केवलं विज्ञान तत्र विज्ञानमेव संस्कारप्रत्ययं न नामरूपमिति। का तत्र युक्तिः? तस्मात् सस्कारप्रत्यय नामरूप-मिति वक्तव्यम्, न तु विज्ञानमिति। कतमदन्यविज्ञानप्रत्ययं नामरूप। यदुत्तर-कालमिति चेत्तस्य प्रातिसन्धिकनामरूपात् क आत्मातिशय; यतस्तदेव विज्ञान-प्रत्ययं न पूर्वं, पूर्वं च संस्कारप्रत्ययं नोत्तरमिति। अतश्च सस्कारप्रत्ययं नामरूप-मेवास्तु किं प्रतिसन्धिविज्ञानेनाङ्गान्तरेण परिकल्पितेन। तस्मान्न प्रतिसन्धि-विज्ञानं संस्कारप्रत्ययं युज्यते। सस्कारपरिभाविता वा षड्विज्ञानकाया अपि न सम्कारप्रत्ययं विज्ञानं युज्यते। किं कारणम्? न हि विज्ञानं विपाकवासनां निष्यन्दवासनां वा स्वात्मन्याधत्तुं समर्थं स्वात्मनि कारित्रविरोधात् नाप्यनागते तस्य तदानुत्पन्नत्वात्, अनुत्पन्नस्य चासत्वात्। नाप्युत्पन्नपूर्वस्य तदा निरुद्ध-त्वात्। अचित्तिकासु च निरोधसमापत्त्याद्यवस्थासु पुनः सस्कारपरिभावित-

in the growth of sprouts. Thus it boils down to this, that the biotic force inherent in the moral antendedents alone unassisted[55] by the Biotic force inherent in the two-fold aspects of a self-conscious idea is incapable of giving rise to vipāka or the accomplishment of maturation as the natural outcome (of the biotic force of good and evil deeds). (And) so it is said (in the kārikā) 'grāhadvayavāsanayā saha' or assisted by the 'grāhadvayavāsanā'.

Now to explain 'kṣīṇe pūrvavipāke anyadvipākaṁ janayanti tat' or the previous maturation having been worn away (they) give rise. The accomplishment of maturation that had taken shape as a result of (moral) deeds accumulated in the previous life having worn away (and) when at the completion of the cycle (of birth and death) a further maturation is at the offing, the biotic force inherent in the moral deeds (in this life), to the best of its potency, in association with biotic force inherent in the

चित्तोत्पत्त्यसंभवात् विज्ञानप्रत्ययं नामरूपं न स्यात्, षडायतनं न स्यात्, एवं यावज्जातिप्रत्ययं जरामरणं न स्यात् । ततश्च संसारप्रवृत्तिरेव न स्यात् । तस्मादविद्याप्रत्ययाः संस्काराः तदधिवासि चालयविज्ञानं संस्कारप्रत्ययं विज्ञानं तत्प्रत्ययं प्रतिसन्धौ नामरूपमित्येषैव नीतिरनवद्या । संसारनिवृत्तिरपि आलयविज्ञाने असति न युज्यते । संसारस्य हि कर्म क्लेशाश्च कारणं तयोश्च क्लेशाः प्रधानम् । तथा हि क्लेशाधिपत्यत्वात् कर्म पुनर्भवाक्षेपसमर्थं भवति नान्यथा । तथा आक्षिप्तपुनर्भवमपि कर्म क्लेशाधिपत्यादेव पुनर्भवो भवति नान्यथा । एवं च क्लेशा एव संसारप्रवृत्तेः प्रधानत्वान् मूलम् । अतस्तेषु प्रहीणेषु संस्कारो विनिवर्तते नान्यथा । न चालयविज्ञानमन्तरेण तत्प्रहाणं युज्यते । कथं पुनर्न युज्यते । संमुखीभूतो वा क्लेशः प्रहीयते बीजावस्थो वा । तत्र संमुखीभूतः प्रहीयत इति । अनिष्टिरेवेयम् । तत्र तत् (क्लेशः) प्रहाणमार्गस्थयिनां वा बीजावस्थोऽपि नैव प्रहीयते । न हि प्रतिपक्षात् तदानीं किञ्चिदन्यदभ्युपगम्यते, यत्र क्लेशबीजं व्यवस्थितं तत्प्रतिपक्षेण प्रहीयेत ।

two-fold aspects of a self-concious idea, proceeding from the previously enjoyed state of fruition (vipāka) gives rise to the same 'Ālaya-vijñāna' imbued with a different state of fruition in-as much-as anything other than the Ālaya-vijñāna is incapable of maturing up to a fruition. With a view to avoiding the idea of an immutable eternal ultimate reality, the expression–'the previous maturation having been worn away' is used, and the expression, 'give rise to another state of fruition' is used to combat the extreme view of utter annihilation. There is the Ālaya-vijñāna as distinguished from the eye-consciousness and the like (and) that one is the 'root of all' and not the eye-consciousness and the like. Why so? Because (such an idea is based on) the scriptures and on reason. So the Lord has said in the Abhidharmasūtra :

Eternal is the consciousness,[56] the source of all entities.
With this (functioning), (are attained) the stages, the Nirvāṇa or the knowledge.

अथ प्रतिपक्षचित्त एव क्लेषबीजानुषक्त इष्यत। न हि तत् क्लेशबीजानुषक्तमेव तत्प्रतिपक्षो भवितुमर्हति। न चाप्रहीणक्लेशबीजानां ससारनिवृत्तिः संभवति। तस्मादवश्यमालयविज्ञानं तदन्यविज्ञानसहभूमिः क्लेशोपक्लेशैर्भाव्यते

Had there been no 'Ālaya-vijñāna', neither attachment nor non-attachment to the worldly life could be explained. Attachment to the worldly life means (that the Vijñāna impregnated with 'Saṁskāras' is) tied to another complex of the 'skandhas' (for the sake of a fresh embodidiment); while non-attachment means 'Nirvāṇa'—a state of mental life either absolutely exempting from the circle of transmigration or (as absolute immorortality through absorption of the self into itself but) peeserving individuality as yet.[57] No other consciousness than the Ālaya is there that has Saṁskāra as its propelling force. (And) there cannot be any attachment to worldly life unless that has 'saṁskāra' as its propelling force.[58] In case the Ālaya-vijñāna' is not admitted, the vijñāna or consciousness-in-transition must be assumed as a force propelled into action by 'saṁskāra' (as its subsititute) or the six vijñāna-kāyas (themselves) perfumed with saṁskāara or impression. Hence the saṁskāaras or impressions that are imagined as a force propelling the rise of a consciousness-in-transition cannot (logically) have any causality in-as-much-as they are but mere discrete elements in view of their being extinct since they are (subject to) extinction for good.[58] Nor can the consciousness in-transition be ever conceived of as a saṁskāra-pratyaya (or propelled into action by saṁskāra) in-as-much-as consciousness-in-transition is also marked with nāma-rūpa or name and form and it is not a pure consciousness.

स्वबीजपुष्ट्याधानत इत्यभ्युपेयम् । ये पुनश्चित्तत एव सन्ततिपरिणामविशेषाद् यथाबलं वासनावृत्तिलाभे सति क्लेशोपक्लेशाः प्रवर्तन्ते तेषां चालयविज्ञान-व्यवस्थितं बीजं तत्सहभूवा क्लेशप्रतिपक्षमार्गेणापनीयते । तस्मिंश्चापनीते न पुनस्तेनाश्रयेण क्लेशानामुत्पत्तिरिति सोपधिशेषो निर्वाणधातुः प्राप्यते । पूर्वकर्मा-क्षिप्तजन्मनिरोधे च ततोऽन्यजन्माप्रतिसंधानान्निरुपधिशेषो निर्वाणधातुः । न हि

Now a question may be asked that how is it that vijñāna alone is 'saṁskāra-pratyaya' (or propelled action by saṃskāar) and not the 'Nāma-rūpas ?' What is the reason thereof ? (obviously there is no reason) (and) therefore nāma-rūpas' (also) are saṁskāra-pratyaya' and not the vijñana (only) (says the opponent). Which nāma-rūpa has vijñāna as the propelling force ? (asks the siddhāntin). If it is held that the nāma-rūpa of a temporally posterior stage of life has vijñāna as the propelling force, while the nāma-rūpa of the moment of transition has saṁskāra as its propelling force, then it has to be asked as to what addition is there to the 'nāma-rūpas' of vijñāna-in-transition, so that it has to be regarded as having vijñāna as the propelling force and not the former one (or the nāma-rūpa) of vijñāna-in-transition and the previous one having the impression (as the propelling force) and not the latter. Thus let 'nāma-rūpa' qua substance be accepted as a 'saṁskāra-pratyaya' or impression as its propelling force and what is the use in imagining of its (nāma.rupa) further sub-division as 'nāma-rūpa' of vijñāna-in-transition ? Thus, the vijñāna-in-transition cannot be assumed as of having saṁskāra as its propelling force. Nor are the six 'vijñāna-kāyas' perfumed with impressions capable of having been propelled to action by such a force, in-as-much-as a vijñāna (a pravṛtti-vijñāna) can not have

कर्म विद्यमानमपि क्लेशेषु प्रहीणेषु सहकारिकारणाभावात् पुनर्भवमभिनिर्वर्तयितुं समर्थम् । एवं आलयविज्ञाने सति संसारप्रवृत्तिर्निवृत्तिश्च नान्यथेत्यस्यं

samskāra or impression (as its propelling force). What is the reason thereof ? (if asked). (We reply) Because a (pravṛtti-vijñāna) cannot hold in itself the maturing influence of moral antecedents (vipākavāsanā) or of homogeneous production (niṣyanda-vāsanā)[50] because it is in itself opposed to any causal efficiency, and in regard to its future existence, it may well be said, that it has not yet come into being and what is yet to be does not well exist and in regard to what existed before, it may be said that it has already ceased to exist. Thus after having undergone the 'acittikā' state (of mental existence) or the state of 'nirodhasamāpatti', the 'citta', perfumed with 'saṁskāra' cannot come back to existence (in case the Ālaya is not admitted). Nor would there be any 'nāma-rūpa' (that has to be) conditioned by vijñāna. So the 'ṣaḍāyatanas' cannot be said to exist. In this way, beginning from 'jāti' till jarā or old age and decay—everything (in the cycle) remains unestablished. As a result, there won't be any attachment to worldly life. So the 'Saṁskāras' are rooted in 'avidyā', the cause thereof and the 'Ālaya-vijñāna' is perfumed with them (saṁskāra) is the consciousness propelled to action by 'saṁskāras' and the 'nāma-rūpa' of the 'consciousness-in-transition' comes into existence as conditioned by the (Ālaya-vijñāna)—such a principle (of the twelve nidānas) is faultless. So also non attachment is not possible in case the 'Ālaya-vijñāna' is not admitted. Attachment to worldly life is caused by (moral) deeds and afficitions; of whom the afflictions are the predominant (causes).

चक्षुरादिविज्ञानव्यतिरिक्तं आलयविज्ञानम् । तदेव च सर्वधर्मबीजानुगतं न चक्षुरादिविज्ञानमित्यभ्युपगन्तव्यम् । विस्तारविचारस्तु पञ्चस्कन्धकोपनिबन्धाद्

Deeds in conjunction with afflictions functioning as the predominant cause (adhipati-pratyaya) can call for a future life and not otherwise. So also the deeds that have called for a new birth can again call for a future life only under the influence of affliction functioning as the predominant cause. Thus the afflictions are the roots of attachment to worldly life in view of the predominance. Thus, only if these are put an end to, the extinction of the impressions (saṁskāras) is possible and not otherwise. In case the 'Ālaya-vijñāna' is not admitted, these (the afflictions) cannot be put an end to. (If asked) why not ? Afflictions can be put an end to either only when these are fully operative or when these are in the form of seeds. The view that these are put an end to when these are fully operative is not tenable. Because even when one proceeds along the path of 'prahāṇa' or extinguishing the afflictions, the afflictions in the form of seeds would still persist (in that case) in-as-much-as, in this case apart from 'what is opposed' (to affliction) nothing else is admitted.[60] Whereas affliction in seed-forms are well estiblished, (and so) the extinction thereof should (logically) be (held) possible (only) by what is directly opposed to it.

The affliction in the form of seeds should adhere to the consciousness opposed to them and not that the consciousness adhereing to the afflictions in the form of seeds could be opposed to them. Nor is non-attachment to worldly life possible in case of those who have not put an end to the seeds of afflictions as yet. Therefore, co-existing

वेदितव्यः। यदि विज्ञप्तिमात्रमेवेदं कथं न सूत्रविरोधः। सूत्रेषु हि त्रयः स्वभावा उक्ताः, परिकल्पितः, परतन्त्रः, परिनिष्पन्नश्च। नास्ति विरोधः, विज्ञप्तिमात्र

with other vijñānas, the Ālaya-vijñāna as determined[61] by the 'kleśa and upakleśa' has to be admitted in view of its functioning as the ground for bringing up to maturation the respective seeds of each of these states (contained in the Ālaya that accomodates the seeds of kleśa and kleśa-pratipakṣa). In regard to those kleśas and upakleśas that proceed on to function as a continuous development of the (afflicted) mind as and when the biotic force (thereof) matures up to action, (it is to be said that) the seed thereof enduring in the 'Ālaya' is done away with by (proceeding on) the path opposed to it simulaneously functioning. This being done away with, the kleśas cannot arise (afresh) enduring in the aforesaid support (ālaya), (and thus) is attained the nirvāṇa state of mental life still preserving individuality. (And) in case, on the extinction of the life determined by previous moral antecedents, there is no more emergence of a new life therefrom, the highest state of spiritual life (ts attained).

In case the kleśas are rooted out, the moral antecedents, for lack of its 'sahakāri-kāraṇa' or auxiliary cause are incapable of accomplishing a new state of existence. This way, the Ālaya-vijñāna being there (admitted) the attachment and the non-attachment to worldly life (can be explained). Not otherwise and thus the Ālaya-vijñāna as distinct from the eye-consciousness and the like (has to be admitted). This one alone is imbued with the seeds of all deeds and not the eye-consciousness and the like, (such a position has to be agreed upon). More detailed

एवं सति स्वभावत्रयव्यवस्थानात् । कथमित्यत आह—

येन येन विकल्पेन यद्यद् वस्तु विकल्प्यते ।
परिकल्पित एवासौ स्वभावो न स विद्यते ॥ २० ॥

आध्यात्मिकबाह्यविकल्प्यवस्तुभेदेन विकल्पानामानन्त्यं प्रदर्शयन्नाह—येन येन विकल्पेनेति । यद् यद् वस्तु विकल्प्यते । आध्यात्मिकं बाह्यं वा अन्तशो वावद् बुद्धधर्मा अपि । परिकल्पित एवासौ स्वभाव इत्यत्र कारणमाह—न स

treatment of it is to be found in the treatise named 'pañcaskandhaka'.

If everything is but consciousness then how is it that such a view is not (regarded as) a contradiction of the Sūtras ? In the 'Sūtras', three essences are spoken of—the constructed, the dependent, and the absolute. (The answer is being given). (No), there is no such contradiction in-as-much-as the three essences can be established only if the theory of 'consciousness alone' is admitted. Why so ? (if asked); it is said (in answer) :

Yena yena vikalpena yadyad vastu vikalpyate
Parikalpita evāsau svabhāvo, na sa, vidyate//20

All things that are constructed by various kinds of imagination are 'parikalpita' in essence (in-as-much-as) they do not (essentially exist).

With a view to showing the endlessness of things that are constructed whether mentally or materially, the expression, 'yena yena vikalpena' is used. The expression, 'Yad yad vastu prakalpyate (vikalpyate ?)' means both the mental and the material things or even the 'Buddha-dharmas' to say of the extreme ones of such things. All these are 'parikalpita' or constructed in essence. To speak

विद्यत इति। यद् वस्तु विकल्पविषयस्तद् यस्मात् सत्ताभावान्न विद्यते तस्मात् तद्वस्तु परिकल्पितस्वभावमेव, न हेतुप्रत्ययप्रतिपद्यस्वभावम्। तथाह्येकस्मिन् वस्तुनि तदभावे च परस्परविरुद्धानेकविकल्पप्रवृत्तिर्दृष्टा। न च तदेकं वस्तु तदभावो वा परस्परविरुद्धानेकस्वभावो युज्यते। तस्मात् सर्वमिदं विकल्पमात्रमेव तदर्थस्य परिकल्पितरूपत्वात्। उक्तं च सूत्रे। न खलु पुनः सुभूते धर्मास्तथा विद्यन्ते यथा बालपृथग्जना अभिनिविष्टा इति।

परिकल्पितानन्तरं परतन्त्रस्वभावो वक्तव्य इति आह—

परतन्त्रस्वभावस्तु विकल्पः प्रत्ययोद्भवः।

of the reasons thereof—'na sa vidyate' or that they do not essentially exist. 'Yadvastu' means the thing of construction—such a thing does not exist in-as-much-as it has no essence of being Because of this, this thing is 'parikalpita' in essence. Such a thing cannot be regarded as having the nature of what exists as a result of the cause and effect relation. (Because) in regard to a single (such) entity or in regard to non-substantiality thereof, numerous constructions, contradictory to each other are even seen. Nor could such a single entity or the non-substantiality thereof, ever logically be of diverse nature (as conceived of). Therefore, all such things are constructions only, in-as-much-as the forms thereof are only parikalpita or imagined. So also is said in the 'Sūtras' : 'oh ! good soul, the states of entities, do not so exist as what the ignorant or the commoners hold to be.'

After having explained the 'parikalpita', the 'paratantra-svabhāva' has to be discussed upon; and so it said : paratantrasvabhāvastu vikalpaḥ pratyayodbhavaḥ/

'The paratantra nature means the constructions born to cause and conditions'.

अत्र विकल्प इति परतन्त्रस्वरूपमाह। प्रत्ययोद्भव इत्यनेनापि परतन्त्राभिधानप्रवृत्तिनिमित्तमाह। तत्र परिकल्पः कुशलाकुशलाव्याकृतभेदभिन्नाः त्रैधातुकाश्चित्तचैत्ताः यथोक्तम्—

अभूतपरिकल्पस्तु चित्तचैत्तास्त्रैधातुकाः।

इति परैर्हेतुप्रत्ययैस्तन्त्र्यत इति परतन्त्र उत्पाद्यत इत्यर्थः। स्वतोऽन्यहेतुप्रत्ययप्रतिबद्धात्मलाभ इति यावदुक्तं भवति। उक्तः परतन्त्रः। परिनिष्पन्नः कथमित्यत आह—

निष्पन्नस्तस्य पूर्वेण सदा रहितता तु या ॥ २१ ॥

अविकारपरिनिष्पत्त्या स परिनिष्पन्नः। तस्येति परतन्त्रस्य पूर्वेणेति परिकल्पितेन। तस्मिन् विकल्पे ग्राह्यग्राहकभावः परिकल्पितः। तथा हि तस्मिन्

Here the word, 'vikalpa' signifies the essence of 'paratantra'. By the expression, 'born of cause and conditions', the reason of using the term, 'paratantra' is signified. Parikalpa or construction (paratantra-svabhāva) means the mind and the mental states pertaining to all the three worlds that are many and diverse—good, evil, and neutral. So also it is said (in the madhyānta-vibhanga) :

"The mind and the mental states of the three worlds are but the constructions of the unreal".

That which is controlled (tantrayate) or originated (brought into existence) by others—the causes and conditions (is called paratantra). It amounts to saying that their self-being is conditioned by the hetu-pratyaya which are distinctly different from itself. Paratantra is spoken of. What about 'parinispanna ? (In answer) it is said :

Nispannastasya purvena sadā rahitatā tu yā/21

The state of 'paratantra' ever being free from the previous (parikalpita-svabhāva) is called 'parinispanna.'[62]

विकल्पे ग्राह्यग्राहकत्वं अविद्यमानमेव परिकल्प्यत इति परिकल्पितमुच्यते। तेन ग्राह्यग्राहकेण परतन्त्रस्य सदा सर्वकालमत्यन्तरहितता या स परिनिष्पन्न-स्वभावः।

अत एव स नैवान्यो नानन्यः परतन्त्रतः।

अत एव स नैवति परिकल्पितेन स्वभावेन परतन्त्रस्य सदा रहितता परिनिष्पन्नः। रहितता च धर्मता धर्मान्नान्या. नानन्या युज्यते। परिनिष्पन्नश्च परतन्त्रधर्मतेत्यत: परतन्त्रात् परिनिष्पन्नो नान्यो नानन्य इति बोद्धव्यः। यदि हि परिनिष्पन्नः परतन्त्रादन्यः स्याद् एवं न परिकल्पितेन परतन्त्रः शून्यः स्यात्। अथानन्य एवमपि परिनिष्पन्नो न विशुद्धालम्बनः स्यात् परतन्त्रवत् संक्लेशात्म-

It is 'parinispanna' in-as-much-as it reveals the undisorted nature (of things). The word, 'tasya' in the 'kārikā' means 'of the paratantra' and the word, 'pūrvena' means 'from the parikalpita'. In that (construction i e., 'paratantra), the perceiver and the perceived are imagined. To explain it further, in such a construction, the perceiver and the perceived—the enties that are solely non-existent are imagined and that is why it is that these are but imagined. The 'paratantra', therefore, if ever free form this notion of the perceiver and the perceived becomes 'parinispaana' by nature [63]

Ata eva sa naivānyo nānanyaḥ paratantrataḥ (22)

It is, therefore, neither different nor identical with the 'paratantra'. The expression, 'it is, therefore, neither' etc. signifies that the 'parinispanna' means the state of 'paratantra' as free from the elements that are imaginary by nature. This freedom is the true nature (of the paratantra) and the idea of the nature of elements being neither different nor identical with the elements is but reasonable.[64] The 'prinispanna' is 'paratantra-dharmatā or paratantra

कत्वात् । एवं परतन्त्रश्च न क्लेशात्मकः स्यात् परिनिष्पन्नादनन्यत्वात् परिनिष्पन्नवत् ।

अनित्यतादिवद् वाच्यो

नान्यो नानन्य इति वाक्यशेषः । यथा ह्यनित्यता दुःखतानात्मता च सस्कारादिभ्यो नान्या नानन्या । यदि संस्कारेभ्योऽनित्यता अन्या एव तर्हि संस्कारा नित्याः स्युः । अथानन्या एवमपि संस्काराः प्रणष्टस्वभावरूपाः स्युः

qua substance; and therefore, it is to be undersood that the 'parinispanna' is neither different nor identical with the 'paratantra'. If the 'parinispanna' were different from the 'paratantra' then the 'paratantra' could not ever be conceived of as free from the 'parikalpita'. If (on the contrary), the 'parinispanna' were identical with the 'paratantra' then it could not be conceived of as having a pure 'ālambana' in-as-much-as it would have been of the nature of affliction like the 'paratantra'. Or otherwise, the 'paratantra' would not be of the nature of affliction as 'parinispanna' because of its being identical with 'parinispanna'.

Anityādivad vācyo

It should not be held like 'anityatā'. The remaining portion of the sentence is 'nānya nānanya' or neither different not identical (like anityatā). It could not be held like 'anityatā', 'duḥkhatā' or 'anātmatā', to be neither different from nor identical with the saṁskāras', and the like. If 'anityatā' were different from the 'saṁskāras' then the 'saṁskāras' would have been the elements whose nature would have been extinct[65] like 'anityatā'. So also would have been the case with 'duḥkhatā' and the like.[66]

अनित्यतावत् । एवं दुःखतादिष्वपि वाच्यम् । यदि ग्राह्यग्राहकभावरहितः परतन्त्रः कथमसौ गृह्यते अगृह्यमाणो वा कथमस्तीति विज्ञायते । अत आह—

नादृष्टेऽस्मिन् स दृश्यते ॥ २२ ॥

नादृष्टेऽस्मिन्निति परिनिष्पन्नस्वभावे स दृश्यत इति परतन्त्रः स्वभावः । निर्विकल्पलोकोत्तरज्ञानदृश्ये परिनिष्पन्ने स्वभावे अदृष्टे अप्रतिविद्धे असाक्षात्कृते तत्पृष्ठलब्धशुद्धलौकिकज्ञानगम्यत्वात् परतन्त्रोऽन्येन ज्ञानेन न गृह्यते । अतः

If 'paratantra' is of the nature of being free from (all notion of) the perceiver and the perceived then how is it itself perceived and in case it is not perceived, how is it known to be existing ? it said :

Nādṛṣṭe'smin sa dṛśyate (22)

'This not being perceived, that (one) is not perceived.' 'This not being perceived' means that the 'pariniṣpanna-svabhāva' not being perceived and 'that (one) is not perceived' means the 'paratantra' is not perceived. If the 'pariniṣpanna' which is perceivable by an indeterminate supramundane knowledge is not perceived, the 'paratantra' also is not known (in that case) by such knowledge because the 'paratantra' is perceived by pure mundane knowledge that arises after that (interminate knowledge). Thus when the 'pariniṣpanna' is not perceived, the 'paratantra' also is not perceived. Nor is it (right to say) that it is not perceived by the (mundane) knowledge that arises after the supermundane knwoledge (had dawned upon). So it is said in the 'dhāraṇī' called the 'Nirvikalpapraveśa' that by means of the 'after-knowledge' one equally perceives all such entities as an illusionary image, a mirage, an object of dream, a reverbation, a reflected moon and a nirmāṇa-kāya.[67] Here the word, 'dharma' means the entities

परिनिष्पन्ने अदृष्टे परतन्त्रो न दृश्यते । न पुनः लोकोत्तरज्ञानपृष्ठलब्धेनापि ज्ञानेन न दृश्यते । यथा निर्विकल्पप्रवेशायां धारण्यामुक्तम्—तत्पृष्ठलब्धेन ज्ञानेन मायामरीचिस्वप्नप्रतिश्रुत्कोदकचन्द्रनिर्मितसमान् सर्वधर्मान् प्रत्येतीति । अत्र च धर्माः परतन्त्रसंगृहीता अभिप्रेताः । परिनिष्पन्नश्चाकाशवद् एकरसं ज्ञानं च यथोक्तं निर्विकल्पेन ज्ञानेनाकाशसमतायां सर्वधर्मान् पश्यतीति परतन्त्रधर्माणां तथतामात्रदर्शनात् । यदि द्रव्यमेव परतन्त्रः कथं सूत्रे सर्वधर्मा निःस्वभावा अनुत्पन्ना अनिरुद्धा इति निर्दिश्यन्ते । नास्ति विरोधः यस्मात् ।

त्रिविधस्य स्वभावस्य त्रिविधां निःस्वभावताम् ।
सन्धाय सर्वधर्माणां देशिता निःस्वभावता ।। २३ ।।

त्रय एव स्वभावा न चतुर्थोऽस्तीति ज्ञापनार्थं सङ्ख्यानिर्देशः स्वेन स्वेन लक्षणेन विद्यमानवद् भवतीति । त्रिविधा निःस्वभावता लक्षणनिःस्वभावता

that are read in the list of the 'paratantra' dharmas or entities. The 'parinişpanna' is a homogeneous (object of) consciousness like 'ākāśa' (i.e., asaṁskṛta) and as has been said earlier that by virtue of indeterminate knowledge one cognises all elements in what is of the nature like 'ākāśa'. It means that the 'paratantra-dharmas' are perceived in the 'Tathatā' only.

If 'paratantra' are the entities qua substance only then how is it that in the 'sūtra', it is so said that all elements are without any essence, without any origin and without any decay. (Even then) there is no such contradiction (as apprehended) because—

Trividhasya svabhāvasya trividhām niḥsvabhāvatām/
Sandhāya sarvadharmāṇām deśitā niḥsvabhāvatā// 23

'of three essences, having seen three-fold non-essence Non-essence of all elements has been ordained'.

उत्पत्तिनिःस्वभावता परमार्थनिःस्वभावता च । सर्वधर्माः परिकल्पितपरतन्त्र-परिनिष्पन्नात्मकाः ।

इदानी त्रिविधस्य स्वभावस्य या यस्य निःस्वभावता तां तस्य प्रदर्शयन्नाह–

प्रथमो लक्षणेनैव निःस्वभावोऽपरः पुनः ।
न स्वयंभाव एतस्येत्यपरा निःस्वभावता ॥ २४ ॥
धर्माणां परमार्थश्च स यतस्तथतापि सः ।

प्रथमः परिकल्पितः स्वभावः अयं च लक्षणेनैव निःस्वभावः तल्लक्षण-स्योत्प्रेक्षितत्वात् रूपलक्षण रूपं अनुभवलक्षणा वेदनेत्यादि । अतश्च स्वरूपा-

The number (three-fold) has been mentioned with a view to signifying that the essence is only three-fold and there is no fourth one—(and) each one exists by virtue of its own characteristic. Three-fold non-essence is non-essence in regard to the characteristic, non-essence in regard to origination and non-essence in regard to the ultimate state of being. All elements are of the nature of (either) 'parikalpita' (or) 'paratantra' (or) 'pariniṣpanna'. Now to show the respective non-essence of the three-fold essence, it is said :

Prathamo lakṣaṇenaiva niḥsvabhāvo'paraḥ punaḥ/
Na svayaṁbhāva etasyetyaparā niḥsvabhāvatā// 24
Dharmāṇām paramārthaśca sa yatastathātāpi saḥ/

'The first is non-essence by its characteristics alone and that which exists not by itself is another kind of non-essence, Absolute of all elements is that since 'Tathatā' is that. The first means the 'parikalpita-svabhāva'. This is a non-essence by its characteristics alone (on the score of its characteristics being non-essential), because its characteristics are a matter of imagination—as 'rūpa' is

भावात् खपुष्पवत् स्वरूपेणैव निःस्वभावः। अपरः पुनरिति परतन्त्रस्वभावः। न स्वयंभाव एतस्य मायावत् परप्रत्ययेनोत्पत्तेः। अतश्च यथा प्रख्याति तथास्योत्पत्तिर्नास्तीति अतोऽस्य उत्पत्तिनिःस्वभावतेत्युच्यते। धर्माणां परमार्थश्च स यतस्तथतापि स इति। परमं हि लोकोत्तरज्ञानं निरुत्तरत्वात्तस्यार्थः परमार्थः। अथ वा आकाशवत् सर्वत्रैकरसार्थेन वैमल्याविकारार्थेन च परिनिष्पन्नः स्वभावः

what is characterised by 'rūpa' (form) and 'vedanā' is what is characterised by 'anubhava' or feeling and so on. Thus because of having no essence in itself, it is (called) a non-essence by its own, like the sky-flower. The other one is the 'paratantra-svabhāva'. It exists (but) not by itself, because it comes into being by causes and conditions other than itself as in the case of an illusion. Therefore, as it's appearance does not conform to its origination, it is called a non-essence on the score of its origination. (To explain the expression that) the Absolute of all elements is that since 'Tathatā' is that etc. (it is to say): 'paramam' means the supramundane knowledge, there being nothing beyond that and the content of such knowledge is called 'paramārthaḥ' or the Absolute. Or in other words, the 'parinispanna-svabhāva' is called 'paramārtha' because of its purity remaining ever impolluted and ever homogeneous or uniform like 'ākāśa'. Since it is 'parinispanna-svabhāva' and as it is the ultimate truth of all 'paratantra' elements—the 'dharmatā' thereof; the parinispanna-svabhāva' is the non-essence in regard to 'paratantra' in-as-much-as the 'parinispanna' is 'abhāva' in its essence. Is 'parinispanna' to be understood by the word, 'paramārtha ? (In answer) it is said, 'no'. Why then is it so said that 'Tathatā' also is that ? (In answer, it is said that) the word, 'api' (i.e. also) in the 'kārikā' signifies that it is not expressed

परमार्थ उच्यते । स यस्मात् परिनिष्पन्नः स्वभावः सर्वधर्माणां परतन्त्रात्मकानां परमार्थः तद्धर्मतेति कृत्वा तस्मात् परिनिष्पन्न एव स्वभावः परमार्थनिःस्वभावता परिनिष्पन्नस्याभावस्वभावत्वात् । किं पुनः परमार्थोभिधानेनैव परिनिष्पन्नोऽभिधातव्यो, नेत्याह । किं तर्हि, तथतापि सः । अपिशब्दान्न केवलं तथताशब्देनैवाभिधातव्यः । किं तर्हि यावन्तो धर्मधातुपर्यायाः सर्वैस्तैरप्यभिधातव्य इति ।

सर्वकालं तथाभावात्

तथता । तथा हि पृथग्जनशैक्ष्याशैक्षावस्थासु सर्वकालं तथैव भवति ना यथेति तथतेत्युच्यते । किं पुनस्तथता तत्परिनिष्पन्न एव विज्ञप्तिमात्रता उतान्या विज्ञप्तिमात्रता । अत आह—

सैव विज्ञप्तिमात्रता ॥ २५ ॥

by the word, 'Tathatā' alone. Is it then that it is expressed by all the synonyms of the word, 'dharma-dhātu ?' (So it said) :

Sarvakālaṁ—tathābhāvāt.

'That being uniform all through',

(is) 'Tathatā'. To explain it further; in all circumstances, whether in the 'śaikṣya' or 'aśaikṣya' stages of the people at large, it remains the same and not otherwise and therefore is called 'Tathatā' or suchness. What again is the 'Tathatā' or suchness—is 'pariniṣpanna' itself, pure consciousness or is pure consciousness somewhat distinct from it ? (In answer it is said) :

Saiva vijñapti-mātratā// 25

'That alone is consciousness pure'

in-as-much-as it imparts knowledge of the qualities that are perfectly pure. As it is so said :

अतिविशुद्धलक्षणावबोधाद्, यथोक्तम्—

नाम्नि तिष्ठति तच्चित्तं तदा तन्मात्रदर्शनात् ।
नाम्नि स्थानाच्च विज्ञप्तावुपलम्भः प्रहीयते ॥
नोपलम्भ तदा धातुं स्पृशते भावनान्वयात् ।
सर्वावरणविमोक्षं विभुत्वं लभते तदा ॥

इति । सैव विज्ञप्तिमात्रतेत्यनेन वचनेनाभिसमय उक्तः । यदि विज्ञप्तिमात्रमेवेदं कस्मात् चक्षुःश्रोत्रघ्राणरसस्पर्शनैः रूपशब्दगन्धरसस्पर्शान् गृह्णातीत्यत आह ।

यावद् विज्ञप्तिमात्रत्वे विज्ञानं नावतिष्ठति ।
ग्राहद्वयस्यानुशयस्तावन्न विनिवर्तते ॥ २६ ॥

अथ वा यास्ताः कर्मवासना ग्राहद्वयवासनासहिताः क्षीणे पूर्वविपाकेऽन्यद्विपाकं जनयन्तीत्युक्तं तस्मात् कथं प्रहाणमप्रहाणं चेत्यत आह । यावद्विज्ञप्ति-

That consciousness exits only in name because that alone is experienced

And that consciousness transcends all names, all senses and all cognitions

Consciousness as associated with the vital Energy then transcends all the worlds

(And) attains freedom from all obstructions and takes to all-pervasiveness

The expression, 'saiva vijñaptimātratā' speakes of 'abhisamaya'.

If everything is (reducible) to consciousness, then how is it that, colour, sound, smell, taste and touch are perceived by the eye, the ear, the nose, the tongue and the organ of touch ? (In answer) it is said :

Yāvad vijñapti-mātratve vijñānaṁ nāvatiṣṭhate/
Grāhadvayasyānuśayastāvanna vinivartate// 26

मात्रत्वे विज्ञानं नावतिष्ठतीति विस्तरः। यावत् चित्तधर्मतायां विज्ञप्तिमात्र-संशब्दितायां विज्ञानं नावतिष्ठति किं तर्हि, ग्राह्यग्राहकोपलम्भे चरति। ग्राहद्वयं ग्राह्यग्राहो ग्राहकग्राहश्च। तस्यानुशयस्तदाहितं अनागतग्राहद्वयोत्पत्तये बीजं आलयविज्ञाने। यावद् अद्वयलक्षणे विज्ञप्तिमात्रे योगिनश्चित्तं न प्रतिष्ठितं भवति

'The consciousness till it permeats in the consciousness pure,

The close attachment of the two-fold grasping does not cease to exist'.

Or since what has been said earlier that the 'vāsanā' of moral antecedents in conjunction with the 'vāsanā' of two-fold grasping give rise to another 'vipāka' at the waning of the previous 'vipāka', what then does 'extinction' or non-extinction mean ? (In answer) it is said : 'till the consciousness does not permeat in the consciousness pure' and so on. (To explain it), till the consciousness permeats in the 'citta-dharmatā' (or the ultimate state of consciousness), designated as 'vijñapatimātratā' (or pure consciousness) and on the contrary it still moves in the process of the cognition of the 'grāhya' and the 'grākaka' (or the subject-object duality). The two-fold grasping means the grasping of the object and of the subject—the close attachment thereof by which the seed (thereof) is deposited in the 'Ālaya-consciousness' for the rise of the future two-fold grasping, Till the consciousness of the 'Yogins' is established in the 'Vijñaptimātratā' marked by the non-duality; the close attachment of the subject and the object does not cease to exist— does not die out. Here it is well demonstrated that without having rooted out the grasping of the external objects, the grasping of the internal (mental) ones cannot be rooted out

तावद् ग्राह्यग्राहकानुशयो न विनिवर्तते, न प्रहीयत इत्यर्थः। अत्र च बहिरुपलम्भाप्रहाणेनाध्यात्मिकोपलम्भाप्रहाणं दर्शितमिति। अतोऽस्यैव भवति अहं चक्षुरादिभिः रूपादीन् गृह्णामीति। इदमिदानीं वक्तव्यं किं अर्थरहितचित्तमात्रोपलम्भात् चित्तधर्मतावस्थानम् नेत्याह। किं तर्हि—

विज्ञप्तिमात्रमेवेदमित्यपि ह्युपलम्भतः।
स्थापयन्नग्रतः किञ्चित् तन्मात्रे नावतिष्ठते ॥ २७ ॥

इति। अथ वा यः पुनराभिमानिकः श्रुतमात्रकेण जानीयाद् अहं विज्ञप्तिमात्रतायां शुद्धायां स्थित इति तद्ग्रहव्युदासार्थमाह विज्ञप्तिमात्रमेवेदमित्यपि ह्युपलम्भत इत्यादि। विज्ञप्तिमात्रमेवेदं अर्थरहितं न बाह्योऽर्थोऽस्तीति एव-

Now it has to be discussed as to whether in view of the consciousness transcending its content, the 'Cittadharmatā' or the Citta or mind par excellence exists (in reality) to which the answer is 'no'. What then ?

Vijñapti-mātramevedamityapi hyupalambhataḥ/

Sthāpayannagrataḥ kimcit tanmātre nāvatiṣṭhate// 27

'As 'consciousnes alone' is also (born) of cognition (in case of one) keeping in view something else, he does not rest on it alone'.

To explain it further : 'as consciobsness alone is also born of cognition' is said with a view to discouraging the stand taken by those who refer everything to one's self, purely from the puritanic knowledge of the scriptures and think 'I have attained the stage of the vijñaptimātratā'. 'Consciousness alone' (is the reality) means that everything is devoid of (external) objectivity that is to say having (fully) grasped or cognised or realised that no external object (ever) exists, (and) 'forward' (or agrataḥ in the kārikā) means 'as heard of by the mind'. The word, 'Kimcid' is

मुपलम्भतो ग्रहणतः चित्रीकरणत इत्यर्थः अग्रत इत्यभिमुखम्। स्थापयन्निति यथाश्रुतं मनसा।बहुप्रकारत्वात् योगाचारालम्बनानां किंचिदित्याह। अस्थिसंकलिकं नीलकं वापि पूयकं वा विपडुमकं वा व्याध्मतकादिकं वा। तन्मात्रे नावतिष्ठते विज्ञानोपलम्भाप्रहाणात्।

कदा पुनः विज्ञानग्राहस्य प्रहाणं चित्तमात्रतायां वा प्रतिष्ठितो भवतीत्यत आह—

यदा त्वालम्बनं ज्ञानं नैवोपलभते तदा।
स्थितो विज्ञानमात्रत्वे ग्राह्याभावे तदग्रहात्॥ २८॥

इति। यस्मिन् काले देशनालम्बनं अववादालम्बनं प्राकृतं वा रूपशब्दाद्यालम्बनं ज्ञानं बहिश्चित्तात् नोपलभते न पश्यति न गृह्णाति नाभिनिविशते,

used to signify the variety of the 'ālambanas' according to the 'Yogācāra'—as for example the piled up bones, the blue, the pus, the '*Vipaḍumaka*' and the '*Vyādmātaka*' and the like. 'He does not rest on it alone'—this expression is used to mean that consciousness has not transcended the (two-fold) grasping as yet.

When then does consciousness transcend the (two-fold) grasping (i.e., duality) and the mind par excellence rests on (its ultimate nature)? (In answer) it is said;

Yadā tvālambanaṁ jñānaṁ naivopalabhate tadā/

Sthito vijñānamātratve grāhyābhāve tadāgrahāt// 28

'Consciousness when no longer cognises the object of cognition

Attains to the state of consciousness pure, there being no object for not cognising it'.

When consciousness no longer sees or cognises or clings to common experince born of the object of instruction or of

यथा भूतार्थदर्शनात् न तु जात्यन्धवत्, तस्मिन् काले विज्ञानग्राहस्य प्रहाणं स्वचित्तधर्मतायां च प्रतिष्ठितो भवति । अत्रैव कारणमाह—ग्राह्याभावे तद्ग्रहादिति । ग्राह्ये सति ग्राहको भवति न तु ग्राह्याभाव इति । ग्राह्याभावे ग्राहकाभावमपि प्रतिपद्यते न केवलं ग्राह्याभावम् । एवं हि समम्नालम्ब्यालम्बकं निर्विकल्पं लोकोत्तरं ज्ञानमुत्पद्यते, ग्राह्यग्राहकाभिनिवेशानुशया प्रहीयन्ते स्वचित्तधर्मतायां च चित्तमेव स्थितं भवति । यदैव विज्ञप्तिमात्रतायां चित्तमवस्थितं भवति तदा कथं व्यपदिश्यत इत्याह—

अचित्तोऽनुपलम्भोऽसौ ज्ञानं लोकोत्तरं च तत् ।
आश्रयस्य परावृत्तिर्द्विधा दौष्ठुल्यहानितः ॥ २९ ॥

love (support) or of colour, sound and the like (and) in case it (consciousness) really can cognise the ultimate truth and not as one born blind, then (and then only) the (concept of) duality in consciousness being transcended, consciousness rests on the ultimate nature of consciousness or cónsciousness par excellence. The reason thereof is stated thus : there being no object and thus for not having cognised it. (And) only if the object exists, the subject would exist and not in case the object ceases to exist. Thus in case there is no object, the subject also does not exist and it does not merely signify the non-existence of the object. This way totally disregarding any object (cause), the indeterminate supramundane consciousness arises. All attachment to the concept of subject-object duality dies out and consciousness rests on its own ultimate nature.

If consciousness thus rests on 'Vijñapti-mātratā' then how is it ever described. (In answer), it is said;

Acitto'nupalambho'sau jñānaṁ lokottaraṁ ca tat/

Āśrayasya parāvṛttirdvidhā dauṣṭhulyhānitaḥ// 29

स एवनास्रवो धातुरचिन्त्य कुशलो ध्रुवः ।
सुखो विमुक्तिकायोऽसौ धर्माख्योऽयं महामुनेः ॥ ३० ॥

इति । तदनेन श्लोकद्वयेन दर्शनमार्गमारभ्योत्तरविशेषगत्या फलसंपत्तिरुद्भाविता विज्ञप्तिमात्रप्रविष्टयोगिनः । तत्र ग्राहकचित्ताभावात् ग्राह्यार्थानुपलम्भाच्च अचित्ताऽनुपलम्भोऽसौ । अपरिचितत्वात् (अक्लिष्टत्वात्) लोके समुदाचाराभावात् निर्विकल्पत्वाच्च लोकादुत्तीर्णमिति ज्ञानं लोकोत्तर च तदिति । तस्य ज्ञानस्या-

Sa evānāsravo dhāturacintyaḥ kuśalo dhruvaḥ/

Sukho vimuktikāyo'sau dharmākyo'yaṁ mahāmuneḥ//30

'Non-cognition, non-perception, supramundane is such consciousness/

(And) the substratum tracks back in two ways when the dausṭhulyas wave away//

Such unimaginable 'dhātu' is faultless, good and unchangable/

(It is) happiness, 'nirvāṇakāya', called the dharma of the great sage'//

By these two verses is explained the accomplishment of fruit attainable in the stages beginning from the 'darśanamārga' onwards by those saints who entered (the realm of the concept of) 'Vijñapti mātratā', there being no perceiving mind nor any external object of perception. It is called 'suprāmundane consciousness' in view of (the fact that) there is no more affliction (left) and thus no manifestation thereof in the world of beings and also (in view of the fact that) it is indeterminate and beyond all worldly perception. The immediate substratum of such consciousness tracks back and to state this, it is said (in the kārikā)—'āśrayasya parāvṛtti' etc. The

न्तराश्रयस्य परावृत्तिर्भवतीति ज्ञापनार्थमाह-आश्रयस्य परावृत्तिरिति । आश्रयो अत्र सर्वबीजकमालयविज्ञानम् । तस्य परावृत्तिः या दौष्ठुल्यविपाकद्वयवासनाभावेन निवृत्तौ सत्यां कर्मण्यताधर्मकायाद्वयज्ञानाभावेन परावृत्तिः । सा पुनराश्रयपरावृत्तिः कस्य प्रहाणात् प्राप्यते, अत आह द्विधा दौष्ठुल्यहानितः । द्विधेति क्लेशावरणदौष्ठुल्यं ज्ञेयावरणदौष्ठुल्यं च । दौष्ठुल्यं आश्रयस्याकर्मण्यता । तत् पुनः क्लेशज्ञेयावरणयोर्बीजम् । सा पुनराश्रयपरावृत्तिः श्रावकादिगतदौष्ठुल्यहानितश्च प्राप्यते, यदाह-विमुक्तिकाय इति । बोधिसत्त्वगतदौष्ठुल्यहानितश्च

substratum, here, refers to the Ālaya-consciousness—the seed (house) of all. It tracks back in the sense that there being no seed of grossness of two-fold 'vipāka' (viṣaya-vijñapti and manovijñapti), it develops the knowledge of the non-duality (of subject & object) and of the 'Dharma-kāya' by virtue of its (positive) activity (inherent in itself).[68] On what being rooted out, does this substratum track back. (With a view to explaining that) it is said : 'dvidhā dauṣṭhlyahānitaḥ'. The word, 'dvidhā' signifies the grossenss of 'kleśāvaraṇa' and of 'jñeyāvaraṇa' and by 'grossness' is meant inactiveness of the 'āśraya'. That again is the root of 'kleśāvaraṇa' and of 'jñeyāvaraṇa'. The tracking back of the substratum again is achieved by virtue of rooting out the (aforesaid) grossness in the śrāvaka's (mind). (And) what has been said by the word, 'vimukti-kāya' is that (the tracking back of the substratum) is achieved by virtue of rooting out the (aforesaid) grossness in the mind of the Bodhisattva. (And) what is (meant to be) said (by) 'dharmākhyo'pi mahamuneḥ' etc. (is this) : reason of rooting out two-fold 'āvaraṇas', the tracking back of the 'āśraya' is also two-fold—the higher (sottara) and the highest (niruttara). So says a 'gāthā' :

प्राप्यते, यदाह-धर्माख्योऽपि महामुनेरिति । द्विधा आवरणभेदेन सोत्तरा निरुत्तरा च आश्रयपरावृत्तिरुक्ता । अत्र गाथा—

ज्ञेयमादानविज्ञानं द्वयावरणलक्षणम् ।
सर्वबीजं क्लेशबीजं बन्धस्तत्र द्वयोर्द्वयोः ॥

इति । श्रावकबोधिसत्त्वयोः । आद्यस्य क्लेशबीजं इतरस्य द्वयावरणबीजं तदुद्घातात् सर्वज्ञतावाप्तिर्भवतीति । स एवानास्रवो धातुरिति स एवाश्रयपरावृत्तिरूपः अनास्रवो धातुरित्युच्यते निर्दौष्ठुल्यत्वात् । स त्वास्रवविगत इत्यनास्रवः । आर्यधर्महेतुत्वाद् धातुः । हेत्वर्थो ह्यत्र धातुशब्दः । अचिन्त्यस्तर्कागोचरत्वात् प्रत्यात्मवेद्यत्वात् दृष्टान्ताभावाच्च । कुशलो विशुद्धालम्बनत्वात् क्षेमत्वात् अना-

'The ādāna-vijñāna is characterised by the duality of affliction

The seed of all, the seed of affliction, both these two are (also) checked therein in regard to both'.

(in regard to both) means in regard to both the 'śrāvaka' and the 'Bodhisattva'. In regard to the first one, the seed of affliction and in regard to the other, the seed of both the types of obstructions are uprooted, and their 'sarvajñatā or omniscience dawns upon. The expression, 'so eva anāsravo dhātu' etc. means the state of the tracking back of the substratum which is a 'world', devoid of affliction. The word, 'dhātu' is used in view of its being devoid of affliction.

It is 'acintya' or unimaginbale in-as-much-as it is not comprehended by any argument, known only by the pure mind and has no parallel thereof. It is 'kuśala' or good because it suspends on something pure, because it is beneficial and because it is a faultless entity. It is 'dhruva' or unchangeable because it is internal in-as-much-as it undegoes no decay. (And) because of its being

स्रवधर्ममयत्वाच्च । ध्रुवो नित्यत्वात् अक्षयतया । सुखो नित्यत्वादेव यदनित्यं तद्दुःख अयं च नित्य इति अस्मात् सुखः । क्लेशावरणप्रहाणात् श्रावकाणां विमुक्तिकायः । स एवाश्रयपरावृत्तिलक्षणो धर्माख्योऽस्त्युच्यते । महामुनेर्भूमिपरा-मितादिभावनया क्लेशज्ञेयावरणप्रहाणात् आश्रयपरावृत्तिसमुदागमात् महामुने-र्धर्मकाय इत्युच्यते । ससारपरित्यागात् यदनुपसक्लेशत्वात् सर्वधर्मविभुत्वलाभ-तश्च धर्मकाय इत्युच्यते । महामुनेरिति परममौनेययोगात् बुद्धो भगवान् महा-मुनिरिति ॥

॥ त्रिंशिकाविज्ञप्तिभाष्यं समाप्तम् ॥

॥ कृतिराचार्यस्थिरमतेः ॥

enternal, it is 'happiness' in view of (the fact that) whatever is changeable is 'dukhaḥ' or unhappiness, and this is changeless and therefore, 'sukha' or happiness. It is the 'vimuktikāya' in regard to the 'śrāvkas' since the 'kleśāvaranas' are all rooted out. This is also called 'dharma' characterised by the tracking back of the substratum. In case of a great sage, because of his having rooted out both the types of 'āvaraṇas' as a result of his mediations on the 'bhūmis' and 'pāramitās' and thus having developed the full knowledge of the tracking back of the substratum, it is called 'dharmakāya'. 'Dharma-kāya, is called because of its going beyond the world of men, because of its being uninflicted and because of its being all-pervasive. The word, 'mahāmuneḥ' in the 'kārikā', refers to Lord Bhudha who is called 'mahāmuni' (or a great sage) in view of his having taken a great vow.

NOTES

1. Pudgala-nairātmya :

The doctrine that maintains the reality of a self, corresponding to the psycho-physical individual is called ātma-vāda, whereas, the view, approaching the doctrine of a permanent soul is 'pudgala-vāda', All Buddhists rejected the 'ātma-vāda', since Buddhism, philosopically means nothing else than 'dharmatā', the theory of dharmas, which is but another name for anātmatā or nairātmya. But there are two schools,—the vātsīputriyas and the sammittīyas–which are nevertheless, adherents of the pudgala-vāda. According to the exposition of vasubandhu, this means that the internal skandhas, at a given moment, constitute a certain unity which is related to them as fire to fuel. It doe snot have the absolute reality of a dharma nor is it included in the list of dharma, but nevertheless, it is not quite unreal. This pudgala is also regarded as surviving, since it is maintained that it assumes new elements at birth and throws them off at death For all other schools of Budhism, pudgala is but another name of ātman. That the position of the vātsīpatriyas is wrong i.e , not in strict conformity with the dharma-theory is evident since this theory admits no real unity whatsoever between separate elements. Therefore, self, soul, personality, individual, living being,

human being—all these conceptions do no aswer to ultimate realities; they are but names for some combinations of dharmas i.e., formulas of elements. (vide The Central Conception of Buddhism p. 58–59)

In the beginning, by pudgala was meant only the 'ego'—the self, behind mental states or skandhas, held to be discrete. The skandhas were taken to be real. Unity behind them was held to be mere construction and the unity was not that of a substance. The continuity of a stream, undergoing incessent change was mistaken as unity. This logic was extended to all the wholes. The whole is only a construction, it was said. This construction is called satkāyadṛiṣṭi. The 'dharmas' that are real are constructed to have a 'pudgala'. (vide The Yogacara Idealism p. 3)

2. dharma-nairātmya

In early Buddhism, difference, change and particularity were objectively real while only one aspect of experience was subjective. The early docrine, therefore, receives the name of 'No-Soul' and 'No-Substance' doctrine. The Mādhyamikas, repudiated, for the first time, the reality of experience as such. The whole is unreal, they argued. The discrete and momentary elements, that the whole was supposed to rest on, were, also equally unreal. The Yogācāra also resorted to the subjective analysis of experince made by early schools of Buddhism. The acceptance the objective existence of dharmas appeared to the yogācāra, illogical. The number of 'real' dharmas originally held by sarvāstivāda was

seventy-five. The sautrāntikas reduced it to fort-three. The whole thing was relegated to the realm of the subjective at the hands of 'yogācāra. The new doctı ine, therefare, receives the name of 'No-Element' (dharma-nairātmya) doctrine. (vide The Yogācāra Idealism p. 14–15).

Sarvjñatva—'universality of consciousness', or omnisience. 'The Buddhist saint, the Ārya, the Bodhisattva, is credited with the faculty of apprehending the universe *sub spacie alternitaties*. The Buddha alone possibly intuits ıhe undifferentiated Absolute, the ordinary yogins can intuit only its subject-object aspect. When he has reached the dṛṣṭimārga, all his habits of thought are changed and he directly intuits by mystic intuition (yogi-pratyakṣa) that condition of the world, which reveals itself to the monistic philosopher. This is called omniscience "(sarva-ākāra-jñatā, sarvajñatā)". Vide Buddhist Logic. vol. II. p. 56, 32, fm.

Yogācāra, though it accepted the Mādhyamika doctrine that experience is entjrely subjective, could not reject it as illusory. To the Mādhyamika, subjectivity breeds unreality and itself too is unreal. To the Yogācrāa, on the otherhead, subjectivity is real. Unlike the Mādhyamika, it sought to esıablish that phenomena is rooted in some reality. A groundless appearance is unintelligible, holds the yogācāra. But this ground cannot be objective as that has been successfully demolished by Mādhyamika and Sautrāntika. The only alternative left to the Yogācāra

was, therefore, to urge that subjectivity is in itself real and that only its objective projections are unreal Consciousness is the only reality and everything else that appears in experience is within experience, it concludes. (vide The Yogācāra Idealism p. 14–16).

5. The subject is supposed to be the cause (ālambana-pratyays) of its knowledge and causality implies a determinate temporal sequence. The object—the cause, therefore, must precede what it stands in causal relation to'—its cognition. (pv. II. 247). But as everything is but momentary, it perishes by the time its cognition is effected (Abhikoṣa 2.43). As such, it cannot be perceived by knowledge (kṣaṇasya jñānena prāpayitumaśakyatvāt. Nyāyabindutīkā. p. 16). In knowledge, therefore, something appears which is no longer existent (na avidyamānasya svarupeṇa darśanam, hetutvena ca jñānāt pūrvatvam. Pūrvatve ca kṣaṇikatayā na jñānakāle āsit. P. V. p. 108).

The Sarvāstivāda anticipated these difficulties, and so according to it, the object is the cause of cognition in the ordinary sense of the term. There is no determinate temperal sequence in the cause-effect relation of an object and its cognition. They flash together. An object and its cognition live at the same moment. A moment of consciousness and a moment of an objective dharma (ālambana) emerge in knowledge. Knowledge does not cognise a dead antecedent. (vide The Yogācāra Idealism p. 22, p. 24, p. 55).

6. The Mādhyamika repudiates the doctrine of reality of experience. The whole being unreal, the discrete elements too are unreal. Everything is but subjective or in other words, relative; everything is known as related to something else than that. Nothing is known in isolation. Appearance is only phenomenal (samvṛti) and not absolute (paramārtha).

7. Four distinct theories of pariṇāma or chage were sponsered by different teachers of the Sarvāstivāda school of early Buddhism. Bhadanta Dharmatrāta explained change as trasformation of modes (bhāvānythātva). A dharma or element remains identical in its essence qua substance throughout (past, present and future) but its bhāva or modes—its form and and quality change. (atītānāgata-pratyutpannasya bhāvasyā'nyathātvam bhavati na dravyasyā'nyathātvam. Sphuṭārtha V. 26 a-b. Vide also Sarvāstivāda. p. 9).

Vasubandhu has characterised this theory of Dharmatrāta as identical with the doctrine of pariṇāma of the Saṅkhya School 'which explains continuity (santati) as the manifestation in the constant substance, of another dharma on the disappearance of any other dharma' (kā ce'yaṁ santatiriti ? Kim yathā sāṁkhyānām avasthita-dravyasya dharmāntara-nivṛttau dharmāntara-prādurbhāvaḥ ? sphutārthaḥ II. 36. Vide also Sarvāstivāda p. 11). This is known as 'dharmapariṇāma in Yoga school of philosophy (Yogasūtra III. 13). The idea is that one dharma gives place to another dharma in

the dharmin—the common substratum of both that remains constant and unchanged.

It has to be borne in mind however, that Dharmatrāta, as a teacher of Buddhism, could not possibly have had the Sāṁkhya-yoga concept of change. To him, dharmas are discrete essences that are conditioned (saṁskṛta)—subject to orignation, decay, continuity and impermamence but which never turn to non-being. The dharma, therefore, 'has two-fold function. It functions as the substratum of itself in its aspect of continuity and it is 'bhava' in its aspect of change'. The relation between substance and mode is, therefore, is one of identity-in-difference (anekānta or bhedābheda). The sautrāntika does not admit the possibility of any such relation subsisting between substance and mode. According to him, there is no substance apart from the 'transitory modes'. Feeling of continuity is only an illusion because of similarity. (vide Sarvstivāda p. 13–14).

Bhadanta Ghoṣaka characterised change or pariṇāma as the transformation of one temporal phase to another (lakṣaṇānyathātva). He meant to say that dharma, as essence, remains the same while the temporal phases thereof change by virtue of which the dharma is characterised as past, present and future. (Vide spuṭārtha V. 26 a–b, Vide also sarvāstivāda p. 14). 'A dharma passing through the times, is vested with a phase called 'past' when it is past and yet is not exclusive of its future and present phases' (pravartamāno 'tīto'tīta-lakṣaṇayuktaḥ

anāgatapratyutpannābhyāṁ lakṣaṇābhyāṁ aviyuktaḥ. AKB V. 26 a–b. Vide also sarvāstivāda p. 14) and so also is the case with the present and future phases.

Vasubandhu criticises this theory on the ground that it involves an apparent confusion in the sense that each dharma is supposed to posses three temporal phases. (adhvasaṁkaraḥ prāpnoti, sarvasya sarvalakṣaṇayogāt AKB. V. 26 a–b. Vide also Sarvāstivāda p. 15).

Bdadanta Vasumitra characterises change as 'variation of states, (avasthānyathātva). A dharma, according to him, is designated as possessed of a temporal phase (past, present or future) by virtue of the variation of the states of its causal function (kāritra) and not of essence. (avasthāntarato na dravyāntaratā iti. sphuṭārtha V. 26. Vide also Sarvāstivāda p. 19).

Vasubandhu approves this theory of change in-as-much-as it seeks to determine the three times by means of Kāritra or causal function. (te bhāvalakṣaṇāvsthānyathānyathikasaṁjñitāḥ/ tritīyaḥ śobhano' dhvānaḥ kāritreṇa vyavasthitāḥ// AK. V. 26. Vide also Sarvāstivāda p 19).

Bhadanta Buddhadeva conceives change as 'temporal relativity' (anyathānyathātva). A dharma, according to him, is differently designated as past or present or future only in reference to each other (purvāparmapeksyā'nyonya ucyate. AKB. 26. Vide also Sarvāstivāda p. 22).

Vasubandhu levels the same charges of incompatibilty of coincidence of the three times in one time as he did in case of Ghoṣaka (ekasmin evādhvani trayo'dhvānaḥ prāpnuvanti iti AKB. V. 26 Vide also Sarvāstivāda p 22).

To Yogācarā, duration obviously meant motion and causal connection exists between moments only, every existence being a flow of discrete moments. Entities disapear as soon as they appear. 'Constant destruction or renovation is inherent in every existence which is really a compact series of ever new moments' (Budhist Eogic Vol. II p. 93).

Any discussion on the theory of change entails a discussion on the doctrine of pratītya-Samutpāda or the theory of dependent origination. It is a theory of causation originally confined to the moral aspect only. This theory, at the beginning, sought to explain that all the elements (or nidānas) in the wheel of existance beginning with Avidyā and ending with jarāmaraṇa were causally conditioned.

With the shift of emphasis from ethics to logic in Buddism, the theory of dharmas (dharma-saṁketa) and that of momentariness (kṣaṇikatva) were put foward. The theory of dependent origination, was applied to the realm of dharma too as a law of causation. In Budhism, nothing is admitted to be qua snbstance. Continuity between one dharma and another, could not, therefore, be explained in the ordinary sense of causation. The cause is only an occasion by virtue of which the effect is conceived to appear (asmin sati idaṁ bhavati).

The Mādhyamika found fault with this view of causation. Causality cannot function but for a real relation between the related phenomena. It explained that since an effect is but dependent upon its cause for its appareance, it cannot be real (qua substance). Everything being dependent on everything else nothing is intrinsically real (pratītya yad yad bhavati na hi tāvat tad eva tat). The law of pratītyasamutapāda, therefore, according to it, does not signify temporal sequence of things but 'essential dependence of things (parasparāpekṣatva) and 'consequently their unreality'.

The Yogācāra admits of the reality of consciousness. It, therefore, sought to intrepret the law of dependent origination as involving the idea of temporal sequence. But this law of causation, according to it, is not applicable to the world of objective dharmas but to the moments of consciousness alone. Synchronisingly with the decay of one moment of consciousness, it argues, another moment thereof emerges notwithstanding the fact that there is no real continuity. (Vide Yogācāra Idealism p. 30).

8. Upacāra means 'calling a thing by a name which does not properly belong to it or attributing to an object a property which does not belong to it'. It is practically something as lakṣaṇā. (vide kvacit tādarthyādupacāraḥ. K. P. II. p. 53). Mammaṭha again, however, uses the word, upacāra in another sense when he says 'ubhaya-rupā ceyam śuddhā/ upacāreṇāmiśritātvāt// (K. P. II. p. 46).. Here he uses the word, in a sense similar to that of 'sāhitya-

darpana' (uapcārā hi nāmātyantaṁ viśkalalitayoḥ sādṛśyātisayamahimnā bheda-pratītisthaganamātraṁ. S. D. Kārikā 14. p. 47). Upacāra or metaphor consists in simply concealing the apprhension of difference between two things which are altogether distinct, on the strength of extreme likeness of the two; as that of fire and a boy called 'mānavaka'. This second meaning is used in a 'pāribhāṣika' sense peculiar to the alaṁkāra-śāstra. The 'Nyāyavārtika' on N. S. II. 63 says 'atacchabdasya tacchabdenābhidhānamupacāraḥ; yathā yaṣṭhikā-śabdena dravyaviśeso'bhidhīyate iti; yaṣṭhikā-śabdāt tu punaḥ sāhacaryād brāhmaṇa-viśeṣo'bhidhīyate; yathā yaṣṭhikāh praveśayeti. Abhinavagupta in Locana (p. 51) says 'upacāro gunavṛttirlakṣaṇā'. According to Mallinātha it means 'atattvasya tattvena vyapadeś'aḥ' (S. D. P. 59–60). The Abhidhāmātṛkā' explains it as 'yatra vastvantaramupacaryate yathā gaurvāhika iti (kā 2).

9. The aggregate does not exist qua substance apart from its parts and thus is not capable of being the object of the cause of the perception which appears as if it is the aggregate itself. Thus for the thesis of aggregate, though there is form, there is no causality.

10. For thesis of the atoms on the contrary, though there is causality, there is no form.

11. According to Vinītadeva, Vāgbhaṭa is an advocate of such an opinion. (vide Alamvanaparīkṣā. p. 97).

According to Ku'ichi, this was the thesis of sanghabhadra too (vide Pussion's siddhi p. 52, Paramānūnāmavicchinadeśānām sajātīyānām yugapadgrahaṇe sthūla iti mānaso vibhramo bhavati. Ālamvanaparīkṣā p. 97) The early sarvāstivādin also might have been the advocates of it. Vide Tattwasaṁgraha: 'tathā nairantaryasthitānekasūkṣmatattatpadārthasaṁvedanato' yamekatvavibhramaḥ ityadoṣaḥ. vide A. Parīkṣā. p. 97).

12. Because, qualities inhere in 'dravya' only

13. There might have been the 'upacāra' of fire in water.

14. 'Jāti' is 'guṇa-niṣṭha' and as sneh 'guṇas' are inseparably associated with 'Jāti'. 'Tīkṣṇatva' and 'kapilatva', therefore, are inseparably associated with the 'agnijāti' or the genus of fire. There is thus the aforesaid upacāra of the jāti of fire on the boy.

15. Tīkṣṇatva or kapilatva is found in the boy and not confined to the jāti of fire. It is at the same time, found in the boy and not in all boys or in all men. It is found in animals that are other than man. Even in the same boy or in the same man again, it is sometimes present and not always.

16. If 'tīkṣṇatva' or 'kapilatva' is inseparably associated with the 'agnijāti' and at the same time, it is equally present in the boy, then logically, the jāti of fire, should be present in the boy too.

17. Because, the substratums being different, the oualities can not be identical to each other.

18. It refers to the doctrine of adṛśya-anupalabdhi of the Sānkhyas that maintain that Matter (pradhāna) and souls (puruṣa) are not sensibilia-not individually distinct. They are only metaphysical (sūkṣma-atīndriya). Their non-perception alone (anupalabdhi-pratyakṣa-nivṛtti-mātraṁ) does not entail apodictic-negative judgement (abhāva-niścaya) : They are cognised by sāmānyatodṛsta-anumāna. Buddhist Legic. Vol. II p. 78

19. The reality of a substance being denied, any difference between the categories of substance and quality is also denied. Theie is no inherence of qualities in substance. Both sānkhya and Buddhism share in common a tendency to push the analysis of Existence up to its minutest last elements which are imagined, as absolute qualities'. Buddhist Legic vol. I. p. 19.

20. The Buddhist theory of Negation is a direct consequence of the Buddhist theory of judgement. The fundamental form of the judgement, is the perceptial judgement or what is the same-the name-giving judgement, of the pattern-this is a jar. Such a judgement is contained in every conception referred to objective reality and in this sense conception and judgement became convertible terms. Negation consists, therefore, in repelling an attempted perceptive judgement and for this reason every negation is a negation of sensibilia, of such objects which can be imagined as present. The negation of the presence of an invisible ghost is just only a negation of its presence i. e., of its visible form. But the Realists and Rationalists, the vaiśeṣikas and the Sānkhyas

speak of supersensuous objects, objects which are invisible by their nature, objects which can never be present to the senses, which are non-sensibilia. The negation or non-perception of such objects is a non-perception of the unperceivable. Non-perception of imagined sensibilia is a source of right knowledge, because it leads on to successful action. But the non-perception or negation of objects whose presence to the senses can not be imagined is not a source of knowledge, since it cannot lead to successful action. There is no knowledge, neither direct nor indirect about metaphysical objects. There are only problems i.e., questions. Matāpuysical objects are non-objects, metaphysical concepts are non-concepts, and metaphysical judgements are non-judgements."

Buddhist Logic Vol. I. p. 384-385.

21. In the Sānkhya system, the objective reality of the categories of substance and quality and the relation of inherence uniting them as well is admitted of. It admits of no separate existence of qualities. Qualities are but particular manifestations of a subtle entity. 'To every new unit of quality corresponds a subtle quantum of matter which is called 'guna' or quality, but represents a subtle substantive entity'. Ibid Vol. I. p. 19. Vide also. S. N. Das Gupta. History of Indian Philosophy. p. 243.

22. Here the word, 'ādı' possibly means to include the synonyms of ātmā i. e., pudgala and the like

23. Vipāka means the maturing influence of moral antecedents, while 'niṣyanda' means that 'obeying solely

the law of uniformity or homogenous production (sabhāgaja)—the next moment follows automatically (niṣyanda) on the former one'. (central Conception of Buddhism p. 28).

24. 'Generality, general ideas, are also conceived of as a kind of force, and it is christened by the name of 'nikāya-sabhāgatā, a conception intended to replace by a 'force' the substantial reality of the 'sāmānya' of other systems' Ibid. p. 20. Vide also Ab-k.II 41.

25. Ālaya is not simply what accumulates, it is also self-conscious. However, it is not self-contained as that would involve its being independent of other vijñānas and its being an ultimate truth.

26. "For the Buddhist, for whom there is no soul, and no substance altogether, the impressions become autonomous, they then receive the name of vāsanā which is sometimes explained as pūrvaṁ jñānam, sometimes as Sāmarthyaṁ i. e., a force, or the force, the force par excellence, which creates the world as it appears to naive realism; vikalpa-vāsanā can thus be compared to reason when it is charged with the task of an autonomous creation of the categories of our understanding. It is clear from the context that much of the business which in realistic systems devolves on the soul, is in Buddhism entrusted to vāsanā or vikalpa vāsanā."

Buddhist Logic. Vol. II. p. 293-294.

27. In later Buddhism, there being no external world and no cognition to apprehend it, a cognition introspective by nature apprehending its own self was

put forward as a theory. The 'universe was assumed to consist of an infinity of possible ideas which lay dormant in a storehouse of consciousness. Reality becomes cogitability and the universe is only the maximum of compossible reality. A Biotie Force was assumed as a necessary complement to the stored consciousness, a force which pushes into efficient existence the series of facts constituting actual reality."

Ibid. Vol. I. p. 13

28. Ātmabhāva-self-being or attainment of completeness of a cognition that requires three things (i) element of rūpa (ii) its conformity with the indriya (iii) mentation.

29. Sādhiṣthānam Indriya-rūpam nāma ca. Perception is explained as an inter-dependent appearance of three elements-one element of colour, one element of the sense-organ and one element of mentation that have their support in the Ālaya (or the Biotic force in the Ālaya).

30. Vijñānavādins are held to be divided into two different camps as sākāravādins, and Nirākāra-vādins. Vide Advaya-Vajra-Saṁgraha.

31. There are two forces that are supposed to be active in producing the highest degrees of trance, the unconscious trance (asanjñi-samāpatti) and the cessation-trance (nirodha-samāpatti) or catalapsy. (Vide. Abh. K. II. 46. Vide also Central Conception of Buddhism. p. 20.

32. The Buddhists propound the functional interdependence of the sense, the sensibilia and the images and do not admit of any Ego or 'any instrumentality of the senses or any grasping of the object. There is no fetching of the form and no delivering of it to the Soul. There are sensations and there are conceptions and there is a co-ordination a kind of harmony between them. Co-ordination of the object with its image and the image itself are not two different things, they are the same thing differently viewed." Buddhist Logic. Vol. II. p. 68.

33. 'because, the object upon which it is intent, is the second moment of the external object, this second moment of the object being the product of its preceding first moment and the first moment is the object grasped by pure sensation." Buddhist Logic Vol. II. p. 319-20.

34. 'The resulting event is always indifferent in the moral sense, because it is the natural outflow of a previous cause, and is supposed not to be produced voluntarily.'' (Central conception of Buddhism. p.27).

35. "To the early Buddhistic schools, Samjñā meant 'ideas as that are defined as operations of abstract thought, as that which abstracts (udgrahaṇa) a common characteristic sign (nimitta) from the individual objects. Even the definite representation of a colour is brought under this head. It is exactly what in later Indian philosophy, Buddhist as well as Brahmanical, was understood by 'definite' (sva-vikalpa) cognition. Dignāga and Dharma-kīrti introduced into Indian Logic the distinction between

pure sense-knowledge, free from any operation of abstract thought(kalpanāpoḍha) and definite cognition (savikalpa). It was then adopted by Udyotkara and the whole of Nyāya-vaiśeṣika school. It now appears that Dignāga was not the originater of this doctrine, he only adopted it to his system. From the very beginning Buddhism had established this difference. Vijñāna and its synonyms-citta, manaḥ represent pure sensation, the same as Kalpanāpoḍha pratykṣa of Dignāga and Sanjñā corresponds to definite ideas. Every construction (kalpanā) every abstraction (udgrahaṇa), every definite representation, such as blue and yellow, long and short, male and female, friend and enemy, happy and miserable-this is all brought under the head of ideas (samjñā) as distinguished from Vijñāna or pure sensation."

(Central Conception of Buddhism p 15-16)

36. Cetanā is a mental effort that preceeds action It is an element or force 'that enters in the composition of a personal life.' But there being no 'personal will' in Buddhism, 'cetanā' is supposed to be an element or force that arranges the 'element in streams according to certain laws. (Ibid p. 16)

37. These are present in a latent form, they stick to the elements of pleasure and pain and bring them into a state of commotion and prevent them comming down to rest.

38. Every existence according to the Yogācāra, without exception is split into discreie moments. Every stability, every duration is a construction, an integration of moments (kṣana-santāna). Elements have no

duration, every moment represents a separate element; thought is evanescent, there are no moving bodies, but consecutive appearances, flashings of new elements in new places' Vide Central Conception of Buddhism p. 61. as also Buddhist Logic. p. 121.

39. Cessation of the factors that make for pravṛtti or proceeding in the life of limitation fraught with sukha, duhka, puṇya and apnṇya. It might also mean the knowledge of impermanence of the entities that are misconceived as permanent.

40. As when one says 'I am ashamed of myself' one distinguishes between 'I' and 'myself' and this 'I' is singled out of myself.

41. Non-sensuous consciousness arising not from an organ of sense but from consciousness itself-from its preceding moment; when the preceding moment takes the place of a support or an organ for a non-sensuous idea.

42. In this case, it may not be spoken out as such, but still within the mind iiself, at such a stage, one speaks to oneself.

43. The word, spraṣṭavya might have a wider implication meaning all the object of cognition-viṣaya in general. It should be also noted that the reading 'spraṣṭavyaviṣeṣe eva pratyāhṛte' (nominative absolute) would have been better and more Cogent.

44. Vide Kārikā 29.

45. This stage unless well-culivated and till one reaches Buddha-hood, cannot be acquired.

46. To consider that the soul by means of having attained purity through the performance of rituals and customs would achieve freedom and transcend this world of existence.

47. It has no independent existence as an entity by itself—it only exists as a mere state of difference.

48. Mithyajiva-en. Vide Kosa. IV. pp. 165. 189.

49. 'In the initial stage (anatyuha-avasthāyām) it is simply a move of will, when emerging into the conscious plane (atyuha-avasthāyām) it becomes a certain thought'. Vide. The Central Conception of Buddhism, p. 87.

50. "Vitarka and vicāra are sub-conscious operations of the mind. Vitarka is an indistinct murmur of the mind which is searching after its object. In this initial stage it is simply a move of will; when emerging into the conscious plane, it becomes a certain thought. Vicāra is also an indistinct murmur of the mind, but it is attempting to fix its object; it has the same two stages; it is also characterised as a refinement of the coarser vitarka. Since both these functions are associated with sense-consciousnes, they very nearly approach the Kantian doctrine of synthesis of apprehension preceded by the mind running through a variety of sense-impressions, so far as they are sub-conscious operations of the mind preceeding a definite sense-perception. The Vaibhāṣikas maintain that there is some vitarka in every movement of consciousness; they then call it svabhāva-vikalpa; but vasubandhu seems to admit

'pure sensation' without any participation of discursive thought'' Vide Ibid. p. 87–88. Vide also Abh. Kosa I. 30. II. 33)

51. The reading in Sylvan Levi's text is 'Kāmavyāpāradavihiṁsā' which seems to be misleading. It should be 'Kāmavyāpādavihiṁsa' as read in the text published by the 'Gita-dharma' Press, Varanasi.

51. (a) Every samanantara-pratyaya is limited to its own stream.

52. Manovijñāna has two-fold function (i) perceiving the perception (ii) having the sense of the subject—the self.

53. Vide illustration Buddhist Logic II. p. p. 311-12.

54. Vide Ibid. p. 50.

55. It should read—'Vāsanānanugṛhīta' as otherwise it becomes meaningless.

56. According to Abhidharma, consciousness is imagined as a separate element of pure consciousness which accompanies every cognition. Buddhist Logic II. p. 20. Central Conception of Buddhism. p. 16.

57. The popular exoteric systems agree in defining 'Nirvāṇa' negatively as a state of absolute exemption from the circle of transmigration, as a state of entire freedom from all forms of existence—a state of indefference to all sensibility. Positively, they define 'Nirvāṇa' as the highest state df spiritual bliss, as absolute immortality through absorption of the soul into itself, but preserving individuality, so that Buddhas after entiring Nirvāṇa may reappear on earth.

58. The twelve links indicate that Vijñāna has saṁskāra as its pratyaya while the saḍvijñānakāyas have nāmadhātu as their pratyayas.

51. (a) Because in that case, the vijñānas should in all logical sense be discrete elements—e. g. $A > A^1$, $A^1 > A^2$. If in these stages, the moment of new birth at every stage has a vijñāna that is suppsed to have saṁskāra, then for the reason of having continuity—these vijñānas are discrete elements and so also are the saṁskāras and thus once they are extinct, they are extinct for good. It leads to niranvaya-vināśa.

59. Because it is single discrete element and not a flux.

60. Kleśa-prahāṇa is meaningful only when you admit Kleśa and Kleśa-pratipakṣa dharmas. But those who admit only Kleśa-prahāṇa and nothing like kleśa apart from its pratipakṣa it is admitted by them in-as-much-as there cannot be any kleśa in the seed-form in case there is no ālaya. Possibly it refers to some kleśa-vāda school. Vide Aṣṭadaśa-nikāya-śāstra.

61. Kleśas and upakleśas are the 'sahabhū' of the 'kliṣṭa-citta'.

62. The unconditioned nature of paratantra is pariniṣpanna.

63. Parikalpita means an imagined externality independent cf 'vijñāna'.


Paratantra means what is conditioned crigination but it does not extened to vijñāra.

Parinispanna means the unconditioned nature of 'paratantra' free from all imaginary instruction (i.e. the ultimate nature of elements). The Vijñānavādins do not deny the existence of the elements that actuate construction (i.e., the citta and the caitasikas) but what they deny is but the externality thereof.

64. The Sarvāstivada hold a different view.

65. Because they would cease to be concrete elements and would become abstract like 'anityatā'.

66.



According to the 'sarvāstivāda', when the element of 'Jāti' functions in favour of *a*, *a* comes into being, and when the element 'utpāda' functions in favour of *a*, *a* grows. Thus, the element of 'Jāti' is different from the element of 'utpāda' and each of them is different from *a*. The element and the functioning thereof is also different. Such a view is not tenable according to the 'vijñānavāda.

67. Hsüan Chuang mentions them as follows :
an illusory image, an mirage, an object of dream, an image reflected on a mirror, a shadow, a reverbation, a reflected moon and a 'nirmānakāya'. These eight dharmas are also referred to in the Madhyantavibhanga śāstra. Vide K'ui c hi. 17.51. p. 31. The 'nirmāna-kāya' is a liberated soul but appears to be subject to human love and affection. The subject object duality is there.

68. 'Parāvṛtti' is not a mere negative idea. It is also a positive one in the sense that it has activity too.

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